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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
During the late 1970's and, above-all, in the early 1980's the nature of the youth labour 
market in Britain altered radically. Unemployment, and particularly youth unemployment rose 
rapidly. By July 1982, unemployment rates for sixteen and seventeen year olds were up to two and a 
half times the overall figure. The response by the government was the introduction and rapid 
expansion of direct intervention in the youth labour market. In 1978, the Youth Opportunities 
Programme (YOP) was introduced. This offered a period of up to six months work experience 
primarily with private employers. Over the period 1978-83, the scheme rapidly expanded until it was 
replaced by the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) in April 1983. YTS initially provided a one year 
period of work experience with an employer including at least thirteen weeks off-the-job training. 
The employer received a government grant to cover the young person's basic wage (which could be 
increased by employers if they so wished) and a fixed contribution towards the cost of training.
If there is a central theme running through this thesis, it is that of youth unemployment, or 
more accurately, youth non-employment. In the context of the two phenomena noted above - the 
rapid increase in unemployment and the expansion of government training schemes - the labour 
market for young people changed substantially during the seventies and eighties Movement from 
school to employment became an exception rather than the rule. Whereas in January 1975, 95% of 
male, and 96% of female, sixteen year-old school-leavers were in employment, the corresponding 
figures for ten years later were 32% and 35% respectively K It is the purpose of the thesis to analyse 
some of the consequences of these changes. The study concentrates on a group of young people 
reaching the minimum school-leaving age of sixteen in the academic year 1983/84. It considers some 
aspects of their experiences over the following two-year period. The central issues dealt with are the 
determinants of the school-leaving decision in the context of high unemployment, and the impact of 
YTS on the employment prospects and wages of participants.
1 The figures given for both years are likely to be overestimates, in as much as they are based on data published 
periodically by the Department of Employment on the Education and Labour Market Status (ELMS) of 16-18 year olds 
(see, for example, DE Gazette, September 19*7, pp. 459-464). The DE data gives employment as a residual category 
also including the labour force. It is plausible that the number of discouraged workers leaving the labour
force was larger in the later period in the context of higher unemployment If this is true, the relative change would 
actually be greater than the figures suggest. See also the notes to figure 1.5.
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It is evident that in dealing with the experiences of individuals, much of the larger picture is 
left implicit. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a discussion of some of the broader issues 
With regard to the analysis of school-leaving, it is possible to compare the findings presented in 
chapter three with previous studies of school-leaving in periods of relatively low unemployment, 
such as Rice (1987) and Micklewright (1989). The analysis of YTS does not allow such direct 
comparison. YTS was introduced precisely as a means to deal with the problem of youth 
unemployment, therefore comparison with a period of low unemployment is of little value 
Consequently, it is important to provide an initial discussion of some of the wider issues Analysing 
the impact on individuals of participation on a training scheme leaves aside the question of the 
macro-level effects. In particular, the relative roles of aggregate demand and labour costs in 
determining the level of unemployment are of central importance in an assessment of whether the 
scheme played, or could have played, a role in reducing unemployment. If unemployment is caused 
by excessive labour costs, then any measure which leads to a reduction of such costs will have a 
beneficial macroeconomic impact. On the other hand, if unemployment is caused by inadequate 
demand, the potential for beneficial macro-level effects is more limited. In this context, it is likely 
that the existence of a widespread temporary employment and training subsidy is likely to have some 
positive effects on the overall demand for labour, however, in the absence of a generalised expansion 
of aggregate demand, it seems probable that any improvement in the employment prospects of YTS 
participants would be achieved principally at the expense of those who did not choose to join the 
scheme, or of older workers who did not have the opportunity to do so.
Section 1.1 provides some background information on the evolution of the situation facing 
youths in Britain during the 1970's and 1980's This allows a first consideration of the some of the 
underlying issues. Section 1.2 considers the question of youth unemployment in more detail, 
providing a review of studies analysing the causes. The central question here regards the relative 
importance of aggregate demand and relative youth wages in determining the level of youth 
unemployment. It is shown that while all the studies considered find an important role for aggregate 
demand, the contribution of high relative youth wages is by no means demonstrated. On the other 
hand, it is evident that the government's thinking was more sympathetic to analyses placing stress on 
the importance of wages. The section also discusses both why youth unemployment should
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constitute a particular cause for concern, and why it was seen to do so. As regards the first aspect, 
attention is focused on the long-term loss of productive potential implied by unemployment early in a 
person's life. It is also suggested that the reasons why youth unemployment was considered a serious 
problem had more to do with the short-term destructive potential of disaffected youth. Section 1.3 
goes on to consider some of the issues underlying the government's response to youth 
unemployment. The implementation of exclusively micro-level policies such as YTS is consistent 
with the government's view that excessive wages and wage expectations were to blame for the 
problem. In discussing the development of the scheme, however, it is also important to recognise 
that YTS was part of a wider strategy. It was not just a means of improving the employment 
prospects of young people. In section 1.4, an outline of the thesis is provided, drawing out the 
implications for the rest of the study of the considerations provided in this chapter.
Section 1.1 - Youths In and Out of the Labour Market: an overview.
The study presented here was principally motivated by a concern for the remarkably high 
levels of unemployment, and more specifically youth unemployment, observed in Britain in the early 
1980's. In common with other Western economies2, unemployment in Britain rose rapidly in the late 
seventies and early eighties following the two oil price shocks. An important characteristic of this 
increase was its uneven distribution across different age-groups. In particular, it was the young who 
bore the brunt of the increase in terms of the level of unemployment rates. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show 
unemployment rates by age over the period 1971-93 for males and females respectively. The figures 
report annual moving averages (based on quarterly data) in order to smooth out seasonal variation, 
the numerous changes in the compilation of unemployment statistics since 1979, and the constant 
revision of estimates of the size of the labour force by age. In interpreting the figures, h should also 
be observed that from September 1988 onwards, young people under the age of eighteen were no 
longer eligible for supplementary benefit. Since, in Britain, unemployment statistics are compiled on 
the basis of those registering to receive benefit, this change in the law effectively removed this age- 
group from measured unemployment. Following this date, statistics of unemployment rates for 16-17
2 Numerous studies have considered the increases in unemployment in Europe, and more generally in Western 
economies, in this period. See, in particular, Bean, Layard & Nickell (1986)
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year olds were no longer published, although registered unemployment amongst this group did not 
entirely disappear3, as is evident from figure 1.3 on unemployment duration presented below.
The greater cyclical variation in the unemployment rates of the younger age-groups is evident 
from the figures. The picture is fairly similar for both males and females, although the unemployment 
rates of females tend to be somewhat lower than for males. From 1983 onwards, the unemployment 
rates of 16-17 year olds was surpassed by that of 18-19 year olds. A part of the explanation for this 
may be sought in the expansion of government schemes which, until at least 1986, were aimed ever 
increasingly at the youngest labour market participants This may have had the effect of shifting 
unemployment from 16-17 year olds to the 18-19 year old age group in two ways. Firstly, through 
the direct substitution of 18-19 year old employees by 16-17 year old YTS participants, and, 
secondly, through the delayed entry of YTS participants into unemployment. Finally, the 16-17 year 
old population reached a peak in 1982, after which it gradually declined. For obvious reasons, the 
18-19 year old age-group followed the same pattern two years later, and the unemployment rates 
also reflect this demographic change to some extent.
Given the amount of manipulation which the underlying data have gone through, both before 
and after they reached me, one should not take the interpretation of the figures too far. The central 
point that the unemployment rates of young people rose much more than those of adults, however, is 
not in doubt. From a situation in which there was very little difference between unemployment rates 
across age-groups in the early 1970's, during the late 1970's and early 1980's, youth unemployment 
rates rose to at least two and a half times the levels of adults.
The second important characteristic of unemployment regards duration. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 
provide figures on uncompleted unemplpyment duration for males under eighteen and for males of all 
ages over the period 1971-1993. The figures suggest that for both groups, increasing unemployment 
arose out of a reduction in outflows indicated by the lengthening of unemployment spells rather than 
through variations of the inflows into unemployment proxied by uncompleted durations of less than a 
week which remained virtually constant over the period4. The principal difference between the two
3 There were a few exceptions to the disqualification of 16-17 year olds. These are detailed in Unemployment 
Unit/Youthaid (1989).
4 Pissarides (1986) demonstrates this point with regard to overall levels of unemployment using aggregate flow data. 
In the case of the younger age-group. a slight variation in inflow-rates is observable. From 1983 to 1987 the rale 
remained at a noticeably higher rate than previously. Subsequently, there was a rapid felling off in the rate coinciding 
with the exclusion of under-eighteens from supplementary benefit.
figures is the much larger proportion of the "all males" group remaining in unemployment for over a 
year The impression gained from the four figures taken together is that whilst the incidence of 
unemployment was much higher for young people, the duration of unemployment was greater for 
adults. The figures may, however, overstate the case. Jobless seventeen year olds remaining in 
unemployment for a substantial period of time necessarily become unemployed eighteen year olds. 
That is, exit from long-term unemployment of 16-17 year olds will, in part, be due to movement into 
another age-group and not exit from unemployment. Secondly, exits from the unemployment figures 
not due to age did not necessarily imply entry to employment. One may observe that unemployment 
.inflow rates for 16-17 year olds increased from 1982 onwards and remained relatively high until 
1988 when young people were effectively disqualified from claiming social security benefit. At the 
same time, overall unemployment in this group was falling. Part of the explanation for this may be 
found in the increasingly compulsory nature of YTS participation. That is, over this period, refusal to 
take up the offer of a YTS place was increasingly considered sufficient to disqualify social security 
claimants on the grounds that they were not actively seeking work5. Thus, exit from registered 
unemployment did not necessarily mean entry into a job.
The statistics on unemployment may be put in the wider context of the education and labour 
market status (ELMS) of young people. Attention here is focused on sixteen year olds. Figures 1.5 
and 1.6 present information on the ELMS of sixteen year olds over the period 1974-89 for males and 
females respectively. The transformation of the ELMS of young people over the period is 
immediately obvious. The principal change which emerges clearly from the figures is the drastic 
reduction in the proportion of sixteen year olds in employment6. This was followed by a stabilisation 
of the percentage in employment towards the mid-1980's. The reduction came about in two main 
phases During the 1970's there was a relatively gradual decline of the numbers finding work, which 
was followed in the early 1980's by a rapid fall. For males, the first phase corresponds to the period' 
1974-80, during which time the percentage in employment fell from 62% to 51%. Between 1980 and
1983, this percentage dropped sharply from 51% to 23%, following which the percentage continued 
to fall but at a much reduced rate until 1988 when the employment of sixteen year old males showed
5 See, for example, Finn (1988). A necessary condition for the award of social security and (insured unemployment) 
benefit for the unemployed was that the recipient actively sought work. Refusal of a job offer (or a YTS placing) could, 
be taken to imply that the recipient was not fulfilling this condition.
6 The considerations of note 1 above might be borne in mind.
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some signs of recovering. As regards females, the percentage in employment fell from 60% in 1974 
to 42% in 1980. between 1980 and 1983, this percentage precipitated from 42% to 16% after which 
it started to rise gradually.
The fall in employment was accompanied by increases in unemployment, participation in 
post-compulsory education, and, after 1978, participation on government schemes. It is not possible 
to draw many inferences about the direction of causation between these interrelated phenomena, 
however, one or two observations are pertinent. The first is obvious and regards unemployment and 
government intervention. The fall in employment was accompanied by increases in unemployment in 
the early seventies and by rapid increases in both unemployment and participation on YOP in the 
early eighties. As regards the latter aspect, it is not possible to say what would have happened in the 
absence of the government scheme. On the one hand, YOP (discussed in more detail below) was a 
programme for unemployed people, therefore prior unemployment was a necessary condition for 
joining. On the other, the scheme undoubtedly involved a substantial degree of displacement of jobs 
which would have existed even in its absence7. What is evident from the figure is that by 1983 YOP, 
and subsequently YTS, had replaced employment as the principal labour market experience of 
sixteen year-olds.
A rather clearer impression emerges from the consideration of participation in further 
education. The potential effects of unemployment (and government programmes) on participation in 
further education is considered in chapter three. As is noted there, the effects are not entirely 
straightforward, particularly when it comes to operationalising the underlying concepts. This is 
reflected in the empirical analysis which does not provide conclusive evidence as to the direction of 
the effects. On the one hand, unemployment will lead to a lowering of the opportunity cost of further 
education and thereby encourage participation. On the other, it may reduce the expected returns 
from education and, therefore, reduce it8. There is some support for the opportunity cost argument 
that increasing unemployment rates lead to a rise in post-compulsory participation rates between 
1974 and 1976. In this period, unemployment of sixteen year olds rose from 4% of males and 3% of 
females to 7% of both groups. At the same time, educational participation rose from 34% to 39% for
7 I am not aware of any studies of the displacement effects of YOP. For YTS, estimates vary from between a total 
displacement effect of between about 40% (Deakin & Pratten, 1987) and 80% (Begg et. al., 1991).
8 I add the italics because mnch depends on the modelling of expectations, and the differential between the 
unemployment rates of sixteen year old school-leavers and those obtaining post-compulsory qualifications.
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males and from 37% to 42% for females9. After 1976, the pattern diverged somewhat between boys 
and girls. The participation rate of boys remained more or less stable between 1976 and 1981. This 
was despite a sharp increase in their unemployment rates between 1980 and 1981. This provides 
some support for the idea that the rapid expansion of YOP had the effect, at least initially, of 
dampening the positive influence of unemployment on post-compulsory participation in education. 
The subsequent increase in participation rates (from 38% in 1981 to 44% in 1983), whilst 
unemployment was rising relatively little but government programmes continued to expand rapidly, 
might be justified by the growing disillusion expressed by young people at the failure of YOP to 
improve post-programme employment prospects (e.g. Finn, 1984). Between 1983 and 1984 
participation once again dropped, reflecting, perhaps, both the fall in unemployment and renewed 
faith in government intervention with the introduction of YTS. The participation rate subsequently 
remained stable, rising slightly in 1989 following the disqualification of sixteen year olds from 
claiming social security benefit in October 1988. The pattern of educational participation of females 
follows much more closely movements in unemployment. Participation increased as unemployment 
rates rose, and decreased when unemployment rates fell.
These types of argument should not be pushed too far on the basis of the rather superficial 
evidence presented in this section. It is clear, however, that there is a case to be made for the 
influence of labour market influences on participation rates in further education. In chapter three, the 
analysis of school-leaving returns to these issues. In particular, modelling problems arising from 
attempts to identify the various influences operating are dealt with in some detail. The discussion 
continues below with a consideration of the causes and consequences of youth unemployment.
1.2) Youth Unemployment: Causes and Consequences
Two questions regarding youth unemployment immediately arise. Firstly, why were 
unemployment rates so much higher for youths than adults ? Secondly, does it matter ? Answers to 
both questions are important in understanding the appropriate policy response as well as putting the
9 Using aggregate Hat?, Payne & Payne (1985) compare the influence of qualifications on the chances of finding work 
between a period of low unemployment (1974/5) and high unemployment (1976/81). They Sad th&t the differentuü 
rose. That is, that the gains to education increased. In this case, the future gains and opportunity cost effects should 
move in the same direction.
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policy actually implemented into perspective. Attempts to reply to the first question have centred 
around the relative importance of aggregate demand and youth relative wages. The answer to the 
second, depends, in part, on the response to the first. In order to understand the nature of the policy 
response, it is also important to answer the questions, what were the causes of youth unemployment 
perceived to be ? And, why did it matter to policy makers ? These issues are taken up in the 
discussion of the policy response in section L3.
1.2.1) The Causes o f Youth Unemployment
There are a number of reasons why one might expect youth unemployment to be particularly 
sensitive to changes in aggregate demand. On the supply side, it is often argued that young people 
are more likely voluntarily quit their job than older workers. The opportunity cost of doing so is 
lower for younger people. They will tend to have fewer skills and lower wages, and are less likely to 
"need" a job to support a family. Indeed, many will be living with their parents and, consequently, 
will tend not to be the principal income earner in the household. If voluntary quitting behaviour is 
less cyclically sensitive than job availability, one consequence will be that when the labour market 
tightens, unemployment will rise more amongst those groups with a higher likelihood of quitting 
Whilst it is likely that voluntary quits will fall during a recession, Moser (1986) shows that, in the 
USA, voluntary quits fall off markedly with age and are less cyclically volatile than "fires" by firms. 
The implication is that young people are more likely to quit jobs and that this behaviour is less 
sensitive to changes in aggregate demand than the demand for labour by firms, as measured by 
layoffs.
Perhaps more important are demand-side considerations. Firstly, the opportunity cost of 
firing young people is lower than for older workers. Being less skilled, they embody lower levels of 
investment by firms in training and consequently involve a smaller loss to firms making them 
redundant. Furthermore, young people will be less likely to be subject to employment protection 
legislation. This became increasingly true in Britain following successive modifications of the law 
after 1979. In particular, the qualifying period spent with one employer necessary before employment 
protection legislation could be invoked was raised from six months to two years. This measure 
affected young people disproportionately for obvious reasons. Indeed, the change in the law
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effectively excluded the youngest (16-17 year old) age group from employment protection. The 
expansion of youth training and employment programmes had the effect of reinforcing this 
movement away from legislative protection for young people. Almost all participants on YTS (and 
YOP) were classified for legal purposes as "trainees" and were therefore not subject to employment 
protection l e g i s l a t i o n ^  Taken in conjunction with the "two-year rule" mentioned above, this implies 
that large numbers of 18-19 year olds were also placed outside the aegis of this legislation 11 This 
again implies that young people would be cheaper to fire. Finally, one may point to the oft-cited 
industrial relations practice of "first-in-last-out" (Lynch & Richardson, 1982)12. Once again, the 
implication for young people is obvious. Thus, there are a series of reasons for which one might 
expect unemployment amongst young people to be particularly responsive to variations in the overall 
demand for labour.
The second principal explanation of youth unemployment centres around the purportedly 
high relative rates of pay. This point of view is much associated with the idea that unemployment is 
essentially a voluntary phenomenon, reflecting an inability of wage-rates to adjust sufficiently to 
changes in demand. From this perspective, youth unemployment is due to the fixing of artificially 
high relative wages for youths by trade unions, the high levels of social security benefits, and so on.
A number of analyses were undertaken in the first half of the 80's to consider the issue. The 
studies may be differentiated according to their underlying assumptions concerning market clearing. 
The simplest approach taken was based on the assumption, either implicitly or explicitly, that labour 
markets cleared. Examples of this approach are provided by the studies of Makeham (1980) and 
Lynch & Richardson (1982). In such an analysis, supply and demand considerations are entered into 
an unemployment equation. Employing this methodology, Makeham (1980) finds an important role 
for aggregate demand and none for relative wages. On the other hand, Lynch & Richardson (1982) 
find that the influence of relative wages, in the case of young males, depends on the variable 
employed to capture aggregate demand. That is to say, they find a statistically significant effect of 
the relative wages of young males when they included vacancies as their demand index. However,
10 They were also excluded from much health and safety at work legislation. See, for example, the considerations 
below and those presented in Lang (1983).
11 That is to say, following the period of work experience and/or training, YOP/YTS participants would have had to 
work with a «anglft employer for a further two years before claiming protection under this legislation.
12 This is not ¿nriepmrignt of the first point indeed, the lower opportunity costs of making young people redundant 
from the point of view of both workers and firms was presumably a prime mover in establishing the practice.
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the significance of the wage variable collapses when they use adult unemployment rates to capture 
demand. For young females, they find a statistically significant influence of relative wages in both 
cases.
Whilst one might quibble with the definition of particular variables in these studies, the 
principal objection concerns the market-clearing assumption. Studies which explicitly consider the 
possibility of non-market clearing have found the hypothesis to be supported, both at an aggregate 
level, and when the labour market is subdivided by age13.
Layard (1982) implicitly, and Hutchinson, Barr & Drobny (1984) explicitly incorporate the 
assumption of excess supply in the youth labour market. Consequently, both studies estimate demand 
for labour equations. Apart from the omnipresent influence of aggregate demand factors, Layard 
finds a high degree of substitutability between young and adult workers. The results of Hutchinson 
et. al. suggest both substitutability and complementarity between young male workers and various 
other groups. Using an employment function approach, Hutchinson et. al estimate a partial 
adjustment labour demand equation of the form:
( " W \
¿ y = 0 - * ) V i + *  a0 + a,Q + a2i + a3t2 + a,Hy+'^fil - ^ \  (1.1)
V >«i wt )
Where Hy is the average number of hours worked by young males, included to allow for adjustments
in the level of utilisation of youth labour, t is a time trend to incorporate exogenous technical change 
Wv
and the terms represent youth wages relative to other groups in the labour market. Using this
approach, they find that while young males are substitutes for adult females with 
are complementary to adult males so that
cL., '  
<0 , they
Although this analysis represents an improvement on the rather ad hoc approach adopted by, 
for example, Lynch & Richardson, the assumption of excess supply over the entire period of analysis 
(1949-69 for Layard, 1952-72 for Hutchinson et. al.) is problematic. Indeed, many writers would
13 See, in particular, Andrews (1983) and Andrews & Nickel] (1986) on the aggregate labour market, and the paper 
by Rice (1986) on young people considered below.
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argue that this period was more often characterised by excess demand. If true, this obviously implies 
that the authors are observing points on a supply rather than a demand curve.
Wells (1983), in a much publicised piece of work14 on male and female youth unemployment, 
allows for periods of both excess supply and excess demand. On the basis of a priori assumptions 
on the date of the switch from excess demand to excess supply, he estimates labour supply equations 
during periods of excess demand (1953-69 for males, 1953-71 for females) and labour demand 
equations for the succeeding period (until 1981). Wells finds an important role for both aggregate 
demand and relative labour costs for both females and males in explaining the period of excess 
supply. There are a number of problems with Wells' analysis as regards the definition and 
interpolation of crucial explanatory variables. Also, whilst Wells tests his model against a continuous 
market clearing one in which both labour supply and demand curves are identified, he does not 
consider the possibility of a switch from excess demand to supply at any other time. Junankar & 
Neale (1985) carry out various tests of specification, stability and robustness using Wells' data. They 
argue on this basis that Wells' model is poorly specified and his results not robust, breaking down 
completely when the more reliable New Earnings Survey data was employed in the place of the 
October (Earnings) Enquiry data used by Wells15.
A more satisfactory approach to the estimation of non-market clearing regimes was 
undertaken by Rice (1986). Rice estimates a model which: a) does not impose a priori assumptions 
on the timing of the switch from one regime to another (to determine this she uses the maximum 
likelihood procedure suggested by Maddala & Nelson (1974)), and, b) is based on rigorous 
theoretical considerations. She estimates unemployment equations separately for juvenile males and 
females allowing for a distinction between apparent and effective supply of labour. That is to say, a 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. The study once again finds that 
aggregate demand plays an important role in determining the level of unemployment. Beyond this, 
her results indicate that juvenile males are substitutes for both adult males and adult females. On the 
other hand, juvenile females are substitutes for adult males but are complementary to adult females. 
These results, although based on a more satisfactory model, are counterintuitive in as much as one
14 See, for example, the article in the Times (20/12/83) headlined, "Pay Cuts Would Create Jobs for Young People."
15 It may be noted that all the studies considered here, apart from that undertaken by Junankar & Neale, employ the 
October Enquiry data.
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would expect to find much more substitutability between juveniles (both male and female) and adult 
females with (perhaps) complementarity between juvenile and adult males, at least in occupations 
with a higher than average skills level. That is, one would expect complementarity between skilled 
and unskilled workers. In as much as adult males have, on average, higher skills levels than adult 
females, one would tend to expect complementarity between adult males and young people whilst 
adult females might more easily be substituted by younger workers.
The analysis undertaken by Rice marks an improvement on earlier attempts to model youth 
unemployment, however, a number of problems remain. She does not, for example, allow for the 
possibility of sectoral shifts which, independently of aggregate demand and relative wage factors may 
alter the structure of labour demand, particularly with the decline of manufacturing and the 
expansion of service industries. One might further mention that in her analysis, the possibility of 
capital substitution is ignored16. Finally, as with the Wells (1983) study, wage data is taken from the 
October Inquiry. Although similar tests of the robustness of Rice's findings using NES data have not, 
to my knowledge, been undertaken, the use of the less reliable source does cast some doubt on the 
results.
To summarise, the studies of the causes of youth unemployment in Britain considered here 
have all found that aggregate demand plays an important role. The findings on relative wage levels 
are mixed although there is some evidence to support the view that relatively high levels of youth 
wages have contributed to the disproportionately high levels of unemployment amongst young 
people. It might reasonably be suggested that both factors have been at work, although modelling 
and, more importantly, data problems have prevented unequivocal identification of the relative 
importance of wages On the basis of the evidence reported here, the potential effectiveness of a 
micro level policy, in isolation, may be questioned. That is, without a substantial increase in the level 
of economic activity in the economy, the potential for the enhancement of the employment prospects 
of youth through the provision of training and work experience will necessarily be limited. Evidently, 
the government did not share this point of view. It is hoped that the considerations presented in the 
following section throw some light on why such emphasis was placed on the youngest labour market 
entrants.
16 As noted above, whilst Hutchinson et. al. deal with this problem rather unsatisfactorily, they do at least recognise 
its existence.
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1.2.2) The Consequences of Youth Unemployment
It is pertinent at this point to consider whether the disproportionately high levels of youth 
unemployment should be a cause for concern. Does it matter that young people faced higher 
unemployment rates than adults ? It is possible to argue that, although young people faced 
particularly high levels of unemployment in the late seventies and throughout the eighties, the 
consequences of joblessness were likely to be less devastating for this group than for adults, 
particularly older adults (Bell et al., 1982).
The central point underlying such an argument regards unemployment duration. It is plausible 
to suggest that the adverse consequences of unemployment rise more than proportionately with the 
duration of the spell. Material hardship, physiological and psychological damage due to 
unemployment are all likely to increase more than proportionately with duration (Fagin & Little,
1984, Smith, 1987)17.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 support the view (with some qualification) that unemployment spells tend 
to be shorter for young people. Explanations for this may be sought in the same type of argument 
used above to substantiate high youth unemployment rates. Just as young people are cheaper to fire, 
so they will be cheaper to hire. Furthermore, they will be less affected by structural changes in the 
patterns of employment since they are less skilled and, more generally, more adaptable than older 
workers who are likely to be less able and willing to learn new trades. From this perspective, youth 
unemployment is essentially a temporary phenomenon which will tend to disappear once the 
economy picks up again. The demographic trends noted above, will also contribute to reducing the 
numbers of young unemployed.
On the other hand, two types of argument have commonly been used to justify special 
treatment of young people. Firstly, unemployment early in a person's *working' life may permanently 
impair his or her productive capacity. Human beings are, by their nature, more flexible and therefore 
more easily trained when they are young. The corollary to this is that patterns established at an early 
point in their "working" lives will tend to persist later on. Thus, whilst high aggregate levels of youth
17 riark & Oswald (1994), on the other hand, offer some evidence to suggest that the negative effect of 
unemployment on mental well-being decreases with duration, although differences in the effect of unemployment due 
to duration are not statistically significant.
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unemployment may be a temporary phenomenon, falling "naturally" through demographic change 
and a increase in economic activity in the economy1 ®, the consequences for the specific cohort going 
through a sustained period of unemployment are decidedly not. The unemployed young person may 
suffer permanent damage to his or her employment prospects as a result of a period of 
unemployment The person's actual and potential human capital will be reduced resulting in lower 
expected lifetime earnings.
Whilst such a reduction in human capital has direct consequences for the individual 
concerned, the implications for society as a whole are perhaps more important in understanding the 
institutional response to youth unemployment. If a large number of people have a permanently 
impaired productive capacity, if and when work becomes readily available they may not be able to fit 
into normal work patterns. Malinvaud (1982) argues along these lines, although using rather 
different language Seen from a slightly different perspective, in relation to the adverse consequences 
from long-term unemployment, it is now commonly argued19 that, for these type of reasons, long­
term unemployment has led to a rise in the 'natural' or 'Non-Accelerating-Inflation' rate of 
unemployment. It might be noted that this type of argument is by no means new. Similar arguments 
had been used in the 1930's. Thus, for example,
"it is hardly too much to say that, by exposing this generation of industrial workers to the most 
deadly effects of the present depression we are storing up elements which threaten to 
perpetuate depression by striking at the quality of future labour resources," (Jewkes & 
Winterbottom, 1933, p.5).
A second concern is with the consequences for society of the large scale alienation of youth. 
This type of argument has frequently been used in political debates. From this point of view, the 
consequences for society of prolonged spells of unemployment are more serious when the 
unemployed are young. From the individual's perspective, to remain unemployed for a long period of 
time is likely to have serious deleterious effects irrespective of age. However, whereas unemployed 
youths tend towards a violent and/or antisocial expression of their alienation, older people are more 
prone to less disruptive expressions of discomfort such as chronic depression, ill-health and suicide. 
Thus, concern, as expressed by policy-makers tends to focus on the potential threat posed by
18 One might question the extent to which this is true or would have been true in the UK without massive state 
intervention. See the comments to figures 1.5 and 1.6 above.
19 See, for example, Layard & Nickell (1987).
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alienated youth to the smooth-running (or even the existence) of society. G. Oakes, then Minister for 
Education in the Labour Government, speaking at a conference of educationalists expressed concern 
that rising youth unemployment implied that,
"a growing number of youngsters are bound to develop the feeling that society has betrayed 
them. Such feelings can easily lead to crime and, even more sinister, can provide a fertile 
ground for the breeding of various kinds of political extremism I do not think it is 
exaggerating to say that these factors pose a threat to the fabric of society as serious as that of 
armed conflict between nations," (quoted in Adams, 1978).
Again, the suggestion of a link between unemployment, crime and social conflict had been expressed 
previously. In the 1930's it had been argued that,
"unemployment, giving rise to lack of pocket money, often persuades young people into the 
path of crime. In order to obtain amusement and diversion from their idleness, these offenders 
turn to pilfering for funds to buy cigarettes, attend the cinema, etc.. Once the first step is taken 
in this direction, an early escape from detection encourages a repetition of this easy means of 
acquiring the desired money or petty luxuries," (County Borough of Newport, 1933, p.3).
Also,
"enforced idleness leads ultimately to demoralisation, to loss of pride in one's person and 
appearance, to envy of those better placed in society, and envy leads in the last resort to social 
conflict," (Meara, 1936, p. 19).
The extent to which such sentiments express reality has been the subject of some debate (Carr-Hill & 
Stern, 1983, Mungham, 1983, Jackson, 1986), however, in the context of widespread rioting 
throughout Britain, above-all in 1981 at the time that plans for YTS were being developed, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that fears of social unrest associated with youth unemployment had a strong 
conditioning effect on the design of policy.
On the basis of the first argument outlined above, it is possible to argue that the 
consequences of youth unemployment should be a legitimate object of particular concern. The 
permanent reduction in (potential and realised) human capital arising from unemployment early in life 
implies a vast wastage of resources. On the other hand, it is not immediately obvious that the short- 
run social costs associated with unemployment arising from demoralisation of the unemployed are
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greater for the young than for the old. The second argument is important, however, in that it helps to 
explain why youth unemployment became the subject of such acute government attention.
1.3) The Policy Response: YTS
The Youth Training Scheme was introduced in April 1983, becoming fully operational in 
September of that year. The scheme provided work experience and training lasting one year. The 
programme was intended to be principally private-employer based (mode A schemes), although a 
significant number of schemes were run by local authorities, voluntary organisations and, in some 
cases the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) itself (mode B schemes)20. Employers received a 
government grant to cover the training "allowance" paid to participants and a fixed contribution to 
training costs. In return employers were obliged to provide at least 13 weeks "off-the-job" training 
during the year. In the case of Mode B schemes, the MSC also funded the running costs of schemes. 
The level of the allowance paid to participants was fixed centrally, although this could be increased 
by employers if they so wished. The level of the weekly allowance was, in 1985, £26.25 which might 
be compared to average (gross) weekly earnings for 16-17 year olds at the time which were £69.50 
for young men and £64.70 for young women. On the other hand, the basic rate of social security 
benefits paid to the unemployed in this age-group was £17.30 per week.
1.3.1) The Context o f YTS: special programmes for young people
In 1974, the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) was created. Its role was,
"To make such arrangements as it considers appropriate for the purpose of assisting persons to 
select, train for, obtain and retain employment." (Employment and Training Act, 1973, section 
2)
Funded by the government but formally independent of it, the MSC introduced and oversaw a series 
of special employment and training measures. Young people, and particularly 16-17 year olds
20 The proportion of participants on Mode B schemes was 31% in 1983/4. This fell to 21% by 1985/6 (Gray & King, 
1986).
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increasingly became the principal target-group for these programmes, at least until 1985/6 
Subsequently, attention began to be focused also on the long-term unemployed (e.g. Maynard, 
1988), although, in absolute terms, support for the youngest age-group was not reduced.
In September 1976, the first initiative aimed directly at young people, the Work Experience 
Programme (WEP), was introduced. This provided a period of work experience with an employer to 
give a small number of young people under nineteen a positive alternative to unemployment.
In April 1978, WEP was superseded by the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP). This 
programme involved, most usually, a period of six months work experience and/or training with an 
employer. Some projects were sponsored by local authorities and short induction courses were also 
run by colleges of Further Education. Once again, the programme was open to under nineteen's who 
were paid an allowance by their sponsor funded by the MSC. Initially, the allowance was £20.55, 
rising to £25 per week by the time YOP was replaced by YTS in 1983.
During its existence, YOP was increasingly the object of criticism. It was argued that YOP 
simply provided free temporary labour for employers without giving anything of lasting benefit to the 
young people participating on the scheme. In particular, the lack of training content was pointed to 
as a major failing of the scheme. In the face of this criticism, and in the presence of ever increasing 
levels of youth unemployment, the MSC introduced the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) based on the 
DE and MSC documents published under the blanket heading 'a New Training Initiative' (DE, 1981, 
MSC, 1981).
In essence, YTS differed from YOP in as much as it was a one year (rather than six month) 
scheme incorporating a compulsory three-month period of off-the-job training. Much effort was 
expended in stressing the differences between YTS and its predecessor. YTS was put forward as a 
permanent training programme available to all school-leavers, a "permanent bridge to work". On the 
other hand, YOP had been proposed as a temporary employment programme for the young 
unemployed.
In April 1986, YTS was extended to become a two-year scheme for sixteen year-old school 
leavers (with one year for unemployed seventeen year-olds). The minimum period of off-the-job 
training was extended from 13 to 20 weeks (13 in the first year and 7 in the second) and the 
allowance was paid at different rates during the first and second years.
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Two other initiatives aimed at young people bear mentioning. The first of these is the Young 
Workers Scheme (YWS), introduced by the DE in 198221. Aimed explicitly at reducing the wages 6f 
young people, the YWS took the form of a £15 per week wage subsidy to employers who took on 
16-17 year olds at a wage of £40 per week or less and £7.50 for those paying under £45. In 1984, 
this was modified to fit in more closely with YTS. The scheme became available only to employers 
taking on unemployed seventeen year olds and the upper limit on earnings was raised to £50 per 
week. In March 1985, 64% of young people supported by the scheme had previously participated on 
YTS thereby reinforcing the idea that YWS was acting as a complement to YTS. In April 1986, once 
again to fit in with YTS, the subsidy (still £15) was renamed the New Workers Scheme (NWS) and 
was paid to employers taking on 18-19 year olds at a wage of less than £55 per week, the idea 
presumably being that these would mainly be YTS graduates, and 20-year olds paid under £65 per 
week.
Finally, a rather different form of intervention was the Technical and Vocational Education 
Initiative (TVEI). Introduced in September 1983 on an experimental basis, TVEI was rapidly 
expanded. By September 1987, more than half the local education authorities in Great Britain were 
running pilot TVEI projects (MSC, 1988). The initiative was aimed at promoting vocational courses 
in schools for 14-18 year olds. Schools received financial support to run the projects, whilst the 
MSC took over central control of the curriculum. The initiative is important in as much as it 
represented a direct alternative for those who were otherwise likely to participate on YTS22.
1.3.2) The Aims o f YTS
The principal aim of YTS which is examined in chapters 4 and 5 below concerns its role in 
enhancing the employment prospects of young people. Thus, YTS was to provide,
a solid base for a comprehensive and lasting system for a more effective transition from 
education to employment," (Atkinson, 1985, p. 32).
21 The YWS was actually, funded by the DE but administered by the MSC.
22 Whether TVEI was a competitor or a complement to YTS rather depends on the eye of the beholder. The MSC, not 
unnaturally, stress its complementarity, whilst Finegold & Soskice (1988) note the conflict between TVEI and YTS. 
Following Dale (1983), Finegold & Soskice identify the conflicting nature of the two schemes as the result of faction 
fighting within the Conservative party.
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Given its ideological underpinnings, it is not unnatural that the Conservative government sought 
explanations of unemployment in terms of individual characteristics rather than deficient aggregate 
demand. The problem of youth unemployment arose due to an inadequately trained youth labour 
force and excessively high youth wages. The strategy to improve young people's employment 
prospects consequently focused on these two objectives. The first of these was repeatedly stressed in 
connection with the YTS. For example,
"YTS is designed to give school-leavers a range of practical, transferable skills to enable them 
to compete more effectively in the labour market," (HC papers, 1982/3, 335-i, p.l).
As regards the second of these objectives, the encouragement of employment through the reduction 
of youth wages was the explicit aim of YWS and, subsequently, NWS. This type of role for YTS 
was less often emphasised, however, the fact that the remuneration of YTS participants was less than 
half the average wage of 16-17 year olds and only slightly above the level of social security benefit23 
point to this role also for YTS. In his March 1985 budget speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Nigel Lawson made this explicit saying,
"Since it was first launched in 1983 the Youth Training Scheme has proved to be a very 
successful bridge between school and work. It has also helped to make young people's pay 
expectations more rea listic (my italics, quoted in Main, 1987a).
The aim of improving young people's employment prospects was only part of the picture. A 
number of other (more or less explicit) purposes underlying YTS may be identified. Firstly, 
improving the quality and adaptability of the workforce (as well as reducing youth wages) was also 
important from the point of view of employers. Thus, some emphasis was placed on providing,
"a better educated, better trained and more adaptable workforce," (my italics, DE, 1981, para.
5)
and, more specifically, YTS was,
23 In some cases the YTS allowance would have been lower than social security benefit. Whilst social security benefit 
was based on a concept of need, and therefore could be increased in certain circumstances, the level of the YTS 
allowance was fixed. In particular, young people receiving social security benefit and not living with their parents 
could claim support for rent payments.
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"to equip....young people to adapt successfully to the changing demands of employment  ^to 
have a fuller appreciation of the world of industry, business and technology in which they will 
be working; and, to develop basic and recognised skills which employers will require in the 
future," (DE, 1981, para. 24).
The adaptability of the workforce was to be enhanced by the removal of legislative constraints on 
employers. YTS participants were removed form the aegis of Wage Councils, and,-unless they were 
amongst the small numbers on the scheme accorded employee status, they could not have recourse 
to employment protection legislation. The importance accorded to the requirements of employers as 
opposed to young people is evident from the way in which the scheme was implemented Initially, 
potential sponsors of YTS were to be obliged to satisfy eight criteria in order to be allowed to run 
schemes24. In the face of employer resistance, seven of the eight criteria were dropped, the exception 
being the provision of "off-the-job" training. Furthermore, the low-level of monitoring of YOP 
schemes was further reduced for YTS. The high accident rate of YTS (Finn, 1988) tends to suggest 
that employers often took advantage of the absence of monitoring also to evade the requirements of 
Health and Safety legislation. Even by its own criteria, one third of YTS schemes did not fulfil the 
minimal MSC standards in the first year (MSC memo quoted in Finn, 1986, p.60).
It was noted above that there was much concern with the destructive potential of unemployed 
youth. Thus, some emphasis was placed on the socialising role of YTS. In this regard, Peter 
Morrison, the Employment Minister responsible, said of YTS in a commons debate in July 1983,
"the scheme is not a social service. Its purpose is to teach youngsters what the real world of 
work is about. This means arriving on time, giving of their best during the working day, and 
perhaps staying on a little longer to complete an unfinished task," (quoted in Finn, 1984).
A further issue regards the political management of the unemployment "problem". It is 
pertinent to ask how it is possible that the Conservative Government was re-elected in 1983 losing 
only 1.5% of its 1979 vote when unemployment had risen from around one million in 1979 to three 
million in 1983 whilst, at the same time, opinion polls were consistently showing that unemployment
24 These included: three months off-the-job training; training in planning, diagnostic and life-skills; guidance and 
counselling throughout; and, a training 'contract' between the sponsor and the trainee.
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was considered to be the most important problem facing the country. Moon & Richardson (1985) 
argue reasonably that the answer lies, at least partly, in the ability of the government to separate in 
people's minds the importance of unemployment as a problem and the government's responsibility for 
it. They argue that the schemes played an important role in the successful political and social 
management of the unemployment problem. That is to say, the existence of the schemes fulfilled the 
role of being seen to be doing something about unemployment.
The importance of this aim was certainly recognised by the government. In a Downing Street 
Policy Unit paper from early 1981 one finds,
"we all know that there is no prospect of getting unemployment down to acceptable levels 
within the next few years. [Consequently] we must show that we have some political 
imagination, that we are willing to salvage something - albeit second best - from the sheer 
waste involved," (quoted in Finegold & Soskice, 1988)
In this regard, YTS also had the effect of officially removing young people the labour force and, 
therefore, from the published unemployment statistics.
The purpose of the analysis of YTS undertaken in chapters four and five is to establish the 
impact of the scheme on the chances of finding employment and the post-programme wages of 
participants. It is well to bear in mind, when considering the results, that YTS represented rather 
more than simply a means to improve the employment prospects of young people.
1.4) Conclusions
In this chapter I have provided an overview of some of the trends in the situation facing 
young people in and out of the labour market during the seventies and eighties in Britain. It is clear 
that the nature of the teenage labour market underwent a fundamental transformation during this 
period. The rise in unemployment was accompanied by a collapse in traditional employment, which 
was, to a large extent replaced by YTS as the initial labour market experience of young people. In 
the overview, the emphasis was on the problem of unemployment, its causes, consequences and the
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policy response. The emphasis is not accidental. In chapters three to five I return repeatedly to the 
role of unemployment. *
As regards the remainder of the thesis, chapter two provides an introduction to the principal 
data source employed, the first England and Wales Youth Cohort Study (YCS). A description of the 
YCS is provided and the advantages, and more importantly, limitations of the study are considered. 
The discussion also allows a first consideration of the sample's experiences over the two years 
subsequent to reaching the minimum school-leaving age.
Chapter three provides an analysis of the factors influencing the school-leaving (or staying- 
on) decision at sixteen. That is, the chapter analyses the choice between staying-on and leaving full­
time education faced by young people reaching the minimum legal school-leaving age of sixteen. The 
chapter also provides a fairly lengthy consideration of the modelling issues involved. In particular, 
problems associated with the treatment of expectations and the further complications implied by the 
introduction of unemployment and government intervention into such models are analysed. The 
empirical analysis undertaken in the chapter finds that a wide variety of factors influence the choice 
at sixteen. Terms are introduced in an attempt to capture the role of expectations. Limitations in the 
data employed to represent expectations, however, prevent a fully satisfactory treatment. In this 
context, more emphasis is placed on other factors in the analysis and on the insight that can be 
gained indirectly on the influence of labour market factors on the school-leaving decision through 
comparison of the results presented here with those of Rice (1987) and Micklewright (1989) who 
analyse the decision in a period of low unemployment. It is further suggested that family background 
plays an important role in determining the choice in a direct way influencing "preferences" for further 
education and not just through its influence on ability and labour market opportunities. This chapter, 
in contrast to previous studies, also explicitly considers and models the problem of 
heteroscedasticity.
Chapter four takes up the issue of the effectiveness of YTS in improving "employment 
prospects" of young people. Specifically, the chapter considers the impact that participation on the 
scheme had on the probability of finding employment. Initially, a single equation probh model is 
proposed and estimated. This allows a comparison with previous analyses of the impact of YTS 
undertaken by Main & Shelley (1990) for Scotland and Whitfield & Bourlakis (1990, 1991) for
22
England & Wales. Both of these studies found a small but statistically significant positive impact of 
YTS on the probability of finding work. This finding is confirmed in the simple one equation 
framework. The chapter goes rather further than previous work, however, in as much as it considers 
problems arising from heteroscedasticity and sample selection bias, neither of which have been 
considered by previous studies. Both are found to be present and influential on the results obtained 
A series of models are considered and formally compared. A switching bivariate probit model (with a 
correction for heteroscedasticity) is proposed and estimated. This model controls for sample 
selection bias in the determination of employment and allows the identification of which groups 
gained more or less from participation on the scheme. The results suggest that previous studies have 
underestimated both the average size of the effect and its variability across different types of 
individual.
Chapter five goes on to consider the impact of YTS on the wages of the employed and the 
expected and reservation wages of the unemployed. The effects of YTS on the wages of participants 
comprises two principal components. Firstly, through an increase in the human capital of 
participants, their productivity and, therefore, their wages might be expected to increase. On the 
other hand, through an increase in the probability of finding employment, YTS would tend to reduce 
the observed earnings of participants. This negative effect of YTS on observed wages is identified as 
being comprised of the negative influence of YTS on the reservation wage (both directly, through a 
preference formation effect, and indirectly through the lowering of expected and, consequently, 
reservation wages), and the positive influence of YTS on the chances of receiving a job offer. The 
principal finding of the chapter is that YTS had no positive influence on wages due to an increase in 
participants' human capital, but did influence both the reservation wages of participants and their 
probability of receiving a job offer. The lowering of reservation wages and, of principal importance, 
the increase in the probability of receiving a job offer are thus also proposed as plausible explanations 
of the increase in employment probabilities of YTS participants found in chapter four. The results of 
the chapter confirm the basic findings of previous studies25 that YTS participation had a small but
25 M ain  & Shelley (1990), Whitfield & Bourlakis (1990, 1991) and Dolton et al. (1994a, 1994c). There are slight 
differences in the findings reported by the different studies. In particular, Whitfield & Bourlakis don't directly treat the 
problem of ompi* selection bias. They limit themselves to reporting that it was not found to be statistically 
significant. Dolton et al., on the other hand, find a statistically significant negative impact of YTS on the earnings of 
females, even in the presence of controls for sample selection bias.
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statistically significant negative influence on earnings which tends to disappear when sample selection 
bias was accounted for. The chapter goes further than these analyses, however, in that two sources 
of sample selection bias are identified and controlled for, and a simple theoretical framework lacking 
from the aforementioned studies is provided. The simple job search model proposed allows a 
coherent interpretation of the effects of YTS referred to above in terms of its influence on individual 
behaviour rather than relying on recourse to the "statistical problems" which Main & Shelley use to 
explain their results.
Finally, chapter six provides some concluding comments on the findings of the thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE YOUTH COHORT STUDY
The empirical analyses presented in chapters three, four and five are based almost exclusively 
on data contained in the first two sweeps of the first England and Wales Youth Cohort Study 
(YCS)1. The YCS comprises longitudinal survey data on the experiences of young people reaching 
the minimum school-leaving age (sixteen) during the -academic year 1983/4. As well as c o n ta in in g  
detailed information on individual characteristics and family background, the study provides a rich 
source of information on the experiences of young people in and out of the labour market over the 
two years, 1984-86
Section 2.1 provides an introduction to the study, describing the nature of the sample, data 
collection methods and the information collected. Section 2.2 provides a discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the survey as well as briefly mentioning other studies employing this 
data source. Section 2.3 employs the YCS to provide a descriptive picture of the education and 
labour market status of young people over the two year period covered by the study After 
considering the aggregate picture, the source of YTS entrants and the destination of YTS leavers are 
briefly considered. Movements between states are also analysed, the principal impression gained 
being that, whilst YTS provided a sounder basis than unemployment for subsequent labour market 
experience, it was not an adequate substitute for early employment experience. Section 2.4 provides 
some concluding comments.
2.1) Description of the Survey
2.1.1) Sample Design
The population from which the sample was constructed consisted of young people in state - 
schools in England and Wales who reached minimum school-leaving age in the academic year 
1983/4. That is, young people in state schools who were aged 16 on 31 August 1984. A 25% 
random sample of schools in England & Wales was passed by the Department of Education and
1 Where relevant, data on regional unemployment and wages based on published DE statistics and the New Earnings 
Survey were also used.
Science (DES) to the Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR), the organisation 
responsible for conducting the survey.
The sample of schools received by the SCPR consisted of 833 English and 57 Welsh schools 
Of these, 847 actually took part. The remaining 43 schools (2 in Wales) did not participate for the 
following reasons: 17 schools provided a written refusal; 9 schools had no eligible pupils; 4 schools 
had closed down, and, 13 schools were believed to have not forwarded mail to selected pupils^ 
Within each participating school a 10% sample of eligible pupils was constructed by selecting young 
people bom on the 5th, 15th and 25th of each month.
Prior consent of pupils was legally required before the schools could furnish their names and 
addresses-*. In order to obtain this consent, pupils were divided into two groups, stayers and leavers. 
Stayers were defined as those pupils in the selected sample who were on the school register in 
January 1985. In this case, the schools concerned were asked to seek the consent of the relevant 
pupils and, consequently, to pass on their names and addresses to the SCPR. The SCPR then mailed 
out questionnaires and information about the survey directly to the 3952 young people identified in 
this way. Leavers were defined as those who had left school during the academic year 1983/4 or who 
had changed schools at the end of that year. In this case, the DES sought the schools agreement to 
forward survey documents to the relevant ex-pupils at their last known address. The names of 8502 
leavers were passed onto the SCPR. Questionnaires and information were then returned to schools 
which forwarded them to the ex-pupils' last known addresses^.
2.1.2) Data Collection and Response
Questionnaires for the first sweep were sent out in the early Summer 19855. In all, 8064 
usable replies were received. Of the 12454 individuals identified, 11764 (94.5%) effectively received 
the questionnaire. That is, 690 questionnaires did not reach the intended recipients. Of these, 274 
were not sent out by the SCPR because: the school refused to participate (181); the school had 
closed down (40);-or, the address was not supplied by the school (53). The remaining 416
3 This refers to the leavers group defined below.
3 The Secretary of State for Education declined to use his powers to waive this requirement.
4 The Inner London Education Authority responsible for schools in London insisted that all young people be treated as 
leavers. That is, packages were forwarded by schools to London pupils rather than being contacted directly by the 
SCPR.
5 The vast majority of the questionnaires (98%) were sent out between May 16 and June 10. See note 14 below.
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questionnaires were mailed by SCPR but did not reach the (ex-) pupil because: they were not 
forwarded by schools to leavers (145); they were returned by the post office (144); or, they were 
withdrawn as ineligible due to the wrong birthday (127). The initial failure to contact young people 
concerned 1.5% (59) of stayers and 5.8% (496) of leavers.
Of the 11764 questionnaires effectively mailed to individuals, 8064 (68.5%) were returned. 
These comprised 84.6% (3179) of stayers and 61.0% (4885) of leavers. The higher response rate of 
stayers is attributable, in part, to the lower propensity to respond among those with a low level of 
academic qualifications. It is also probable that some questionnaires were not mailed out by schools, 
although this was not reported to the SCPRA The response rate to the first sweep of the second 
cohort, for which questionnaires were sent out to individuals directly by the SCPR was 75%, which 
supports the idea that some schools found it impossible to send out questionnaires for the first 
cohort. The date of response to the first sweep was spread over the Summer 1985. By the end of 
June 1985, the majority of questionnaires (63.2%) had been returned. By the end of July this figure 
was 90.0%, 97.4% were returned by the end of August, whilst the last reply was received during the 
first week of October.
As regards the second sweep, questionnaires were sent out in February 1986 to which 6075 
usable replies were received. 7633 questionnaires were mailed out to first sweep respondents. The 
remaining 431 (5.3% of first sweep respondents) were not contacted either because of inadequate 
addresses or because they stated at the time of the first sweep that they did not wish to participate in 
further sweeps. Of the questionnaires sent out, 46 were returned by the post office, 43 were returned 
with a refusal by respondents whilst 1469 did not r e p l y The sample actually responding to both 
sweeps therefore comprised 75.3% of those replying to the first sweep (8064) and 51.6% of the 
questionnaires effectively mailed to individuals at the time of the first sweep. The date of response 
was spread over a shorter period than for the first sweep. 59.9% of the questionnaires arrived during 
March (none were received during February), and 97.7% of responses had arrived by the end of 
April. The last questionnaire to be received arrived on June 9.
6 That is, they were recorded as part of the 11764 questionnaires effectively sent to individuals but were never in fact 
mailed.
7 For both sweeps the procedure for data collection comprised, apart from the initial mailing, two postal reminders 
(complete with questionnaires and information on the survey) and a telephone follow up where possible.
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2.1.3) Information Collected
The questionnaires contained a series of questions regarding individual characteristics and 
family background. Some individual characteristics were available from school records. These 
comprised sex, age and the region where the respondent lived, as well as the type of school attended 
and exam results at sixteen. Other information regarding experiences during the period of obligatory 
schooling (e.g. whether the individual had had a part-time job or work experience, and whether and 
by whom the person had been advised to stay on in school) was collected at the time of the first 
sweep. Also at this time, information concerning the occupation of respondents' parents, the size of 
family and type of accommodation was solicited**. At the time of the second sweep, information 
regarding the individual's ethnic origin and whether the person suffered from a disability was 
collected. The fact that this information was available only at the time of the second sweep largely 
determined the use of full two sweep data for the school-leaving analysis in chapter three, rather than 
employing sweep one. This point is discussed further in section 2.2.
Respondents were asked to provide information on what they were currently doing at the 
time of each sweep. This information is used to define key variables in the analysis below. 
Participation in post-compulsory education (used in chapter three) was defined as those people in 
full-time education at the time of the first sweep. Labour market status (employed, unemployed etc.,) 
at the time of the second sweep is used in chapters four and five. In addition, information on the 
expected and reservation wages of the unemployed and the wages, hours and other job 
characteristics of the employed are used in chapter five. Specifically, the questions asked were:
a) What is your take-home pay, after any stoppages but including bonuses or overtime?
b) How many hours do you usually work each week ?
The unemployed were asked for information on their expected and reservation wages. The exact 
form being:
a) How much weekly take-home pay do you expect to earn in your next job ?
b) What is the lowest take-home pay you would consider ?
8 I am informed by John Gray that questions regarding parental occupation were not well received by respondents' 
parents. The SCPR received a rash of telephone calls from parents of the form (excluding superfluous adjectives) "its 
all very well you asking about what our [child's name] is up to bat why do you want to poke your nose into my 
business”.
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Young people were also asked what they had been doing in each month over the period 
September 1984 - May 1985 (first sweep) and May 1985 - February 1986 (second sweep). This 
provided a more complete record of young people's status in and out of the labour force for each 
month between September 1984 and February 1986. The information collected on the basis of these 
"diary" questions is used in the analyses below to identify YTS participants (chapters four and five), 
young people with early employment experience and/or some experience of further education 
(chapter four) and the duration of employment, unemployment and further education used in chapter 
five^.
2.2) Advantages and Disadvantages of YCS
2.2.1) Advantages
The first, and most obvious advantage of YCS is that it is the only source of detailed panel 
data charting the experiences of a representative sample of sixteen year olds in England & Wales 
over a two year period^. Detailed information is collected on a month-by-month basis concerning 
the experiences of young people throughout the period In comparison to the other similar survey 
data of young people, the Scottish Young People's Survey (SYPS), the principal advantage of YCS 
is the existence of this month by month information used to construct the YTS variable for the 
analyses of chapters four and five. The corresponding SYPS data contained questions concerning the 
respondent's status at six monthly intervals, rather than every month. This implies that, in examining 
YTS participation, SYPS was likely to miss short-term YTS participants 11. That is those who joined 
and left YTS between the dates for which information was collected. The diary question also allowed 
the construction of employment, unemployment and educational duration variables. Another 
important characteristic of YCS is that it contains accurate information concerning exam 
performance. Basing the identification of young people on school records, it was not necessary to
9 Full information on the definition of variables used in the analysis and their sources are given in an appendix at the 
end of the thesis.
10 In the «hfrit information is used from the first two of the three sweeps comprising the YCS. In principle, use of the 
third sweep would allow analysis of the experience over a three year period. The use of the second sweep reduces the 
problem of attrition but at the same time allows a sufficient period to analysis the effects of YTS. The period 
covered is the as that analysed by Main & Shelley (1990) considered in more detail in chapter four.
11 This problem has now been mitigated to some extent, in as much as the SYPS comprises a diary question in the 
first sweep of the data (sent out in March).
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rely on young people's self-reports. This allowed the construction of a integer index of exam success 
at sixteen which is used throughout the thesis.
As regards the school-leaving decision analysed in chapter three, a useful characteristic of 
YCS is that the cohort is defined by birth date. In combination with the uniformity of the dates for 
which information is collected, this obviates problems in identifying whether or not young people had 
reached school-leaving age associated with studies using Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data to 
analyse the decision (Rice, 1987, Micklewright et al., 1990). The interviews constituting the FES are 
spread throughout the year. The analyst does not have sufficient information to identify whether or 
not the young person on whom information was collected had actually reached m in im um  school- 
leaving age!2 Rice (1987) ignores this issue, whilst Micklewright et al. (1990) take some account of 
the problem, weighting the probability of leaving by the estimated probability that the individual 
concerned is legally unconstrained in their choice.
Also of importance to the analysis conducted below was the collection of detailed 
information on individuals' status at the time of the second sweep. As noted above, detailed 
information is available on the wages, hours and other job characteristics for those in employment 
and direct information is collected on the expected and reservation wages of the unemployed. The 
latter information is not collected in the SYPS. This information allows additional light to be thrown 
on the effects of YTS on wages considered in chapter five.
2.2.2) Disadvantages
With regard to the drawbacks of the survey, one obvious problem is its postal nature. In 
particular, with a postal survey response rates are, for obvious reasons, lower than they would be 
with a personal interview. The effective response rate with respect to the sample base of 11764 was 
68.5% for the first sweep and 51.6% for the second sweep (comprising 75.3% of those replying to 
the first sweep).
At least as important as the response rate in itself was the lack of balance in non-response. It 
is evident from the information presented above that the leavers group was under-represented in the 
sample. Courtenay (1988a) suggests that this depended on two factors, the indirect means (via
12 See Micklewright et. al (1990) for details. It might also be noted that the FES contains no information on individual 
ability or qualifications likely to be important in determining the choice.
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schools) employed to track these young people down, and, the greater tendency of people with low 
qualifications to not respond. Table 2.1 attempts to shed some light on this issue, comparing 
percentages obtained from the YCS with the figures produced by the DE which were used to 
construct figures 1.5 and 1.6 above. It is evident from the table that the percentage of young people 
in further education is overestimated, even taking into account possible differences in the school- 
leaving pattern of Scottish young people who are included in the DE data but not in the YCS. The 
left-hand side of the table also compares labour market status in more detail. Whilst the numbers on 
YTS or in employment are well within a confidence interval of two standard errors, the percentage in 
unemployment is clearly underestimated. Although unemployment rates in Scotland were higher than 
the British average, this is not sufficient to explain the difference here. The table therefore supports 
the idea that poor performers at school who were, consequently, likely to be poor performers in the 
labour market are under-represented here.
Having noted the presence of a non-random sample, there is, however, little that one can do 
to rectify the situation. The information required to estimate the likelihood of non-response is not 
available for non-respondents to the first sweep. One approach would be to weight responses. The 
YCS includes a weighting variable for this purpose, based on a comparison between the population 
and the sample in terms of exam performance, region and sex. This variable is not employed in the 
analyses carried out below. Firstly, the use of such a variable does not resolve the problem in as 
much as it ignores unobserved characteristics. That is, the assumption would have to be made that 
young people were alike in unobserved characteristics. It is very likely to be precisely these 
characteristics which differ between, for example, unemployed respondents and non-respondents. 
Secondly, and to some extent consequently, introducing weights changes the results very little^. As 
regards the school-leaving chapter, most of the variables used were available in the first sweep 
surveys, which should suffer slightly less from this potential source of bias. The first sweep is not 
employed, however, because information on two important individual characteristics were only 
collected at the time of the second sweep. These were ethnic origin and the possession of a disability. 
The inclusion of these is important, both because these variables are likely to play an important role
13 The probit model employed in the thesis differs from the logit model in this respect, in as much as the parameter 
estimates do vary slightly, whereas, with the logit, the only difference arising from the use of weights regards the 
intercept term (Maddala. 1983).
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in the decision, but also because they enrich the discussion of the indirect inferences to be drawn on 
the effect of labour market experiences on the school-leaving decision.
A second issue regards the use of diary questions. It may be noted that the level of non­
response for these ranged from 0.4% to 2.7% over the period with a mean of 1.9%, the largest 
number of non-responses arising somewhat unsurprisingly over the period, June-August 1985 when 
many of those who subsequently continued in full-time further education were on holiday and, 
therefore, may have been in doubt as to how to respond. That is, they were not physically going to 
school in that period, not because they had left, but simply because the school had closed for the 
summer. As regards the status question at the time of each of the two sweeps there were no non- 
usable replies.
A second, and perhaps more important, problem with the diary information concerns 
response error, as opposed to non-response. Information for May 1985 was collected at the time of 
both the first and second sweeps allowing some consideration (although no remedy) of the 
problem^. Table 2.2 provides a cross tabulation of the replies given at the time of the two sweeps. 
Table 2.2a reports the absolute numbers, whilst, table 2.2b gives the information in terms of row 
percentages. That is, the status reported at the time of the second sweep is reported as a percentage 
of the those reporting particular states at the time of the first sweep *5. Thus, for example, the first
14 One possible source of the discrepancy* between the sweeps might arise from the date on which the questionnaires 
were answered. Courtenay (1988a) reports that 24% of the questionnaires were sent out on May 16, whilst the majority 
(74%) went out between May 27 and June 10. The remaining 2% were not sent out until after July 1. The staggered 
mailing of the survey was due to the late receipt by the SCPR of the addresses of many of the young people in the 
sample. 17.3% of the questionnaires were returned during May 1985. It is possible that some of those receiving the 
questionnaire shortly after May 16 and replying immediately may have subsequently spent a majority of that month 
(May 1985) in a different activity. If, for example, the person spent the first ten days of May in unemployment and 
subsequently became employed, at the time of replying to the first sweep they would have spent a majority of the 
month in unemployment. If they remained in employment from May 10 until the end of the month, in retrospect (i.e. 
when they replied to the second sweep) they would have spent the majority of May in another activity (employment). It 
does not, however, seem plausible to attribute a large proportion of response error to this phenomenon. The 
questionnaires were sent out after the middle of the month, therefore, a person remaining in the same state from May 
1 until May 16 will necessarily have spent the majority of the whole month in that activity, even if they changed states 
on May 17. Secondly, even if they did change states on or around May 10 and replied immediately, they presumably 
would form the reasonable expectation that they would spend the rest of the month in the new state. Assuming this to 
be true, i.e. in the context of the example given above, they were not fired on their first day (or week) of work, the 
status reported correctly at the time of the first sweep would correspond to that given at the time of the second sweep. 
In the absence of individual specific information in the YCS data-set on the date of mailing and receipt of 
questionnaires, it seems reasonable, in as much as it affects the procedure adopted, to presume that discrepancies arose 
through recall error at the time of the second sweep. The procedure adopted also implies that those changing states 
during the early part of the month who, being unsure as to their status for the month, did not reply to the status 
question at the time of the first sweep, but replied correctly at the time of the second one, would have been 
appropriately coded using the procedure adopted here.
15 It should be noted that the reference here to the first sweep regards the 6075 people who responded to both sweeps.
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row gives the status of young people in May 1985 given at the time of sweep two as a percentage of 
those reporting themselves as being unemployed in May 1985 in the first sweep. The leading 
diagonal of the tables, therefore, gives the number (table 2.2a) or percentage (table 2.2b) of 
consistent replies. The overall mean percentage of consistent replies was 87.5%, although this rises 
to 89.1% when non-response and the something else category are excluded. In order to minimise the 
potential influence of this problem, as well as that of non-response, the full potential of the diary 
information was not exploited^. In practice, use of the "diary" is limited to the definition of 
variables representing YTS participation, early employment experience and the duration of 
employment, unemployment and further education. Recall error and non-response are, therefore, 
unlikely to have made any significant difference to the analysis undertaken here. As regards the 
analyses in later chapters, and the figures on status reported below, the responses employed for May
1985, except in the case of non-response, were taken from the first sweep, since the length of time 
which had passed following that date was less. In the case of non-response to the first sweep and a 
usable response to the second sweep, the latter information was employed.
A further question concerns the date of response This is of particular concern as regards the 
first sweep, since the replies were spread over a longer time period, and, there is no information in 
the second sweep data on the date of response to the first, therefore, no direct control can be made. 
On the one hand, the majority of young people staying on in school would be doing so for two years, 
taking exams at eighteen. On the other, those staying on for one year are likely to have left by the 
end of June 1985, since State organised examinations generally take place during that month. By the 
end of June, 36.8% of responses had not yet been received. Thus, it is possible that a few of those 
who stayed on for one year after leaving school are coded, in the analysis of chapter three, as having 
left school. In the second sweep data, the date of response to the first sweep is not included, and so 
there is no direct means to control for this problem. As regards the date of response to the second 
sweep, almost all the questionnaires (97.7%) were received during March and April 1986. The 
remainder arrived during May and the first nine days of June. Exploratory analyses to consider the 
possibility that the date of the reply to the survey influenced results of chapter four and five were
16 For example, the possibility of undertaking ananalysis of the impact of YTS on exits from unemployment using a 
hazard function approach was thus precluded. Recently, just such an analysis has been undertaken by Dolton et al. 
(1994b) using a later Cohori of the YCS. This paper, as well as the other analyses by these authors are discussed 
further below.
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carried out. In addition to the explanatory variables, dummy variables were introduced to control for 
the week in which the questionnaire was received. In no case did the inclusion of these dummies 
influence in any significant manner the parameter estimates associated with the other explanatory 
variables.
Other drawbacks with the survey concern, in particular, the analysis of the school-leaving 
decision. Firstly, there is no parental income data. Given the level of hostility (demonstrated by 
parents) to questions regarding their characteristics one might doubt the usefulness of asking young 
people for this information. A second issue which is, in principle, easier to resolve regards parental 
education. It is reasonable to suppose that tastes for further education will depend to a substantial 
degree on the level of parental education in itself. This will, to some extent, be picked up by other 
variables employed to represent social class, however, variables representing parental education 
would have made a useful addition to the analysis. A further issue regards geographical location. The 
breakdown of young people by travel to work area, for example, would have allowed a more 
accurate assessment of the employment prospects actually facing young people than is possible 
through the use of the ten standard regions reported in the first YCS. It might also be observed that 
a larger sample would have allowed a more subtle breakdown of some of the effects analysed in the 
thesis than is presented here.
Finally, all the analyses presented here would have gained from a longer time, scale. That is, 
information on the cohort's experiences at present (in 1994) would enrich greatly the potential of the 
analyses. This would allow a longer term perspective on rates of return from education, and their 
role in the school-leaving decision, and any longer-run effects of YTS participation.
Many of the drawbacks of the first YCS have been resolved, or at least mitigated by the later 
cohort studies^7. The sample base has been increased to around 20,000 young people and the 
problems associated with contacting school-leavers resolved. This does not remove the sample 
selection problem, but it reduces the number of potential sources of non-response. Information is 
available on parental education and a higher degree of geographical subdivision was employed in 
later YCS cohort studies. It would be interesting, in the future, to compare the results presented here 
with those produced by an analysis of future cohorts. There are, to my knowledge, no plans to
17 YCS studies have been earned out for people reaching minimum school-leaving age in 1984/5, 1985/6 and, 
subsequently every two years.
recontact young people at a later date. This, however, would be fraught with difficulties. In 
particular, one might expect an exceedingly high level of panel attrition
2.2.3) Previous Studies using YCS
A number of studies have been carried out using YCS data Of most immediate relevance to 
the thesis is the analysis of the impact of YTS on employment prospects and wages ¿>f participants 
carried out by Whitfield & Bourlakis (1990,1991). More recently, analyses of the two-year YTS 
have been carried out using the third YCS18 (Dolton et al., 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). Detailed 
discussion of these analyses is deferred to the relevant chapters (four and five)19. Studies have also 
been carried out to examine, at a more qualitative level, participation in further education (Gray et 
al., 1989, Gray & Sime, 1990, Jesson & Gray, 1990, Jesson et al., 1991, Ashford & Gray, 1992), 
unemployment amongst school-leavers (Sime, 1991), the transition from school to the labour market 
(Sime et al., 1990, Roberts et al. 1991) experiences of YTS (Clough et al., 1988) and of those who 
turned down the scheme (Clough et al., 1987).
2.3: The YCS and Young People's Experiences
2.3.1) YCS and the Education and Labour Market Status o f Young People
Figure 2.1 shows young people's status, in and out of the labour market on a monthly basis 
over the period, September 1984-February 1986 drawn from YCS20. The over-representation of 
participants in further education, noted above, is evident from the figure. Apart from this, the 
numbers in full-time education remain almost constant over the period September 1984 - May 1985. 
In June the numbers start to decline, with a sharp fall during July and August. Some of those leaving 
education at this time entered the labour market, however, a substantial proportion of this group 
considered their holidays from school or college as "doing something else" as is indicated by the
18 The third YCS tracks the paths of young people reaching minimum school-leaving age in the academic year 
1985/6.
19 The chapters also discuss the other important study of the issue undertaken by Main & Shelley (1990) using SYPS 
data.
20 It should be noted that the figures presented in this section take no account of sampling error. This is particularly 
important, given the reduced sample size, of the discussion of entries and exits to YTS. Thus, the figures presented 
should be seen as indicative rather than numerically accurate.
41
corresponding rise in the "Else" category during those two months. In September, the numbers 
increase, although not to their previous levels. The school-leaving decision, analysed in chapter 
three, is seen in terms of the choice between staying on until at least May 198521 and leaving before 
that date. In the analyses of YTS contained in chapters four and five, those entering the labour 
market in the Summer 1985 are also included. That is, those who left further education after one full 
year. In the analyses, differences arising out of the inclusion of this group are controlled for The 
group is included so as to allow comparison between participation on YTS and in full-time further 
education as a basis for subsequent labour market experiences.
Table 2.3 provides further information on the status of young people over the period The 
table shows the numbers of young people with experience of the various possible states. Thus, for 
example, the table indicates that 45% of young people had at least one months experience of a full­
time job between September 1984 and February 1986. The mean number of states experienced by 
young people over the eighteen months was of the order of 1.8 as is indicated by the final row of the 
table. The Column on the right gives the median length of time spent in particular states for those 
people having some experience of the state. This provides a further insight into the nature of the 
experiences of young people. Further education was evidently the most stable state with relatively 
little movement from education into the labour market. Also, although the proportion of people
having some experience of unemployment (26.6%) was almost as large as for YTS participation
(28.4%), the median length of time spent in YTS was nine months as opposed to three in
unemployment. That is, almost the same number of young people had some experience of
unemployment as YTS, however, unemployment tended to be a more transitory experience. It will be 
observed that the median duration of YTS of nine months was significantly below the full length of 
the scheme (12 months). There are two principal explanations for this. Firstly, many schemes would 
have started before the diary questions. That is, many schemes would have begun between June and 
August 1984, whereas the diary information begins in September 1984. Thus, a scheme starting in 
June 1984 would finish in May or June of the following year. The YCS data would record even a 
completed scheme under these circumstances as having lasted only nine or ten months. The second
21 The considerations noted above concerning the date of receipt of the questionnaire by the SCPR should be borne in 
mind.
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important explanation lies in the early exit of young people from the scheme. Reasons for this are 
discussed further below in the consideration of exits from YTS.
Figure 2.2 provides similar information to that contained in figure 2.1, differing in that it is 
restricted to young people in the labour market, allowing a clearer picture of variations in 
unemployment, YTS and employment. The figure shows a steady increase (with a slight variation in 
June 1985) in the. proportion of young people in full-time employment. The complement to this, is 
the steady decrease in YTS participation (after a small initial rise) until May 1985. That is, there was 
a steady movement out of YTS and into employment until May 1985. The importance of YTS in the 
labour market in this period is indicated by the fact that in September 1984, 52% of labour market 
entrants were on the scheme. In July and August 1985 there was a sharp fall in YTS participants, 
followed in September by a return to the steady decline. The sharp fall may be attributed to the fact 
that many schemes started in July and August of the previous year would have come to an end. That 
is to say, whereas exits from YTS up to that time were, for the most part, due to young people 
leaving the scheme early, largely because they had found work, in July and August a number of 
schemes came to an end, thereby forcing young people to leave whether or not they had found a job 
in the meantime. This interpretation is further supported by the increase in unemployment, otherwise 
more or less constant, during those two months. Thus, for those young people entering the labour 
market, the predominant experience, initially, was YTS participation. As time went on, there was a 
movement out of YTS and into employment or unemployment.
2.3.2) Entry to and Exit from YTS
Table 2.4 summarises the status of YTS participants in the month immediately preceding the 
period of participation whilst figure 2.3 shows the source of entries to YTS on a month-by-month 
basis. Some caution should be exercised in interpreting this information. The figures are subject to a 
substantial degree of sampling error (see note 20 above). Secondly, a substantial proportion of YTS 
participants (1180 young people or 19.4% of the sample) were already on the scheme by September 
1984, and, therefore, no information is available on their previous status. Having said this, however, 
some broad impressions may be gained by consideration of the table and figure. From table 2.4, it is 
immediately apparent that the principal source of YTS participants was unemployment as was noted
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in chapter one, although figure 2.3 indicates that there was some temporal variation. In particular, 
from May until August 1985, a substantial proportion of YTS entrants came from full-time 
education. It will also be observed that between October and December 1984 the numbers entering 
YTS fell rapidly. With some fluctuations during the first half of 1985, numbers joining YTS began to 
rise consistently in the Summer 1985. Initially, the entrants in the later period came from full-time 
education. Furthermore, many of those entering from unemployment in the Autumn J985 came 
indirectly from education. That is, after spending a year in further education, they entered the labour 
market but could not find work and, consequently, joined YTS.
Table 2.5 and figure 2.4 present analogous information regarding the destination of YTS 
participants on leaving the scheme. From the table, it is evident that the principal destination on 
leaving YTS was a full-time job (nearly 60%), however, a substantial proportion (31%) of those 
leaving the scheme became unemployed. It would not appear, on this basis, that YTS provided a 
very effective "Bridge to Work". What sort of bridge is it that only gets three-fifths of those crossing 
it to the other side ? On the other hand, to suggest that the DE slogan be replaced by "Gangplank to 
the Dole" as Finn (1985) would have it is perhaps going a little too far The analysis of chapter four 
deals with this question rather more systematically, taking a slightly longer term perspective. It is 
evident from the figures presented here, however, that YTS by no means guaranteed a job. In any 
event, 91% of those leaving YTS remained in the labour market (at least in the short-run). Only 2% 
left YTS to return to full-time education. Figure 2.4 shows the temporal variation in the destination 
of YTS leavers. The numbers leaving the scheme gradually increased over the first year reaching a 
peak in September 1985. Those leaving in October and November 1984 were almost as likely to 
move into unemployment as employment. There is a widening of this gap during the following eight 
months after which time it once again closes. Early leaving may therefore be identified as being due 
principally, either to young people finding a "real job", or to participants becoming disillusioned with 
the scheme, preferring to remain in unemployment. The latter phenomenon being more prevalent at 
the start of the scheme than later on.
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2.3.3) Movements Between States
It is also useful to look at longer term movements between different states over the period. 
This helps to provide an impression of the role that early experience had in determining outcomes in 
the two years following the reaching of minimum school-leaving age. Tables 2.6a and 2.6b display 
the status of young people in September 1984 and at the time of the first sweep (early Summer 
1985) in percentage terms. The percentages refer, in table 2.6a, to status in September 1984 (row 
percentages). Thus, for example, 43% of those people who were unemployed in September 1984, 
were also unemployed at the time of the first sweep. In the second part of the table (2.6b), the 
.percentages refer to the Summer 1985 (column percentages). Tables 2.7a and 2.7b repeat the 
procedure with regard to status at the time of the second sweep (Spring 1986). It is immediately 
apparent that the initial status of young people was important in determining where they ended up 
both nine months and twenty months later. Thus, in particular, 87% of those going (more or less) 
straight into a job from school, were observed to be in full-time employment in both the Summer 
1985 and the Spring 1986 (although this was not necessarily the same 87%). On the other hand 71% 
of those going straight into YTS had gained full-time employment by the Spring 1986 (2.7a). Whilst 
only 41% of those unemployed in September 1984 had gained full-time employment by the Spring 
1986. This gives an indication that YTS participation compared unfavourably with early employment 
experience but favourably with early unemployment experience in terms of its impact on the 
probability of finding work. This point will be returned to at length in chapter four.
Another observation to be made regards the stability of full-time education. Some 89% of 
those at school or college in September 1984 were still there the following Summer. Perhaps of more 
importance as regards the analysis undertaken in chapter three is the fact that 99% of those in full­
time education in the Summer 1985 were also in education in the previous September. This is 
relevant in as much as those in education in the Summer 1985 are considered as having stayed on for 
the purpose of the analysis in chapter three. This allows the exclusion of young people remaining in 
education to do retakes in the Autumn 1984. Thus, in chapter three, the variable chosen to indicate 
staying on in full-time education is to be interpreted as those continuing in education for at least one 
academic year. The suggestion is that there were very few people returning to full-time education
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once they had left. This picture is further supported by table 2.7b. It may be observed that 97% of 
those at school and college in the Spring 1986 were also in the same state in September 1984.
A further point arising from table 2.7b is that, of those on YTS in the Spring 1986, 85% had 
initially stayed on in further education. The implication is that YTS was also providing a way into the 
labour market also for seventeen year old leavers. This reinforces the suggestion in section 2.3.2 
above that late entrants to YTS were coming, either directly or indirectly, from education.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter some of the issues arising out of the use of the YCS have been considered. 
The chapter also employed the data to give an overall impression of young people's experiences in 
and out of the labour market. Like all surveys, the YCS is not without its faults, and some attention 
was paid to its drawbacks. On the other hand, the YCS is a rich source of information providing 
detailed data on the experiences of young people in and out of the labour market during the two 
years following the reaching of minimum school-leaving age.
The picture of the ELMS of young people presented in chapter one was developed with 
regard to survey respondents. The role of YTS in replacing full-time employment as the first-time 
"labour market" experience of young people was confirmed. It further emerges that whilst YTS and 
further education were, to some extent, substitutes, they were also complementary. That is, after 
spending a year in further education, many young people were using YTS as a route into the labour 
market. The principal source of seventeen year old entrants to the scheme in the Summer 1985 was 
further education.
It is worth making a number of observations pertinent to the analyses undertaken below. 
Further education was the most stable state. 89% of those in full-time education in September 1984 
were still there in the Summer 1985. Subsequently, there was a small movement from education to 
the labour market, largely by way of YTS participation (and unemployment), however, by the Spring
1986, 74% of those initially entering further-education were still there. On the other hand, 99% of 
those in education in the Summer 1985 were also in education in September 1984. This provides a 
justification for the definition of "staying on" used below.
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As regards YTS, the impression gained is that, whilst participation on the scheme provided a 
better initial basis than unemployment, it did not compensate for the failure to find a "real" job 
immediately on leaving school. This is indicated, above-all, by the relationship between status in 
September 1984 and status in the Spring 1986. At first glance, it would appear that YTS could not 
accurately be described as either a "Bridge to Employment" or a "Gangplank to the Dole".
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Table 2.1: Status of Sixteen Year Olds in January 1985: YCS and DE data Compared (•/•)
Standard errors in parenthesis
All Young People School-leavers
YCS DE data YCS DE Data
Unemployed 5.0 (28) 10.1 12.3 (66) 18.3
YTS 19.4 (51) 26.7 47.9 (101) 48.5
Employed 13.8 (.44) 18.4 34.1 (96) 33.4
Further Education 59.5 (.63) 44.9 - -
Something Else 0.9 (12) - 2.1 (29) -
No Response 1.5 (.16) 3.6 (.38)
Source: YCS and DE Gazette
.Notes: 1) YCS data refer England & Wales, DE data refer to Great Britain.
2) Standard errors are calculated using the formula: [p(l-p)/n]1/2. Since the sample was stratified this is a 
slight underestimate, but serves to give an idea of its order of magnitude. See Courtenay (1988a) for details.
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1abke 2.2: status in May 1985 according to the Fist (CIS!) and Second (C1S2) Sweeps compared. 
2.2a: Raw Data
STATUs MAY 1985 (C1S2)
UNEMPLOYED YTS JOB EDUCATION ELSE N/A
UNEMPLOYED .......262 h
IN 1^ 17 11 34<> ■
STATUS YTS 53 684 156 6 10 73 982
MAY 1985 JOB 17 26 999 18 11 20 1091
(C1S1) EDUCATION 46 11 40 3325 34 39 3495
ELSE 10 1 11 12 32 4 70
N/A 23 8 34 9 9 12 88
4 n "741 ■ m 3387 106 1&5 6075
2.2b: Row Percentages
STATUS MAY 1985 (C1S2)
UNEMPLOYED YTS JOB EDUCATION ELSE N/A
UNEMPLOYED 7 5 ^ /0 3,15% 7^16% 4JWo " " 4*87% 4J87% S#74%
STATUS YTS 5,40% 69,65% 15.89% 0,61% 1JD2% 7,43% 16,16%
MAY 1985 JOB 1.56% 2,38% 91,57% 1 J55% 1.01% 1.83% 17,96%
(C1S1) EDUCATION 1.32% 0,31% 1*14% 95.14% 0.97% 1,12% 57.53%
ELSE 14,29% 1.43% 15.71% 17.14% 45.71% 5 J \% 1.15%
N/A 26.14% 9.09% 38.64% 1(U3% 10,23% 13^4% 1,45%
6,77% 12t20J/o 20.82% 55.75W” 1^74% 2,72% 100JX)%
Source: YCS.
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Table 2J: Summary of States Experienced by Young People (9/84 - 2/86)
YOUNG PEOPLE WITH Median No. of
EXPERIENCE OF Months in State
N %
UNEMPLOYMENT 1617 26,62% 3
YTS 1727 28,43% 9
FULL-TIME JOB 2734 45.00% 9
FURTHER EDUCATION 3768 62.02% 17
SOMETHING ELSE 1062 17,48% 2
TOTAL 10908 179.56%
Source: YCS.
Note: The first two columns of the table show the numbers and percentages of young people who had at least one
month's experience of the various states. The final column indicates the median number of months spent in 
that state for those having spent at least one month in it.
Table 2.4: Source of YTS Entrants (9/84-1/86)
YTS FROM:
N %
UNEMPLOYED 321 56,51%
JOB 45 7.92%
EDUCATION 105 18,49%
ELSE 42 7,39%
N/A 55 9,68%
TOTAL 568 100,00%
Source: YCS.
Note: The table reports the status of young people who joined YTS between October 1984 and February 1986, in
the month previous to participation on the scheme.
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Table 2.5: Destination of YTS Leavers (10/84* 2/86)
YTS Exits To:
N %
UNEMPLOYED 387 31.03%
JOB 742 59.50%
EDUCATION 23 1,84%
ELSE 62 4,97%
N/A 33 2.65%
TOTAL 1247 100,00%
Source: YCS.
Note: The table summarises the status of young people in the month following the last full month's participation on
the scheme over the period October 1984 to February 1986.
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CHAPTER THREE: SCHOOL-LEAVING AT SIXTEEN
In this chapter, I consider some of the factors influencing the decision of young people in 
England and Wales to stay on in fiill-time education beyond the m inim um  sch o o l-le a v in g  age of 
sixteen. Increasingly, concern has been expressed at the low level of both post-compulsory 
educational participation in Britain and the low -levels of vocational training provided outside the 
school1. Figure 3.1 provides a picture of staying-on rates in the European Community for the 
academic year 1982/3. Although cross-country comparisons of this type are problematic due, in 
particular, to institutional differences (Micklewright et. al., 1989), h may be observed that only girls 
in Greece had a lower staying on rate than the UK.
The economics literature has, until recently, concentrated on the role of e a rn in g s  in the 
determination of schooling choice (e.g. Willis & Rosen, 1979). It is evident, however, that an 
important element of the choice is ignored in this context. That is, concentrating on earnings ignores 
the fact that a large proportion of school-leavers (69% in the YCS sample) did not move straight 
into employment. Rather, the majority went into either unemployment (17%) or YTS (52%). The 
presence of a substantial unemployment, or more generally, non-employment rate, has implications 
not only for the level of income in the labour market but also its certainty. Nickell (1979) considers 
the role of education in determining unemployment and Ashenfelter & Ham (1979) explain the effect 
of schooling on wages in terms of its role in reducing unemployment It is only recently, however, 
that the role of unemployment and, in particular, unemployment expectations in the determination of 
the choice of the level of schooling has been considered.
The implications of YTS are rather more complex. YTS implied in the short-run, a period of 
low paid, full-time work. The scheme also provided oflf-the-job training. In the long-run, this might 
be expected to im p ro v e  the individual's employment prospects and, perhaps, earnings. Evidence 
presented in chapters four and five suggests that the former effect was prevalent in the period 
immediately following participation on the scheme, however, it is plausible that the longer run 
benefits were not yet apparent2. The relevant point here is that YTS was presented as a vocational
1 See, for g*amplf» the entire issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, (vol. 4, n. 3, 1988) devoted to these 
questions.
2 This not be taken to imply that there would necessarily be longer-nm wage gains associated with YTS
participation.
training scheme. Therefore, it might be seen as a direct competitor to staying on in full-time 
education, particularly in the context of TVEI mentioned in chapter one. Seen in this light YTS had 
one very obvious advantage over staying on in school. Although the rates of pay were low, YTS 
participation did provide some financial support for participants whilst further education did not3. 
Whitfield & Wilson (1991) present time series evidence which suggests that YTS (and YOP) had the 
effect of discouraging participation in further education. .The data on the ELMS of young people in 
chapter one also provide some support for this idea. Between 1983 and 1984, following the 
introduction of YTS, participation in further education fell from 44% to 40% for boys and from 54% 
to 51% for girls, interrupting a period of relatively rapid expansion in the post-compulsory 
educational participation rate. Between 1981 and 1983, the percentage of sixteen year old males rose 
from 38% to 44% whilst the corresponding increase for females was from 48% to 54%.
These considerations suggest that a comprehensive model of the school leaving decision 
would take into account the various aspects of labour market experience, namely unemployment, 
YTS participation, and employment, which, in addition to wages, are likely to influence the decision. 
In practice, such a model would be very complicated indeed and is not attempted here. It would 
imply, at the very least, the joint determination of school-leaving, employment and YTS 
participation. Distinctions between types of full-time educational participation would also become 
fundamentally important. YTS might be considered as an alternative to taking part in a TVEI 
scheme, or more generally, obtaining further vocational qualifications, whilst it would presumably 
not be considered an effective competitor to more academic forms of further education. In the 
discussion of past results and the development and estimation of the model presented below, these 
issues are taken up in more detail.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 considers past studies of the schooling 
choice, concentrating on individual level cross-section studies. Section 3.1.1 discusses past studies 
which focus on the role of wages in determining educational choice. The principal study of this kind 
is Willis & Rosen (1979). These authors estimate a structural human capital model involving the 
simultaneous determination of wages and participation in further education. Much of what is said
3 The Rice (1987) paper discussed in this chapter uses the "Effects of Educational Maintenance Allowances" (i.e. 
financial support for those remaining in full-time education) as its principal justification. Since the data employed 
come from 1976, however, the analysis allows no consideration of the effects of YOP or YTS. Other problems with the 
study are discussed below.
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regarding this paper may be applied to the use of the human capital approach in general, and, to this 
end, their model is analysed in some detail. Section 3 .1.2 turns to a consideration of more general 
models which recognise the role of unemployment, and occasionally government programmes, in 
determining school-leaving. Given the complications implied by the recognition of the role of 
unemployment in school-leaving, these are almost invariably reduced form models although, in some 
cases, the inclusion of exogenous variables employed to capture individual expectations renders the 
distinction between structural and reduced forms less well-defined.
Section 3.2 briefly describes the nature of the data employed in this paper and outlines the 
specification and estimation procedure adopted for the empirical model. After a brief consideration 
of the problems involved with the explicit incorporation of YTS into the model, a single equation 
reduced form probit model is proposed and estimated using data drawn from the YCS. An attempt is 
made to take some account of expectations through the inclusion of terms to represent labour market 
conditions, however, these do not prove to be particularly successful. Section 3.3 presents and 
discusses the results. The principle findings are that school-leaving is strongly influenced by both 
individual and family background characteristics. These findings are compared to previous studies 
which consider the British youth labour market in earlier periods to examine the changing nature of 
the influence of social class. In this indirect manner, some light is also thrown on the role of changes 
in the youth labour market. Section 3.4 provides some concluding comments.
3.1: Empirical Analyses of School-Leaving
3.1.1) School-leaving and Wages
The seminal paper in this area was undertaken by Willis & Rosen (1979, hereafter W&R) 
who estimate what might be termed an extreme form of the human capital model. W&R analyse the 
school-leaving decision and the determination of individual earnings taking into account the 
interdependence between the two. As Griliches (1977) notes, one problem with human capital 
models estimating earnings as a function of schooling is that, in a choice model of this kind, the 
length of schooling itself depends on the expected returns to education. If expectations concerning
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returns are rational, in as much as they differ from realised earnings only in a non-systematic way, the 
decision as to the length of time spent in full-time education is endogenous to the model W&R 
consider such a model in the American context, estimating factors influencing the choice between 
leaving school with a high-school diploma and continuing in education at college taking into account 
the implied simultaneity of observed earnings and the school-leaving decision.
Putting the argument in slightly more formal terms, W&R assume that individuals are only 
concerned with maximising lifetime income, or rather an infinite earnings stream4. In such a context, 
individuals choose schooling option j so as to maximise:
ac
£ ( / ,^ )  = Jexp(-n)£(r„)</i (3.1)
0
Where Yjt represents earnings of the individual in option j at time t; r is the discount rate; PVj is the 
present discounted value of the earnings stream corresponding to option j, and, the E(.) terms 
represent expectations on the part of individuals. It may be noted that, throughout the analysis, 
individual subscripts are suppressed, although it should be remembered that all the variables are 
individual specific.
W&R further simplify the choice problem, restricting their attention to just two options: 
leaving education after completing high school; and, staying on in college. Clearly, this is an 
important simplification, but also one which they are well aware of. In this context, individuals may 
be thought of as implicitly maximising the income streams within the two possible options. That is to 
say, they will continue their education in graduate school, for example, if the net gain is positive (as 
against leaving education after completing college). W&R do discuss problems with the error 
normality assumption in the face of truncated normal variables implied by this assumption, however, 
they leave the issue unresolved Hartog et al. (1989) propose a means to deal with this problem. 
They estimate a structural model which is similar in character to that of W&R, but which allows for 
seven different exit levels from education. In order to arrive at a manageable form for estimation,
4 As W &R point out, the assumption of an infinite rather than finite time horizon should have little effect on the 
results, ceteris paribus, since the existence of a positive discount rate ensures that income in later life has a relatively 
low weighting in the objective function.
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however, they necessarily make another fairly strong assumption about the error terms. Specifically, 
they assume a stepwise decision process. That is, at each level, individuals decide on the basis of 
current information whether or not to continue in education, rather than deciding at the outset at 
which level to leave education. Thus, the error terms at each level are assumed to be independent of 
those at higher levels.
One important question to be raised regards the treatment of expectations. Leaving aside for 
the moment the assumption of risk neutrality which is returned to below, W&R assume that 
expectations are rational in a very particular way. At the time of making the decision as to whether 
or not to stay on in education individuals estimate their lifetime earnings prospects in the different 
options. In order to operationalise such prospects one needs to assume some relationship between 
expected and realised earnings. W&R assume that expected earnings are related to realised earnings 
in the following manner
r ^ E l r ^  + e , eit~N{0 ,a2) (3.2)
Such an approach implies the estimation of a model in which earnings and the school-leaving 
decision are simultaneously determined. Expectations are estimated at the reduced form stage by a 
regression of realised earnings on all exogenous variables. Expectations are thus taken to be the 
estimated value of the systematic component of realised income which is subsequently inserted in the 
structural equation of educational choice. In principle, this assumption regarding expectations implies 
that at the moment of making the decision, all systematic movements in the relative earnings from the 
different occupations over the individual's lifetime are anticipated. Such an approach is frequently 
employed in cross-section work, perhaps because of the relative ease with which lifetime earnings 
expectations may be derived. It should be noted, however, that it is quite different from the type of 
rational expectations assumed by time-series analyses  ^where the expected gains from staying on in 
education are generally assumed to be related to current (rather than future) values of observed 
variables. That is to say, the calculations of gains are presumed to be based on what more and less 
educated workers earn at each stage of their career at the point in time at which the decision is
5 See, for example, Pissarides (1981) or Whitfield & Wilson (1991).
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taken. Not, as is assumed by the model of W&R, what they will really be able to earn over the 
lifetime (give or take a random error). That is, taking into account future changes in the structure of 
demand for different types of labour and the like.
Siow (1984) proposes a rational expectations model in which earnings at the time of entry to 
the labour market provide sufficient information on future earnings streams, in as much as other 
wage differentials will be arbitraged away by future generations. Siow further provides a simple and 
convenient test of the rational expectations hypothesis in this context. Unfortunately, Connolly
(1989) points out that this conclusion, and, consequently, also the test of the rational expectations 
hypothesis, are both crucially dependent on the assumption that the only source of heterogeneity 
across workers is the level of education. Once earnings differences due to experience are 
incorporated, the entire stream of future earnings enter the earnings function. It might also be noted 
that Orazem & Mattila (1991, p.Ill) report that estimates of earnings based on the myopia 
assumption were more successful than rational projections of the type employed by W&R in 
explaining career choices.
Additional assumptions are employed to further simplify the analysis. Education is assumed 
to be an investment good whose only cost is that of foregone earnings during the period spent in 
education. That is to say, there is no mention of school being a consumption good with an associated 
price. One might justify such an assumption suggesting that the direct (consumption) benefits and 
costs are likely to more or less cancel each other out, however, it is difficult not to feel that some 
mention of this issue would have been warranted.
In order to arrive at an estimable form of the model, W&R employ one other assumption 
worthy of comment. This regards the rate of growth of earnings. W&R employ the observed income 
at two points in an individual's career, which, coupled with the assumption of a constant rate of 
growth of income allow the estimation of lifetime earnings. Micklewright (1988) has questioned the 
use of such an assumption on the grounds that it will tend to underestimate the rate of growth of 
earnings in earlier life, which, given a positive discount rate, will have an important influence on the 
decision. It is commonly observed in empirical work that, in both the United States and Britain, the 
rate of growth of earnings decreases with age, eventually becoming negative. That is to say,
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individuals' earnings profiles display quite a different shape to that assumed by W&rA The inclusion 
of this assumption, coupled with a first-order Taylor's approximation, allows the straightforward 
derivation of lifetime earnings from the two observed income variables.
The W&R model may now be summarised. After completing high school, individuals face the 
choice of whether or not to continue their education at college. The decision they make depends on 
whether the discounted earnings stream from the college option is greater than that from leaving 
education. That is to say, if the expected (i.e. the systematic component of realised) earnings after 
going to college are sufficiently high to more than compensate for the period of zero earnings 
sustained during the college period. Thus, individuals will continue in education at college level iff:
ac od
E(PVt) = Jexp{-rt)E(Yu)dt > E(PV2) = ] exp(-rt)E(Y2,)dt (3.3)
s 0
where the subscripts 1 and 2 represent the staying-on and leaving options respectively, and s 
represents the length of time spent in additional schooling. One may perhaps express the condition 
more clearly as:
ao s
/<(-«)[£(};, )-E{Y„)}dt>  Jexp(-«)£(};,)<* (3.31)
s 0
Simply stated, individuals will remain in school so long as the higher discounted earnings stream 
derived from a college education more than compensates for the zero earnings received during the 
period spent at college.
The W&R paper, therefore, has the virtue of being explicit in the relationship between the 
theoretical and empirical models. The price of such explicitness is a number of questionable 
simplifications. The crucial point, however, is that at no stage is the underlying human capital model 
tested. The internal consistency tests carried out serve to verify the accuracy of the approximation of 
lifetime earnings by initial earnings and a geometric growth rate and do not test the theoretical model 
in itself. Furthermore, it should be added that the rational expectations hypothesis and the human
6 See, for example, Murphy & Welch (1990) for the USA and Moghadam (1990) for Britain.
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capital model cannot be independently tested. Thus, the lack of statistical significance (and/or wrong 
sign) of coefficients on terms representing expected income in W&R, as well as in other cross- 
section studies of this type^ may be given one of two possible interpretations. Either expected 
income is not important in the decision process, or, rather more plausibly, the variables employed to 
represent income expectations in empirical applications do not adequately measure the phenomenon 
which they are intended to capture. That is, the systematic component of realised future income is 
not in fact closely related to individual income expectations.
As regards the econometric specification of the model, one or two further issues should be 
mentioned. Firstly, identification requires that there is at least one explanatory variable in the 
structural wage equation not included in the structural school-leaving equation. In their formulation, 
W&R choose to enter "ability" indicators as influencing wages directly, whilst family background 
variables have an impact on the school-leaving decision through their influence on the discount-rate. 
Thus, this formulation posits that individual characteristics such as ability contribute towards the 
determination of potential earnings in the various options whereas family background characteristics 
enter only in as much as they influence the discount rate, r. No justification is given for such a 
division, although the need for some difference between the two equations is discussed. In as much 
as family background variables may reflect financial constraints on the choice, their introduction 
through the discount rate may be reasonable, certainly it is not clear what other justification they 
might be given in the context of the human capital model. Whilst the model is consistent with the 
maximisation of a family utility function with the earnings of children as arguments, the "inclusion of 
family effects in this way excludes the possibility of education being a consumption good. It is noted 
below that tastes for education are likely to be influenced by family background in a variety of ways.
A more serious criticism of the reported estimation procedure regards the introduction of 
schooling duration and work experience variables into the structural wage equations (Table 3, p. 
s26). In statistical terms, if an explanatory variable in one of the equations is exogenous then, when 
one substitutes expressions for the endogenous variables to arrive at the reduced form, such a 
variable must also be present. If, on the other hand, the variable is endogenous, it is correct to 
exclude it from the reduced form but, of course, it needs explaining. That is, to complete the system,
7 See below, and, for example, the results of Micklewright (1988) and Hartog et. al. (1989).
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there should be a structural equation corresponding to each endogenous variable. W&R follow 
neither of these procedures introducing experience and schooling-duration variables in their 
structural wage (and wage growth) equations which were not present in the reduced forms. If these 
variables are exogenous, their exclusion from the reduced forms implies bias in the estimation of the 
other reduced form coefficients and underestimation of the size of the standard errors of parameters 
arising from the correlation of omitted variables with those included. If, on the other hand, the 
excluded variables are endogenous, the structural form parameter estimates are biased due to the 
correlation between the endogenous variables and the error term.
One might look at this issue from the point of view of the logic of the theoretical model. 
Indeed, it is in these terms that W&R provide a logically inconsistent statement justifying the 
inclusion of these variables. Thus,
"structural estimates of earnings ...are somewhat different from the typical earnings 
equations....because they include a much sparser set of regressors. For example, we know 
respondents' unemployment experience ...and so forth but have not included them in the 
regressions. The logic lies in the model itself: at the time the decision was made, there is no 
reason to expect that respondents knew the outcomes of such variables,"(W&R, p. s23).
But, two sentences later they argue that,
"the problem is more difficult in the case of school-completion differences ...[which] raises an 
unresolvable aggregation problem. The anticipation's argument above suggests that school- 
completion differences within group A [stayers] may not enter the earnings equations ... 
Alternatively, it can be argued that the level of schooling achieved within group A should be 
controlled ...[the] latter specification is used to estimate the structural probit." (W&R, p. s23).
One might agree that the level of schooling should form part of the analysis, however, at the. 
same time the issue of endogeneity or exogeneity is in no way resolved. Indeed, matters are made 
worse because W&R deal with the problem in an inconsistent manner. W&R are faced with the 
logical problem that future values of the wage are determined partly by factors unknown at the time 
the decision is made as to whether to stay on at school or not. This raises an obvious question related 
to the modelling of expectations considered above. If young people are not aware of the influences
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that various factors will have on their estimated earnings, how can they rationally formulate such 
expectations®. W&R fall between two stools by including variables representing different completion 
times of schooling. As they observe, the problem is not resolvable within the simple dichotomous 
choice framework of the model. That being the case, however, such variables should not enter the 
analysis at all. Clearly, the question of the level of education chosen would fit conceptually into the 
model. Different levels of education could be incorporated formally as part of the choice problem as 
in Hartog et. al. (1989). One is left wondering why, given that they choose not to add this 
complication to an already sophisticated model, they include such variables at all and do not leave 
their effect implicit in the other variables in the model. One might observe that in the earnings and 
eamings-growth equations the R2 is extremely low, particularly in the case of the early school- 
leavers who do not have the benefit of the additional variables. It might also be noted that these 
additional variables are almost the only statistically significant explanatory variables in the 
regressions. Finally, one might add that the coefficient on the growth rates of earnings in the 
structural leaving equation is extremely unstable. In the case of leavers’ growth-rates, the coefficient 
is either statistically insignificant (at a 5% significance level) or wrongly signed.
Recently, a similar model to that employed by W&R has been applied to British data 
(Micklewright, 1988). Micklewright's model differs from that of W&R in as much as he allows for 
two sample selection effects: with regard to the leaving decision (as in W&R); but, also with regard 
to panel attrition in the data. The principal differences between the two models, however, arise 
because, in contrast to W&R, Micklewright employs no underlying theoretical structure which 
allows a flexibility not possible in the W&R model. Thus, the analysis differs somewhat in the 
underlying assumptions. Micklewright does not adopt the rigid distinction between individual ability 
and family background influences. He also adopts a more empirically accurate varying growth rate of 
earnings. Finally, Micklewright's analysis differs from that of W&R in that he enters estimates of the 
leavers and stayers earnings separately, rather than in the form of a ratio. In so doing, it emerges 
that, at least in Britain, the only correctly signed and statistically significant earnings variable is 
starting earnings. In interpreting his results, Micklewright points to problems of measurement with 
respect to lifetime earnings data. One is again faced with the difficulty of the representation of
8 It may be noted that Hartog et. al. (1989) resolve the issue by allowing earnings expectations to differ systematically 
from expected earnings, allowing variations in the type of job to influence earnings but not earnings expectations.
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expectations in the model which, in this case, is aggravated by problems in the measurement of 
realised incomes. In any event, if Micklewright's analysis does not provide much evidence against 
such a hypothesis, it certainly provides no support for the idea that lifetime earnings play an 
important role in the leaving decision at sixteen.
I feel that the crucial weakness in this type of model is the assumption made concerning 
expectations. That is, the assumption that the decision to leave school depends on the non-stochastic, 
or more precisely, the explicitly explained part of the realised values of earnings. Micklewright 
suggests that the statistical insignificance and/or wrong signs on future earnings coefficients may be 
due to a divergence between the estimated values employed and their realisations and not to a 
divergence between individuals' expectations and their representation in the empirical estimation. 
Once again, the problem arises that their is no way of testing the formation of expectations 
independently of the effect of realised values in such a model.
Thus, the estimation of structural human capital models allowing for the endogeneity of 
e a r n in g s  has so far not produced very satisfying results. Even in its simplest form, a structural model 
raises a number of difficult estimation issues. Once the possibility of unemployment and, more 
generally, different labour market states is recognised, these difficulties are aggravated. The 
discussion continues below with a consideration of the approaches that have been adopted to deal 
with (or avoid) problems posed by the structural model. As before, the central issue revolves around 
the treatment of expectations.
3.1.2) School-leaving and Unemployment
One important issue not treated in the structural models discussed above concerns attitudes 
to risk and, in particular, the role of future (unemployment expectations. Levhari & Weiss (1974) 
show that in the presence of risk aversion, investment in human capital is negatively related to the 
riskiness of the return. Snow & Warren (1991) consider the case in which labour supply is 
endogenous, thereby incorporating income effects on labour supply. That is, human capital 
-investment raises wage-rates and, therefore, potential but not necessarily realised earnings. The effect 
of the riskiness of the return depends on whether human capital investment is normal or inferior. In
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the former case, the Levhari & Weiss result holds, in the latter, the effect of uncertainty is 
indeterminate.
All of these models, however, assume that there is no constraint on labour supply. Common 
sense, as well as the rather more rigorous analyses of Ham (1986a, 1986b)9 suggest that 
unemployment does not necessarily represent voluntary leisure. Kodde (1988) explicitly incorporates 
unemployment expectations in a theoretical and empirical model of educational choice. Employing a 
two period framework, individuals allocate their time between the labour market and education in the 
first period. In the second period, they spend all their time in the labour market. Both those with and 
without further education face a non-zero unemployment probability. Unemployment probability is 
higher and wages lower (in both periods) for those not undertaking further education. Thus, the 
choice problem faced by individuals has a similar form to the W&R model summarised by equation 
(3.3) above. There are three basic differences. Firstly, Kodde introduces the possibility of a non-zero 
unemployment probability. Secondly, time is collapsed into two periods. Finally, schooling choice 
regards the amount of time spent in education and not the dichotomous choice between school and 
labour market. He derives the theoretical prediction that the demand for further education rises with 
increases in the probability of employment at all levels of education as well as increasing in response 
to improvements in the relative advantage of more educated people with regard to the chances of 
finding a job. The effect of foregone earnings is indeterminate, however, wage gains arising from 
education will have a positive effect on human capital investment.
In his empirical model, Kodde gets around the problem of estimating earnings and 
(un)employment expectations by using data which includes explicit information on individuals' 
expectations. Whilst he is then heavily dependent on the accuracy of self-reported expectations, it 
might reasonably be argued that such reports are likely to conform more closely to the phenomena 
which they are intended to represent than the constructed estimates considered above. Certainly, the 
parameter estimates produced by Kodde are more satisfactory than those based on rational future 
expectations. They have the expected signs and are almost always statistically significant^. On the 
other hand, the two period structure of Kodde's underlying theoretical model makes it difficult, in the
9 See also the papers considering the issue of market clearing in the labour market cited in Chapter one, note 13.
10 The exception being the coefficient on expected foregone earnings which, as noted above, has an indeterminate 
effect on the decision in the theoretical model.
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empirical application, to interpret earnings and employment expectations as lifetime values. The 
expectations variables employed might therefore be more properly thought of as starting earnings 
and employment prospects relating to the two options. Thus, strictly speaking, the model does not 
test the predictions of human capital theory.
Turning now to reduced form estimates, that is to say, models which get around the problem 
by avoiding it altogether. Using this approach, the effects of expected financial and other gains are 
not explicitly included. Several studies have been carried out in Great Britain. Rice (1987) reports 
reduced form estimates for a human capital model based on cross-section data. Her theoretical model 
differs from that of W&R in that family background variables are assumed to affect attitudes towards 
further education, that is, to have a direct effect on the school-leaving decision and not just to 
influence the discount-rate, although, of course, in the context of a reduced form model, such a 
distinction is of no material importance. Regional dummies, the regional unemployment rate and 
measures of household income are also included. It should be noted that the regional unemployment 
rate is included to reflect variations in the opportunity cost of further education. That is, in contrast 
to Kodde, a higher unemployment rate is seen as reflecting lower expected foregone wages for those 
staying on in school, and not as influencing the expected returns to education. Finally, and of 
principle importance, since Rice is interested in the potential effects of Educational Maintenance 
Allowances (EMAs), the model includes family income variables. These represent the existence (or 
absence) of constraints in the decision and might therefore be thought of as entering through their 
impact on the discount-rate. Rice finds no significant impact for males, but a strong impact for 
females. In the context of a reduced form, however, this result may be somewhat misleading in as 
much as it neglects any substitution effects influencing the choice, as she herself observes. Finally, 
Rice finds a significant positive impact of the unemployment rate on staying on rates, which 
conforms to her prior expectations.
Micklewright, Pearson & Smith (1990) argue for a rather more sophisticated treatment of the 
role of unemployment in the school-leaving decision. Building on the arguments contained in Kodde 
(1988), they suggest that, although the current level of youth unemployment is likely to have the 
effect suggested by Rice, current levels of adult unemployment are likely to influence expectations 
concerning future prospects. Higher expected future unemployment will tend to reduce the returns to
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education, although such an effect may be mitigated by the fact that the more educated, or rather, 
better qualified individuals will face a lower unemployment probability (Nickell, 1979). Finally, there 
is the impact of parental unemployment which is likely to raise the probability of leaving school since 
it lowers both consumption and investment demand for schooling (Micklewright et. al., 1990, p. 
163) and reduces access to credit, i.e. raises the discount-rate. Rice takes account of this last factor 
by including family income as an explanatory variable. Micklewright et al. use, in addition, the 
proportion of the previous year spent in unemployment by the head of the household. They find that 
regional unemployment-rates have a positive impact on the probability of leaving school at sixteen. 
That is, the opposite effect to that found by Rice (and, indeed, by Pissarides, 1981). One explanation 
may be sought in the different time periods analysed. Pissarides' analysis covers the period 1955- 
1978, whilst Rice looks at cross-section data for 1976. Micklewright et. al., on the other hand, 
employ cross-section data over the period 1978-84, during which unemployment was rapidly rising. 
It may be the case that the effect of such increases in unemployment has been to lower the expected 
returns to schooling sufficiently to counteract the opportunity cost effect.
Another aspect of the problem is considered by Micklewright (1989). The paper concentrates 
on family background and individual specific effects (namely school-type and a measure of ability), 
leaving aside issues related to unemployment rates. The inclusion of family background variables 
provides a basis for comparison with the results presented below and discussion of them is deferred 
to section 3.3. It is interesting to note here that, in common with his previous estimates 
(Micklewright, 1988), he finds no significant impact of household income on the school-leaving 
decision, although, in common with Rice (1987), Micklewright finds that the effect is better 
determined for girls than for boys. This raises the obvious question as to what the Head-of- 
Household unemployment variable in Micklewright et. al. (1990) is actually reflecting. However, it 
should be recalled that the more recent analysis refers to a period of relatively high unemployment.
One issue which has not yet been dealt with in microeconometric studies of educational 
choice regards the role of government training programmes. Programmes such as YTS are likely to 
influence the decision in two ways. Firstly, in the short-run, YTS participation may be seen as 
reducing the probability of unemployment on entering the labour market at sixteen and therefore 
increasing the opportunity cost of education. This is likely to have a limited impact for two reasons.
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As noted previously, the YTS allowance was relatively low, slightly above the social security benefit 
available to unemployed young people'1. Secondly, it was noted in chapter one that YTS involved a 
substantial degree of displacement. Many YTS places substituted jobs which would have existed in 
any case, presumably with higher rates of pay.
Perhaps of more importance are the long-run effects. In as much as YTS raised the level of 
human capital of participants, or generally made them more attractive to employers, YTS was likely 
to raise the post-programme employment prospects of young people. In both cases, the effect of 
YTS would be to increase the attractiveness of the labour market as opposed to further education 
Thus, one would expect a negative influence of YTS on staying on in school In as much as full-time 
employment provided higher wages and a more stable future12, the effect of YTS was likely to be 
less influential than increases in the probability of finding work. Thus, an improvement in the 
probability of finding employment on entering the labour market should be more influential in 
determining the choice. In their study of school-leaving employing aggregate time series data, 
Whitfield and Wilson (1991) report an elasticity of the staying on rate with respect to YTS of -.2 for 
boys and -.4 for girls at the 1985/6 levels of participation. The elasticity of staying on with respect to 
the unemployment rate is of the order of . 1. Therefore, the implications are that the longer run 
effects of YTS were operating. This abstracts from a number of problems. In particular, YTS 
participation is likely to be endogenous13 and thé effect of unemployment is ambiguous given the two 
opposing influences identified above.
To summarise, it is important to note that, despite the plausibility of the positive relationship 
between the expected earnings gain from education and the propensity to stay on in school, 
sophisticated structural models employing what might be termed rational future expectations have 
failed to produce statistically significant support for the notion. The results presented by Kodde 
(1988) employing a direct measure of expectations have produced more satisfactory estimates
11 As with the studies discussed above, the assumption is made that the negative impact of unemployment arose solely 
through a reduction in income. The possibility that unemployment is intrinsically unpleasant does not materially affect 
the thrust of the argument. The implication of negative utility arising from unemployment in itself is that the effects 
of YTS would be reinforced.
12 See chapter four below.
13 Whitfield & Wilson deal with this by using lagged values of YTS participation, subsequently testing for omitted 
variable bias through the wrrimritm of current values. Having thus excluded current values, they test for simultaneity 
bias using the lagged values of YTS participation only. One might question the appropriateness of this methodology. 
YTS values from year to year are likely to be highly correlated, and, therefore, it is not surprising that the exclusion of 
current YTS participation is not rejected. It would be interesting (and would constitute a more convincing test) to 
consider the possibility of simultaneity bias including cunent values of YTS in the specification.
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suggesting it may not be the human capital model which is at fault but rather the modelling of 
expectations. In as much as Kodde employs variables which should perhaps be interpreted as 
representing starting rather than lifetime values, however, the issue remains unresolved.
A second issue which remains to be dealt with regards the influence of YTS on the decision. 
Theoretical considerations suggest that this is likely to have a negative impact on staying on, 
however, given the low levels of remuneration, and the more stable future provided by a "real" job, 
the effect is likely to be weaker than an improvement in employment prospects. The situation is 
complicated when it is recognised that YTS participation is likely to be endogenous. In o u tlin in g  the 
empirical model below, problems associated with the inclusion of YTS participation in the decision 
are dealt with more formally. Discussion of this issue provides a justification for the simpler 
approach actually adopted.
3.2: Empirical Model.
In this section a single equation model of the school-leaving decision incorporating individual, 
family and background socio-economic effects is presented. Labour market variables are included in 
order to take some account of the role of individual expectations on earnings and (unemployment 
experience related to the two options. These "expectation" variables are measured at a regional 
rather than an individual level, however, so they cannot adequately control for individual differences 
which will inevitably be absorbed to some extent by other explanatory variables in the model.
3.2.1) Basic Model
Before outlining in more detail the estimation procedure it is worth considering the modelling 
problem in a little more detail. To keep things simple, suppose that earnings and employment 
probability differ between the two options, but that they remain constant over time. Suppose also 
that the only influence of unemployment is to reduce earnings and that unemployment income is 
zero. None of these simplifications affect the thrust of the argument expressed in its general form. 
Now suppose that young people can choose whether or not to participate on YTS. To remain in the 
spirit of the human capital model, suppose that expected and realised values are equal. The
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probability of staying on at school may be expressed as a function of individual characteristics and 
the outcomes associated with the two options:
p(s =  1) =  f{X,p(e  =  1|j =  1)£(h-| s  =  1 ),p(e =  l|s =  0)£(w>| j  =  0)} (3.4)
where X represents a vector of individual characteristics, s is a dummy taking the value of one if the 
person stays on in school and e is dummy taking the value of one iff the person finds a job. The 
reasoning above suggests that > 0, and <0 where the two terms represent partial derivatives
with respect to the second and third arguments of the function. The third argument has a dual role. It 
is important in itself in determining the opportunity cost of education, but also enters as a 
determinant of the expected gains from education. It is probable that the third argument will depend 
also on whether or not the individual participates on YTS. Thus:
p(e = 1|j = 0)£(w |i = 0) = p(y = 1 )p(e = l|s  = 0,^ = 1)£(H s = 0,.y = l) + p(y  = 0 )p(e = \\s = 0,.y = 0)£(w |s = 0,.y = 0)
(3.5)
where y=l if person participates on YTS and y=0 otherwise. The argument outlined above was that
YTS would plausibly raise the probability of finding work and the wages of participants. Thus,
— ; ^  (0. This does not, however, represent a full specification. Note that the probability of
dy
participating on YTS should more correctly be expressed as:
p {y= i) = p(y = i k = °)
_ p ( y - 1,^=0) (3-6)
1 - p i s  = 1)
If YTS participation and school-leaving are independent, then the model reduces to (3.5). Given the 
structure of the decision procedure assumed, however, this cannot be true. The YTS participation 
decision will necessarily depend, amongst other things, on the gains from staying on in school. Once 
one recognises the role of YTS in determining employment and wage prospects, the situation is 
further complicated.
Some practical considerations should be introduced at this point. Firstly, the expected 
prospects for the majority of people staying on at school are not observed in the data set employed
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here. In principle, one might employ the third sweep of the data to remedy this, however, in a more 
realistic framework the problem is not resolved. The third sweep of YCS would give information on 
wages for those eighteen/nineteen year olds enter the labour market with two years of post- 
compulsory education. In practice, wages and employment prospects change over time, however, so 
that it is clear that the gains to further education are only likely to be observable over a longer time 
span. Indeed, in the short-run, these "gains" may be negative.
A second issue of central importance regards the decision making process, and, in particular, 
the formation of expectations. It is simply not plausible to suppose that sixteen year olds have more 
than a vague idea of the wage and employment prospects associated with the various outcomes This 
is not to say that they do not rationally choose whether or not to continue in further education based 
on their expectations. Rather, the point is that expectations are not likely to be the highly 
sophisticated formulations implied by an augmented W&R model. This is particularly the case of 
labour market entrants, and is used to justify the separation of school-leaving from the determinants 
of labour market experience examined in chapters four and five. Specifically, YTS had only existed 
for just over one year when the educational choice was made, and had only been fully operational 
since September 1983. The relevant information on the outcomes for YTS participants necessary to 
make even a short-run rational choice was therefore not available. Thus, the assumption adopted 
here, and in the following chapters is that the school-leaving/YTS decision process was sequential, 
not simultaneous. That is, young people first chose whether to stay on at school or not based on an 
assessment of prospects. Subsequently, labour market entrants "chose'' whether or not to participate 
on YTS14.
Given these considerations, the rather complicated modelling framework outlined above is 
not adopted here. It is questionable whether a more sophisticated simultaneous model is likely to add 
much to our understanding. Given the unsatisfactory nature of the expectations variables included, 
however, the individual specific variables will necessarily also reflect individual differences in 
expectations. On the other hand, the model is consistent with the proposition that variables such as 
family background and individual characteristics exert a direct influence on the probability that an 
individual continues in full-time education beyond the minimum school-leaving age, rather than
14 The basis of the YTS participation decision is developed more fully in chapter four.
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simply being proxies for expectations, capital market constraints and unobserved ability. In order to 
further consider this question, various specifications are presented.
The model used is the univariate probit. The existence of an unobserved or latent variable s* 
is postulated. This represents the "tendency" to stay on in full-time education. This latent variable is 
assumed to be a linear function of various independent variables, X, producing the standard linear 
model of the form:
s' = X0+e e~ N (  0,1) (3.7)
The outcome of this variable is observed in terms of whether or not a young person decides to stay 
on in full-time education. That is, the dichotomous variable, s, is observed taking the value of one if 
the person stays on and zero if the person leaves full-time education, s is related to s* by the 
following relationship:
5=1 if  s' > 0 
j  = 0 Otherwise
(3.8)
Therefore, we may postulate that the probability that the person stays on at school is:
p(s=\) = p{e>-Xp)  (3.9)
Given the assumptions on the error term, this may be expressed as:
p(s=l) = \-<t>(-XP) = Q(XP)
x* ,/ ( «2>\
= j  (2tt) ^  exp —— \du (3.10)
-*>  V /
giving the likelihood function:
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n [ <xA »f[<t>(-A w r‘s) (3.11)
3.2.2) Heteroscedasticity
The formulation of (3.11) neglects an important specification issue. In the theoretical 
econometrics literature, it is well-known that, if the error term in the probit model is not 
homoscedastic (i.e. does not have constant variance), estimation produces not only inconsistent 
(biased) estimates of standard errors, as in the linear model, but also inconsistent parameter estimates 
(e.g. Godfrey, 1988). This is easy to see when one considers that in a probit model, the error 
variance, a, is not identified. Thus, in practice one estimates p/o not J3. The normalisation, cr=l is 
innocent so long as a  is constant, however, if it is not, the variation in cr will obviously affect the 
estimate of the parameter vector, (3.
Yatchew & Griliches (1985) consider the effects of specific forms of heteroscedasticity in the 
univariate probit model, and Davidson & MacKinnon (1984) suggest tests for multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity in this context. As yet, this interest has not been reflected in any change in applied 
work which almost invariably ignores this issue15. The tests for heteroscedasticity are based on the 
comparison of the hypotheses:
where x\ is some function of a set of independent variables. Davidson & MacKinnon suggest 
employing the function:
where W is a row vector of independent variables, and 8 is a parameter vector16. In the case of the 
univariate probit, therefore, the test consists of a comparison of the models:
15 A recent exception to this, in the context of the univariate probit model is provided by Knapp & Seaks (1992).
16 The functional form is not relevant for testing purposes, so long as: a) it is twice differentiable; b) Tj(0)* 1; and c)
(3.12)
Ti = exp(Wj&) (3.13)
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H0.p{e = 1) = 4>( Xfi)
Ha:p{e = \) = Q>
exi
Xfi
p ( M
(3.14)
Whilst the testing procedure is fairly well established in the literature, the response to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity is not. The most obvious solution, and that employed here, is to use the 
heteroscedastic model employed in the test (Greene, 1993).
It should be noted that the test is also likely to pick up others forms of misspecification of the 
model. Thus, what is called heteroscedasticity may, in reality, be more properly thought of as, for 
example, incorrect functional form. However, since the predicted probabilities are calculated using 
the entire corrected function, the exact interpretation of what is being picked up is of minor interest. 
That is to say, the interpretation of what "heteroscedasticity" actually represents should not affect the 
probability calculations which are the focus of interest17.
The parameter vectors P and S are estimated simultaneously. The heteroscedastic model 
takes the form of the alternative hypothesis in (3.14). The likelihood function therefore becomes:
n <p Xfi jexp(W &) J 1-<D X fi[exp (fVS) / . (3.15)
The procedure adopted to choose the precise specification of heteroscedasticity consisted of: a) 
estimation of a model including in W all the variables in X save the intercept18; and, b) reduction of 
the terms in W using t-ratios so as to have a relatively simple form of heteroscedasticity which, at the 
same time, was not rqected in a formal comparison with the more general model. Once again, results 
are presented below for both the heteroscedastic and homoscedastic models so as to allow further 
consideration of the issue.
17 This approach still assumes error normality. A promising alternative which has not yet found its way into the 
mainstream applied literature would be to estimate the model semi-paramctrically. This approach allows a more 
general form of the distribution of the error term. See, for example, Horowitz (1993) and Gabler et al. (1993). Gerfin 
(1993) provides a comparison of the performance of the probit model with three semi-parametric estimators in the 
estimation of a labour-supply model for German and Swiss married women. For Germany, but not for Switzerland, he 
finds that the probit model is rejected in favour of a semi-parametric estimator although it still performed better than 
the semi-parametric estimators in a within sample simulation.
18 Since exp(0)=l, the inclusion of an intercept term is redundant.
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3.2.3) Empirical Implementation
The data employed are drawn from the second sweep of the YCS. Although, in principle, it 
would be possible to estimate the model using just the first sweep, it was noted above that use of the 
second sweep allows the inclusion of additional individual characteristics obtained at that time. In 
particular, data on ethnic origin and disability was only collected at the time of the later sweep.
The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of one if respondents stated that they 
were in full-time education at the time of the first sweep of the data, that is, in the Summer 198519. 
For the purposes of the analysis I consider staying on at school to comprise those continuing in all 
forms of full-time further education. The use of the later date to define staying on in school largely 
avoids the problem of the interpretation of the decision. That is, it excludes those people returning to 
school or college in the Autumn for retakes. On the other hand, it was noted in chapter two that 99% 
of those in full-time education in the Summer of 1985 were also in full-time education in September 
1984. The use of the later date also gets around the problem of missing data. The "diary" questions 
regarding the status in each month between September 1984 and May 1985 are subject to a small 
percentage (1-3%) of non-response. Thus, to be explicit, the probability of being in education one 
year after the earliest possible leaving date is estimated.
No distinction is made between school-leavers who enter the labour market and those 
leaving the labour force. Clark & Summers (1982) suggest that for American teenagers 
unemployment and out-of-the-labour-force are not distinct states. For the purposes of the analysis 
here the question makes little practical difference. Excluding from the sample those who reported 
themselves as doing "something else", that is, as neither unemployed, employed, on a government 
training scheme or in full-time education removes 46 young people from the sample and has virtually 
no influence on the parameter estimates.
19 As noted in chapter two, the date of return of the questionnaires varied somewhat. The vast majority (90.0%) were 
received between May and July, 1985.
In common with other studies of this type, I consider the problem in terms of a simple 
dichotomous choice, not taking into account, for example, the intended length of time to be spent in 
further education, the type of institution chosen, nor indeed, the date of school-leaving^0.
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. I postulate that 
the leaving decision will depend on a variety of factors. Firstly, items which might be considered 
immutable individual characteristics. In this group fall DISABILTY and BLACK, dummy variables 
representing the possession of a significant disability and ethnic origin respectively21. These variables 
are both expected to have a positive influence on staying on in education through their influence on 
its opportunity cost. That is, both the probability of finding work and the wages received in 
employment are likely to be lower for coloured and disabled people22.1 would argue that this is due 
more to discrimination on the part of employers than to any objective difference in the potential 
productivity of these groups. Whatever the reason, if the perceived difference is reduced by 
education, that is with education the relative discrimination against these groups is reduced, then one 
would expect a positive coefficient on these variables.
The third indigenous (although not immutable) characteristic is gender. The effect of being 
female is expected to be positive. The higher staying on rates of females is a feature of all EC 
countries apart from Greece (figure 3.1), and has been fairly stable over time in the UK (figures 1.5,
1.6). This higher staying on rate is reflected in the sample, as can be seen from table 3.1. This issue is 
returned to in the discussion of the results.
The next group of variables included relate to the individual's experience at school. The 
influence of a part-time job at school is not obvious a priori. In as much as a job at school may 
reflect an underlying desire to (i.e. a relative preference for) work rather than study, as well as, 
perhaps more importantly, giving the individual greater access to labour markets, one would expect a 
negative impact on staying on. On the other hand, a part-time job also provides a certain amount of
20 In principle, respondents may have left full-time education at a variety of dates, and, in particular, one might 
expect some difference in the nature of the decision for those leaving at Easter before taking any exams, and those 
leaving in the Summer 1984.
21 Full definitions of variables employed in the analysis in this and subsequent chapters are included in a data 
appendix to be found at the end of the thesis.
22 Although, in the analysis of wages in chapter five, young people from ethnic minorities are found to receive higher 
wages in employment than other young people. Explanations for this finding are also offered below.
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income, thereby relaxing to some extent the constraint on further study imposed by what one might 
call imperfect capital markets.
In the case of the work experience variable, the expected sign is unequivocally negative. The 
relaxation of the financial constraint does not apply because work experience was not paid 
Furthermore, undertaking work experience at school would also reflect the class background of the 
person (in as much as it was only offered in schools more oriented towards sixteen year-old leavers) 
and more clearly, a relative preference for work in that such experience was a substitute for school 
lessons.
The dummy variables representing truancy at school (serious truants if the person played 
truant for weeks or days at a time, or for particular days or lessons, and occasional truants if they 
played truant for the odd day or lesson) are again expected to have an unequivocally negative 
influence on staying-on. They are presumed to represent a specific dislike of school, but in this case, 
do not necessarily indicate a relative preference for work. Rather, one might expect these variables to 
reflect motivational characteristics of individuals. That is, they are seen as operating through tastes 
for education rather than through the opportunity cost of further education. Indeed, chapter four 
below reports results suggesting that truants faced significantly lower employment probabilities once 
they entered the labour market.
I also include three dummies representing the type of school attended. A sixth form college is 
a school (generally an ex-grammar school) providing, in principle, exclusively post-compulsory 
education. The presence of young people under minimum school-leaving age reflects the fact that in 
the period under consideration these schools were being phased in. A grammar school is a higher 
ability school with post-compulsory educational provision. Comprehensive schools are all-ability 
schools which were in the process of replacing the old grammar/secondary modem system. Not all of 
these had provision for post-compulsory education. Those which did are explicitly included. The 
residual category is made up of those people attending comprehensive schools without a sixth form 
(i.e. post-compulsory provision) and secondary modem schools (also finishing at sixteen). The idea 
underlying these variables being that schools with a sixth form are more oriented towards further 
education, an orientation which may be inculcated in their students. Sixth form colleges and grammar 
schools are also associated with higher ability, in as much as they were subject to an entrance exam
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at eleven. The presence of an internal sixth form also eases access to staying on. Thus, one would 
expect a positive effect of each of these dummies on staying on.
I include two sets of variables intended to represent ability. An (integer) index of success in 
exams taken at sixteen (ILEA score). When included, its coefficient is positive and highly significant. 
In as much as it measures academic performance and not intrinsic ability, however, it is problematic 
as an explanatory variable since performance in examinations is also likely lo .reflect prior intentions 
with regard to school. That is, it is unlikely to be exogenous to the school-leaving decision In 
particular, young people who obtain the promise of employment before taking exams have much less 
incentive to perform well, and may even leave before sitting them. Therefore, we employ three 
dummy variables as alternatives. Specifically whether the young person received advice to stay on at 
school or not (from the family, teachers at school, or the careers service). These variables are an 
imprecise measure of ability, and, may reflect a number of other factors such as social class 
(particularly in the case of family advice), however, they do have the advantage that they may more 
reasonably be treated as exogenous to the school leaving decision. Results are reported for various 
specifications, principally differing in the ability variables included.
The model also comprises a number of variables representing family background. Family size 
represents the reported number of offspring in the family. It has often been suggested that the 
number of children in the family is likely to be negatively related to the probability of staying on^3 
The principle argument being that academic ability depends in part on the amount of time parents 
spend with each child. This, in turn, is negatively related to the number of children in the family. The 
effect is likely to be stronger in the presence of older brothers and sisters, however, the data does not 
allow us to distinguish between older and younger siblings. Therefore, we include the overall 
reported number of offspring in the family.
It has generally been found, not surprisingly, that parental social class has a significant 
influence on the school-leaving decision (Micklewright, 1989). These influences are taken into 
account explicitly by dummies representing whether the fathers occupation was professional, 
otherwise non-manual and whether the mothers occupation was non-manual. Social class is also 
likely to be reflected by variables included for other purposes, in particular, family advice to stay on,
23 See, for example, Micklewright (1989).
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family size and so on. These variables will also reflect different tastes for education, although, the 
issue of consumption and investment demand is somewhat blurred in as much as young people 
coming from "middle class" backgrounds may both be more aware of the potential material 
advantages of further education and also more able to realise such potential gains through easier 
access to jobs requiring higher levels of education. Thus, parental background is interpreted here as 
having a rather more extensive influence on the staying on decision of young people than determining 
their time-rate of preference as W&R would have us believe.
Parental self-employment might be thought of as having an effect more directly through 
household income, that is, reducing the financial constraint, in the absence of a specific measure of 
household income. On the other hand, parental self-employment is likely to enhance an individual's 
likelihood of getting a job, specifically, in the family firm, and thus encourage school-leaving. The 
direction of the effect is, therefore, ambiguous.
I also include a variable representing paternal unemployment at the time of the first sweep of 
the cohort. The idea underlying the inclusion of this influence is to represent the existence of a 
financial constraint to further education, however, it is somewhat unsatisfactory in as much as it 
refers to a single point in time one year after the school-leaving decision is made. Finally, in the 
group of family background influences, I include a dummy variable to represent whether or not 
young people live in owner occupied (as opposed to rented) accommodation. Here again, the idea is 
that home ownership represents the relaxation of the financial constraint^, but, of course, it will 
also tend to reflect the social class of the parents.
The final group of variables included reflect local labour market conditions. As noted above, 
the approach to expectations adopted here differs from that of W&R. Rather than estimate a 
simultaneous model of the determination of earnings and school-leaving, I attempt to take some 
account of expectations by including variables reflecting labour market conditions at a regional level. 
In doing so, information is lost on individual differences in employment and earnings prospects, 
however, in the context of the discussion above concerning the formation of expectations, the 
relevance of rationally formed expectations seems at best problematic. Certainly, it has not been 
demonstrated that young people have such precise long-term perspectives on earnings and
241 do concede, however, that people suffering from re-possession might not be in full agreement with this argument.
84
(un)employment potential, much less has it been demonstrated that such correctly formed prospects 
exert an important influence on the school-leaving decision. In any event, the first two sweeps of the 
data do not provide information concerning even the starting earnings and employment prospects of 
eighteen year old leavers let alone their lifetime earnings potential, or indeed, the earnings increment 
arising out of an university education.
I employ three labour market variables. The first of these, youth unemployment, is the median 
uncompleted duration of unemployment for young people under twenty five, subdivided by region, 
and sex. This variable is intended to represent the (un)employment prospects of school leavers The 
use of this indicator, rather than the more conventional unemployment rate, is dictated by the 
availability of published data, however, I feel its use is appropriate. It was noted in chapter one that 
the increases in unemployment in the UK were due more to reductions in the unemployment outflow, 
reflected in increasing unemployment duration, than to variations of incidence (unemployment 
inflow). In as much as this variable represents the opportunity cost of further education, it is 
expected to be positively related to staying-on in school. The second unemployment indicator is the 
regional adult unemployment rate subdivided by sex. This is intended to capture, to some extent, 
unemployment expectations. An increase in the regional adult unemployment rate implying a 
reduction in the expected returns to education as discussed by Kodde (1988) and Micklewright et. al.
(1990). Thus, the distinction is drawn between the youth unemployment situation reflecting the 
opportunity cost of education, expected to be positively related to staying on, and, the adult 
unemployment rate reflecting expectations concerning the returns to education which is likely to be 
negatively related to participation in further education. Apart from the fact that they do not take into 
account individual differences in employment prospects, the principal problem with the 
unemployment variables is that they do not distinguish between unemployment rates according to 
education, which would allow a clearer consideration of the issue. That is, one would expect that the 
g a in  in employment prospects to be had from further education would be at least as relevant as the 
absolute level of unemployment. A YTS indicator is not included. In as much as it reduced 
unemployment, its effect will be partly subsumed by the youth unemployment variable, and the 
direction of the effect should be the same. On the other hand, use of YTS was highly correlated with
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unemployment levels, therefore its inclusion would compound the multicollinearity problems already 
present in the other three labour market variables included.
The third, and final, labour market variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of non-manual 
to manual hourly earnings at a regional level derived from the New Earnings Survey. This is intended 
to reflect the wage gain to be had from staying-on at school. One would expect a positive 
relationship between this ratio and staying on. That is, the larger the difference between non-manual 
and manual wages, the greater the incentive to continue in further education.
3.3: Results
Table 3.2 below reports the results of the estimation of the school-leaving model. Variables 
preceded by "Log" represent natural logarithms. Five separate estimates are presented, model 1 
excludes expectations (labour market) variables; model 2 excludes all ability variables; model 3 
excludes exam performance (ILEA score); model 4 excludes the advice variables; and, model S 
presents the full specification, providing a basis of comparison for the other models.
It may be noted that heteroscedasticity was detected25. Furthermore, the more general form 
of heteroscedasticity is rejected. It will also be observed that each of the exclusions implied by 
models 1 to 4 are rejected by a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. The specification of model 5 is therefore 
preferred. This ignores the probable endogeneity of exam performance. On the other hand, whilst the 
estimates of the impact of "ability" thus measured are likely to be biased, the inclusion of ILEA score 
(in addition to the advice variables) implies that the influence of other variables may be considered to 
be "net” of ability.
Since, the estimation of the effects of the independent variables are also dependent upon the 
parameters of the heteroscedastic function, comparison of parameter estimates is not very revealing. 
Thus, the specific effects are considered separately in table 3.3. The effects are calculated as the shift 
in probability of staying on at school brought about by the inclusion of the specific variable. That is, 
the effect is calculated as:
25 Full results for the homoscedastic model are presented in an appendix to the chapter.
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Where i>0 represents the mean probability of leaving school, and <t>, gives the probability with the 
addition of the relevant variable. In the case of continuous variables, the effect of an increase of one 
standard deviation is considered. The table also reports, in the final column, the estimated 
probabilities calculated using the homoscedastic model. The results produced suggest that taking 
heteroscedasticity into account did not greatly influence the probability estimates.
With regard to the labour market variables, one is immediately struck by their individual lack 
of statistical significance. As a group, however, their exclusion is rejected by a LR test at a 1% 
significance level (model 1). This points to the importance of multicollinearity, with all three 
indicators being closely related for obvious reasons. The joint significance of the variables implies 
that they do have a role to play in young people's school-leaving decision. Their lack of individual 
significance implies, however, that little or nothing can be inferred from the model regarding the 
nature of this role. On the other hand, it will be observed that all the coefficients do have signs 
consistent with a priori expectations and that the size of the effect is fairly stable across the different 
specifications. The effect of youth unemployment is to raise the probability of staying on consistent 
with the notion of a lowering of the opportunity cost of further education, whilst the adult 
unemployment rate, reflecting future expectations, tend to lower the probability of continuing in 
school, consistent with their role as indicators of lower returns to education. Similarly, the coefficient 
on the non-manual/manual hourly wage is, as would be expected positive, albeit statistically 
insignificant.
It may be noted that being female had a small "positive" impact on staying on. The influence 
is net of the lower unemployment rates facing teenage girls. That is, in calculating the effect of being 
female, the lower u n e m p lo y m en t rates and lower wage differential were also included. This explains 
the difference in sign ificance  of the "female" variable between tables 3.3 and 3.2. In the earlier table, 
when labour market variables were included the coefficient was generally not statistically significant. 
When one allows for variations in these factors, however, the calculated effect of being female 
becomes significant.
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Belonging to an ethnic minority appears to have a relatively strong and statistically significant 
impact on staying on. This confirms the notion that people coming from ethnic minorities are more 
likely to remain in school. As suggested above, my explanation of this regards the relatively poor 
prospects facing such minorities when they do enter the labour market which it was not possible to 
incorporate in the labour market terms. On the other hand, the effect of disability is much weaker 
and not generally statistically significant. It might be that, in this case, the difficulties faced in finding 
work are mirrored by difficulties in continuing in school.
Turning to the variables relating to experience at school, it is apparent that whilst work 
experience has a significant negative influence on staying on in school, the possession of a part-time 
job at school does not. This may be explained by the effect of income relaxing to some extent the 
financial constraint on further education in the case of a part-time job, and therefore, to some extent, 
counteracting what might be called the labour market attachment effect that both a part-time job and 
work experience represent. Since work experience is not paid, the only influence operating is the 
latter one
As regards the truancy variables, one may note that their negative influence is sizeable and 
statistically significant. The effect is substantially reduced when the ILEA score is included reflecting 
the poor performance of truants in examinations. In all cases however, truancy remains negative and 
statistically significant over and above the ability indicators. This is interesting in as much as people 
who play truant at school are not likely to be advantaged on entry into the labour market as is shown 
below in chapter four, and thus, it is reasonable to consider these variables as representing general 
motivation of the individuals concerned as regards their interest and ability both at school and in the 
labour market.
It will also be observed that the type of school attended appears to be particularly important 
in determining staying on. I would suggest that this is the result of a variety of factors. In addition to 
the influence of the school's attitude to further education, one might also note that the type of school 
attended will also reflect class, and, in the case of sixth form colleges and grammar schools, ability at 
eleven when selection for these schools was undertaken. In the case of comprehensive schools, 
admission is not regulated on the basis of ability and one might suggest that it is more the effect of
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ease of access to a sixth form that is operating in this case. Not surprisingly, these variables lose 
some of their influence once exam success is taken into account.
The variables included to capture ability are all highly significant. The stronger influence of 
family advice may reflect familial preference for education as well as simply ability, whereas advice to 
stay on at school by members of the school will tend to depend, given the attitudes of the particular 
school, more strictly on the academic ability of the student. It will be observed that the effect of these 
variables is substantially reduced when the ILEA score is also included. The fact that they are 
reduced adds weight to their employment as indicators of ability, whereas, the fact that two of them 
•remain statistically significant suggests that, particularly in the case of family advice, they are 
reflecting rather more than just ability. As regards exam success, it may be observed that both the 
ILEA score and its square have a positive coefficient, indicating that, ceteris paribus, the marginal 
effect of exam success on the probability of staying on increased with the level of success. Given the 
considerations above on the likely endogeneity of this variable, however, one should not attach too 
much importance to this result.
Turning to family background influences, one observes that family size exerts a statistically 
significant negative influence on staying on when exam results are excluded but otherwise not. This 
is as would be expected in as much as it was suggested above that family size might be related to 
academic ability.
As regards the other variables employed to explicitly represent the class background of young 
people, having a non-manual father or mother and living in an owner occupied household appear to 
have an im p o r ta n t  role in the choice of young people at sixteen I would suggest that this is likely to 
be due to consumption motives on the part of parents, although, as noted above it may also be the 
case that middle class families are more aware of, and more able to exploit, the financial (and other) 
gains to be achieved through further education. At the same time, these variables will also reflea, to 
some degree, relaxation of the financial constraint on further education. It may also be observed that 
parental self employment is always statistically insignificant, whereas, having an unemployed father 
appears to be positively related to staying on when exam results are included. This is quite the 
opposite of what was expected, and, I would suggest, may be due to the poor quality of the variable 
rather than the positive influence of paternal unemployment on staying on.
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The results confirm the importance of social class in the determination of the decision found 
by previous authors, and, in particular, by Rice (1987) and Micklewright (1989) who studied the 
same decision at a time of low unemployment. There is a strong effect even controlling for ability, 
and school type. This provides some indirect support for the suggestion that the worsening labour 
market situation facing young people had relatively little impact on their probability of staying on. 
On the one hand, coming from a "middle class" background would tend to enhance the employment 
prospects of young people26. In as much as these young people were less affected by the worsening 
conditions than their less fortunate counterparts, one would expect a notable reduction in the 
influence of social class on staying on. This is not evident from a comparison of the results. Rice 
(1987) finds that having a professional father increased the probability of staying on by 9 percentage 
points for boys and 13 percentage points for girls. The effect of having a father employed in an 
intermediate occupation (roughly equivalent to the other non-manual classification adopted here27) 
was very similar, 9 percentage points for boys and 12 for girls. More in line with the results 
presented here, Micklewright (1989) finds a stronger effect of having a professional father. 
Specifically, controlling for ability, having a professional father raises the probability by 30 
percentage points for boys and 32 for girls (my calculations). This is higher than the 17 percentage 
points calculated above, however, Micklewright's analysis does not include a variable to control for 
home ownership. Since professional people almost invariably own their own houses, inclusion of this 
variable in the effect raises the "effect" to 24 percentage points. On the other hand, the effect of 
intermediate occupations is, once again, very similar to the effect found here, 10 percentage points 
for boys and 12 for girls (compared to 11 percentage points reported above). The implication is that 
the influence of social class has not greatly altered between the seventies and eighties. For the 
reasons mentioned above, I would suggest that this supports the notion that class factors far 
outweigh the role of (un)employment expectations in determining the choice.
26 Evidence presented in the next chapter supports this proposition.
27 The other non-manual classification includes also skilled non-manual workers. In both the analyses considered 
here, although the effects were estimated separately for this group, the parameter estimates were not statistically 
different from the intermediate group.
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3.4: Conclusions
In this chapter I have considered some of the issues involved in the d e te rm in a tion of decision 
as to whether or not to leave school at the minimum school-leaving age. In the consideration of 
previous approaches to this problem I identified the difficulties associated with the estimation of 
expectations, and the corresponding failure of such models to provide convincing support for more 
extreme versions of the human capital model. In particular, the idea that the decision is based 
exclusively, or even principally, on the maximisation of discounted expected lifetime ea rn in g s has 
not been demonstrated. Two potential explanations of this failure may be suggested. Either young 
people do not maximise expected lifetime earnings and/or the variables employed in such models to 
represent expectations do not correspond to those actually held by individuals. Certainly, the two 
interpretations are not mutually exclusive. However, in the type of model employed by these studies, 
it is not possible to distinguish between these two alternatives. In as much as it is based on a two 
period model, I would argue that the analysis undertaken by Kodde(1988) offers evidence to support 
the view that individuals have a rather short-run view of expectations. Certainly the relatively good 
results suggest that individuals are responsive in their choices to what they perceive as their income 
and employment prospects.
In the second part of the chapter I undertook an empirical estimation of the school-leaving 
decision in England and Wales. I attempt to get around the problems of expectation formation by 
e m p lo y in g  aggregate regional level variables to capture expectations. In as much as these neglect 
individual level differences, however, they do not fully capture the effects of expectations which will 
largely be absorbed by the other explanatory variables in the model. Indeed, they do not prove to be 
enormously successful in determining differences in the probability of staying on in full-time 
education.
It does emerge from the estimation, however, that participation in full-time education is 
s t r o n g ly  by individual and family characteristics. In particular, the social class of
individuals plays an important role in the decision as to whether or not to stay on in school even 
when ability and the type of school attended are controlled for. In the analysis presented above, it 
was not possible to formally distinguish between different explanations of this finding, however, I
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feel that the strength of the effect is sufficient to reject an explanation relying entirely on differences 
in the time-rate of preference, along the lines of the W&R model.
Comparison with previous analyses of the same decision in the seventies demonstrated that 
the influence of class has remained remarkably constant over time. It was suggested that this 
provides indirect evidence to support the idea that worsening labour market conditions have had a 
relatively minor role in the schooling choice.
It is more difficult, however, to distinguish between consumption and investment motives 
That is, social class is likely to affect individuals tastes for education, but, also the possibility of 
realising the potential material gains to be had. Given that ability is amply controlled for (even 
though its measured influence is problematic due to its probable endogeneity this, obviously, does 
not affect its value as a control) the differences in the probability of staying on by social class cannot 
be attributed simply to relative advantages in wage and employment gains due to ability. It may be, 
indeed I feel it is almost certainly, the case, that coming from a "middle-class" background allows 
young people to realise wage and employment gains from further education which are not available 
to their less fortunate "working-class" colleagues. In any event, in the present context, the question 
of consumption versus investment as a basis for class differences in the demand for further education 
remains unresolved. It is, I hope, fairly clear, however, that a simple human capital model which 
neglects such issues entirely ignores an important source of variation in staying on rates with wide- 
reaching implications.
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Table 3.1: Means (standard deviations of continuous variables In brackets) of variables used in
the analysis
ALL STAYERS LEAVERS
(n=6075) (n=3296) (n-=2779)
STAYON .54
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY .03 .03 .03
BLACK .04 .06 .02
GIRL .53 .56 .50
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
PART-TIME JOB .56 .56 .57
WORK EXPERIENCE .29 .26 .33
SERIOUS TRUANT .11 .04 .19
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .34 .32 .37
SIXTH FORM COLLEGE .07 .13 .01
GRAMMAR SCHOOL .04 .06 .01
COMPREHENSIVE (SIXTH FORM) .65 .67 .61
ADVISED TO STAY BY FAMILY .58 . .79 .34
ADVISED TO STAY BY TEACHER .38 .51 .23
ADVISED TO STAY BY CAREERS SERVICE .27 .37 .16
ILEA SCORE 29.2 (16.1) 38.0 (13.6) 18.1 (12.1)
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS
SIZE OF FAMILY 2.87 (1.62) 2.72 (1.46) 3.05 (1.79)
DAD PROFESSIONAL .06 .09 .02
DAD OTHER NON-MANUAL .31 .41 .19
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED .16 .18 .15
DAD UNEMPLOYED .07 .05 .09
MUM NON-MANUAL .42 .51 .31
MUM SELF-EMPLOYED .05 .06 .04
OWNER OCCUPIER .73 .84 .60
LABOUR MARKET
YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT 29.6 (5.89) 29.4 (5.83) 29.9 (5.95)
ADULT UNEMPLOYMENT 9.80 (3.47) 9.62 (3.41) 10.02 (3.48)
NON-MANUAL/MANUAL HOURLY
WAGE-RATE 1.48 (.11) 1.48 (.11) 1.49 (.11)
Notes: I) Youth Unemployment is defined as the median duration of uncompleted spells of unemployment for youths 
under 25 subdivided by region and sex, calculated from Published DE data for April 1984.
2) Adult unemployment is defined as the adult unemployment rate, subdivided by region and sex, average 1984.
3) The wage-ratio is calculated from the New Earnings Survey data on the Gross weekly Earnings of manual and 
non-manual workers, subdivided by sex and region.
TSJTT5 ^ robi^noddofSchooMSvi!^
Model ™ 1 
No
Expectations
rasran
No
Ability
T™ *io& r~
No
ILEA
J -
Score
Mod«;!
No
Advice
4 TSBU"
Fdl
Model
5"
INTERCEPT -2.55 (-13.40) -3.96 (-2.62) -3.80 (-2.25) -3.37 (-2.66) -3.02 (-278)
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY .22 (159) .32 (168) .22 (98) 0.30 (2 02) .21 (150)
BLACK .95 (7.95) 1.16 (6.58) 1.08 (5.97) 1.09 (6.55) .89 (7.43)
FEMALE .27 (5.58) .53 (2.28) .32 (1.20) .38 (1.90) .16 (.93)
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
PART-TIME JOB -.05 (-1.04) .07 (107) -.05 (-*5) -.10 (-1-88) -.06 (-*45)
WORK EXPERIENCE -.11 (-2.22) -.31 (-4.49) -.34 (-416) -.14 (-2.49) -.11 (-229)
SERIOUS TRUANT -.58 (-6.66) -1.75 (-9.42) -1.57 (-8.35) -68 (576) -.60 (-6 77)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT -.12 (-2.54) -48 (-6.21) -.42 (-502) -.18 (-2.90) -.13 (-2.60)
SIXTH FORM COLLEGE 1.80 (10.97) 3.59 (9.27) 3.27 (8.90) 2.65 (6.77) 1.82 (10.96)
GRAMMAR SCHOOL .81 (4.61) 2.24 (8.00) 234 (8.09) 1.12 (414) .79 (4.49)
COMPREHENSIVE (SIXTH FORM) .53 (8.86) 1.10 (10.22) 1.09 (8.98) .67 (6.64) .54 (8.96)
ABILITY
ADVISED TO STAY BY FAMILY .77 (11.31) - 1.41 (9.23) - .78 (1141)
ADVISED TO STAY BY TEACHER .09 (1.77) - .55 (5.96) - .17 (3.06)
ADVISED TO STAY BY CAREERS SERVICE .16 (2.97) . - .64 (583) - .09 (1.68)
ILEA SCORE/IO .33 (4.46) - - 18 (133) .34 (4.54)
ILEA SCORE SQUARED/1000 .36 (2.62) - - .98 (2.56) .35 (2.57)
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS
SIZE OF FAMILY .00 (20) -.07 (-3.36) -.05 (-2.11) .01 (81) .00 (.20)
DAD PROFESSIONAL .46 (3.80) 1.35 (617) 1.27 (5.59) .64 (4 18) 44 (3.67)
DAD OTHER NON-MANUAL .32 (5.85) .82 (7.80) .74 (6.59) .42 (5.29) .30 (5.58)
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED .07 (1 18) .08 (97) .06 (-62) .07 (97) .06 (94)
DAD UNEMPLOYED .16 (1.88) -.00 (-01) .10 (74) .23 (2.28) .19 (2.24)
MUM NON-MANUAL .15 (3.10) .48 (6.19) .36 (4.37) .22 (3.60) .14 (2.96)
MUM SELF-EMPLOYED .07 (-66) -.12 (-81) .08 (49) .06 (49) .09 (.79)
OWNER OCCUPIER .23 (4.20) .75 (8.10) .78 (7.30) .23 (3.50) 23 (4.25)
LABOUR MARKET
Log(YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT) - .83 (118) .60 (.76) .42 (.72) .44 (86)
Log( ADULT UNEMPLOYMENT) - -.50 (-98) -.58 (-98) -.41 (-96) -.56 (-148)
Log(Non-Manual/Manual wage-rate) • 1.93 (182) 1.26 (104) 1.37 (145) .75 (93)
Heteroscedasticity terms
FEMALE .11 (2.31) .08 (1-52) .13 (2.59) .07 (1.50) .11 (2.26)
PART-TIME JOB .13 (2.72) .29 (4.77) .20 (398) .09 (187) .13 (2.75)
COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL (18) -.20 (-3.51) -.13 (-1.74) -.14 (-2.24) -.30 (-4.77) -.19 (-3.44)
ADVISED TO STAY BY TEACHER .13 (2.28) .03 (53) .13 (2.41) .15 (2.83) .12 (2.13)
ILEA SCORE/IO - .55 (11.05) .47 (9.70) .18 (2-29) -
ILEA SCORE SQUARED /1000 - -1.12 (-14.55) -.90 (-12.86 -.21 (-184)
'
RESTRICTED LOG-LIKELIHOOD -4188.8 -4188:8 -4188.8 -4188.8 -4188.8
UNRESTRICTED LOG-LIKELIHOOD -2351.2 -3116.0 -2712.5 -2525.8 -2344.7
McFadden r-squared .44 .26 .35 .40 .44
LR TEST FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY 33.7 (4 d.f.) 213.1 (6 d.f.) 169.3 (6 d.f.) 47.0 (6 d.f) 31.8 (4 d.£)
LR TEST FOR MORE GENERAL HET 17.3 (22 d.f.) 33.8 (20 d.f.) 28.8 (20 d.f. 22.2 (20 d.f.) 16.9 (22 d.f.)
LR TEST FOR PARAMETER RESTRICTIONS 13.0 (3 d.f.) 1544.1 (5 <Lf.) 737.1 (3 d.f.) 363.7 (2 d.f.) -
N 6075 6075 6075 6075 6075
« It tU .Notes: 1) The McFadden is defined as: [ 1 -(ULL/KLL/J where u l l  is  me iog-iiKciinooa m n c u o n  m w u n i w u  w .u .  uj
parameters, RLL is the log-iikeiihood function maximised with respect to the intercept only, McFadden (1974).
2) The LR test for heteroscedasticity tests the homoscedastic model against the simpler form of heteroscedasticity. The test has
a distribution, and the degrees of freedom are given in brackets.
3) The LR test for more general heteroscedasticity, compares the heteroscedastic model with four or six terms with the more
general form including all 26 independent variables.
4) The LR test for parameter restrictions tests the restrictions imposed on each model against model 5. In the case of models 2, 
3, and 4, the relevant more general model includes also the ILEA score variables in the heteroscedasticity term. The relevant Log- 
likelihood is -2343.9. The specific tests are: Model 1 - Exclusion of Expectation terms; Model 2 - exclusion of "ability" variables; Model 
3 - exclusion of ILEA score: and. Model 4 - exclusion of advice variables.
95
Table 3 J :  Effects of Independent Variables evaluated at the Mean 
(t-ratios in brackets).
Model 7 Mode 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Sa
No No No No Fall Fall Model
Expectations Ability ILEA Score Advice Model No H et
IINDIGfcXJuS i i tA K A n iU lS T ic s
DISABILITY 09 (163) 07 (171) .05 (99) 08 (2 14) 08 (153) 08 (157)
BLACK .31 (10.01) .22 (5.00) .21 (309) 20 (1 86) 30 (371) .30 (392)
FEMALE 09 (4 94) 07 (3.52) .06 (144) 09 (461) 09 (2.78) 10 (503)
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
PART-TIME JOB -02 (-127) - 00 (-.01) -02 (-31) -03 (-186) -03 (-1 03) -03 (-1 52)
WORK EXPERIENCE -04 (-2.22) - 06 (-4 58) -08 (-4 36) -04 (-251) -.04 (-2.28) -04 (-2.32)
SERIOUS TRUANT -.22 (-7 10) -.33 (-6 91) -.32 (-443) -.-19 « -M  3) -.23 - ( * 0 9 ) -.22 (-675)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT -05 (-2 54) - 10 (-6 65) -.09 (-534) -05 (-3 11) -05 (-2.59) -.05 (-2 61)
SIXTH FORM COLLEGE 43 (1382) 43 (357) 43 (1 86) 43 (524) 43 (2 79) 41 (3 19)
GRAMMAR SCHOOL 28 (578) .36 (4.42) .37 (2.20) .27 (5 13) .27 (363) .21 (3.63)
COMPREHENSIVE (SIXTH FORM) .24 (947) .24 (7 79) .25 (4 82) .24 (9 75) .24 (7 87) 17 (560)
ABILITY
ADVISED TO STAY BY FAMILY .24 (10.30) - .24 (2.42) - .24 (366) .27 (4 73)
ADVISED TO STAY BY TEACHER .04 (178) - .12 (439) - 04 (167) .02 (101)
ADVISED TO STAY BY CAREERS SERVICE .06 (301) - .13 (4.19) - .06 (2.99) 06 (2 96)
ILEA SCORE .30 (12.25) - - 41 (193) 30 (4.00) .29 (443)
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS
SIZE OF FAMILY .00 (20) -01 (-333) -01 (-2.42) 00 (81) 00 (20) .00 (10)
DAD PROFESSIONAL .17 (4 16) .25 (5.21) .25 (3.04) 17 (4 70) 17 (346) 16 (3 76)
DAD OTHER NON-MANUAL .12 (6 11) 16 (685) 15 (420) 11 (6 14) 12 (485) .11 (504)
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED 03 (1 18) 02 (97) 01 (62) 02 (98) 02 (94) 03 (128)
DAD UNEMPLOYED 06 (191) - 00 (- 01) 02 (74) 06 (238) 08 (2.22) 07 (2.21)
MUM NON-MANUAL 06 (3 14) 10 (588) 08 (3 93) 06 (379) 06 (2.93) 05 (303)
MUM SELF-EMPLOYED 03 (67) -03 (-82) 02 (49) 02 (49) 03 (79) .02 (48)
OWNER OCCUPIER 09 (4 26) .15 (719) .16 (4 12) 06 (365) 09 (397) 09 (4 25)
LABOUR MARKET
Log(YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT) - .03 (I 26) .02 (81) .02 (98) 03 (93) 03 (93)
Log ADULT UNEMPLOYMENT) - - 02 (-.99) -03 (-101) -03 (-121) -05 (-152) -.05 (-164)
Log(Non-Manual/Manual wage-rate)
'
.02 (190) 01 (1 10) 02 (153) 01 (96) .01 (88)
Notes: 1) Effects are calculated at the mean school-leaving probability, .54.
2) Calculation of t-ratios are based on the general formula for the asymptotic variance of a non-linear function 
(e.g. Greene, 1993). That is, the asymptotic variance of the effect under consideration denoted by E is given by:
(.apj
In practice, the t-ratios were calculated using the WALD routine in LIMDEP 6.0. For the purposes of the calculation of 
t-ratios, the function was evaluated at the mean male values of continuous variables and at the default values of dummy 
variables. The constant was adjusted to ensure that the base probability was equal to the sample mean.
3) For dummy variables, the effect is the discrete shift in probability brought about by the inclusion of the 
variable. For continuous variables, the effect is the discrete shift brought about by an increase of one standard deviation 
in the variable. The effect of being female, for models 2-5a, include the effects of different mean levels of the 
expectation variables. That is, the effect is calculated including the girl dummy and shifting the values of the 
expectation variables from the mean male levels to mean female levels.
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(t-ratios in brackets).
sraa-----
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Expectations
Model""
No
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No
ILEA Score
mstT
No
Advice
Model
Fall
Model
-2.42 (-20.58) -2.11 (-2.43) -2.09INTERCEPT
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY
BLACK
FEMALE
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE 
PART-TIME JOB 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
SERIOUS TRUANT 
OCCASIONAL TRUANT 
SIXTH FORM COLLEGE 
GRAMMAR SCHOOL 
COMPREHENSIVE (SIXTH FORM)
ABILITY
ADVISED TO STAY BY FAMILY
ADVISED TO STAY BY TEACHER
ADVISED TO STAY BY CAREERS SERVICE
ILEA SCORE/IO
ILEA SCORE SQUARED/1000
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS
SIZE OF FAMILY
DAD PROFESSIONAL
DAD OTHER NON-MANUAL
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED
DAD UNEMPLOYED
MUM NON-MANUAL
MUM SELF-EMPLOYED
OWNER OCCUPIER
LABOUR MARKET
LogiYOLTTH UNEMPLOYMENT)
Log( ADULT UNEMPLOYMENT)
.21 (1.67) .16 (149) .09
.92 (8.67) .81 (8.07) .71
.25 (5.84) .32 (2-29) .15
-.05 (-1.08) -.05 (-131) -.05
-.10 (-2-22) -.21 (-5.23) -.20
-.56 (-7.34) -1.03 (-15.54) -.94
-.11 (-2.52) -.28 (-7.06) -.24
1.45 (11.90) 1.97 (17.81) 1.71
.59 (4.04) 1.42 (U 78) 1.29
.45 (9.40) .62 (14.59) .60
.76 (17.29) .88
.05 (1.07) 31
.14 (2.90) 33
.35 (5.53) -
.29 (2.68) -
.00 (08) -.03 (-2.61) -.03
.45 (4.19) .90 (9.91) .74
.29 (6.09) .51 (12.19) .42
.09 (1-50) .08 (1.63) .07
.16 (1.85) -.00 (-07) .03
.14 (3.21) .30 (7.65) .22
.03 (33) .00 (03) .04
23 (4.59) .43 (9.81) .42
(-2-26) -2.71 (-2.81) -2.76 (-2-75)
(79) 25 (2.05) .20 (155)
(6-83) .97 (9.10) .88 (8.06)
(99) .21 (1.34) .13 (79)
(-135) -.08 (-182) -.07 (-153)
(-4.63) -.12 (-2.63) -.11 (-2.33)
(-1334) -.57 (7.63) -.58 (-7.47)
(-5.85) -.13 (-2.90) -.12 (-2.61)
(15.01) 1.67 (13-69) 1.48 (12-05)
(10.11) .57 (3.%) .58 (390)
(13.14) .45 (9.76) .46 (9.55)
(21.51) - .77 (17.42)
(7.34) - .05 (1-01)
(7.21) - .15 (3.03)
.39 (6.38) .35 (5.57)
.35 (3.22) .29 (2-66)
(-236) .01 (70) .00 (ID
(7.66) .52 (4.99) .43 (4.01)
(9.37) .32 (6.78) .28 (5.72)
(129) .08 (1 47) .07 (1*23)
(36) .18 (2-15) .19 (22\)
(5.33) .18 (409) .14 (3.07)
(41) .03 (.32) .05 (47)
(9.17) .20 (4.11) .23 (4.62)
(85) 38 (85) .41 (88)
(-1*24) -.43 (-130) -.56 (-162)
(100) .76 (LOI) .66 (86)Log(Non-Manual/Manual wage-rate)
.39 (95) .37
-.24 (-79) -.40
1.06 (158) .71
RESTRICTED LOG-UKEUHOOD 
UNRESTRICTED LOG-UKEUHOOD 
McFADDEN R-SQUARED
N
-41888
-2368.1
.43
6075
-4188.8
-3222.5
.23
6075
-4188.8
-2797.2
.33
6075
-4188.8
-2549.3
.39
6075
-4188.8
-2360.6
.44
6075
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CHAPTER FOUR: YTS AND EMPLOYMENT
In this chapter, the effectiveness of the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) in England and Wales 
is analysed in terms of its impact, at an individual level, on the employment prospects of young 
people. The analysis goes beyond previous work in that it explicitly deals with the problems of 
sample selection bias in the determination of employment and the effects of heteroscedasticity. Both 
sample selectivity and heteroscedasticity are found to be present and influential on the estimates 
obtained. An heteroscedasticity corrected switching bivariate probit model is proposed and is found 
to be preferred to both the univariate probit and the bivariate probit model with a dummy variable 
representing YTS participation. In addition to alleviating distortions due to sample selectivity and 
heteroscedasticity, the preferred model explicitly allows the effect of YTS to vary across individual 
characteristics. Thus, it is possible to identify which types of people benefited more or less from 
participation on YTS.
The results of the empirical implementation of the model suggest that the previous studies of 
Main & Shelley (1990, hereafter M&S) and Whitfield & Bourlakis (1990, 1991, hereafter W&B) 
may have underestimated both the size and the variability of the effect of YTS participation on the 
likelihood of finding employment. The more general model employed also suggests that the effects of 
some labour market disadvantages, namely those associated with being female and being a habitual 
truant, were partially alleviated by YTS participation. On the other hand, the effect of other 
disadvantages, in particular, those faced by ethnic minorities and disabled people were accentuated. 
For these groups, YTS is found to have no significant influence on the probability of finding work. 
Thus, their relative disadvantage in the labour market is increased rather than reduced 1.
In the first section, issues underlying the evaluation of YTS are briefly discussed. This is 
followed by a consideration of the issues involved in the estimation of the impact of YTS on 
employment prospects. In particular, the problems of sample selection bias and heteroscedasticity are 
considered. The third section presents the estimation results. An univariate probit model, similar in 
character to those estimated by both M&S and W&B is estimated and compared with the results
1 The relative disadvantages facing ethnic minorities in the labour market have recently been analysed by Drew et. al. 
(1992) and by Jewson et. al. (1990), whilst those facing the disabled are considered by Morrell (1990).
presented in these studies. Subsequently, tests for heteroscedasticity and sample selection as well as 
more general formal comparisons of the different models are undertaken. Full results are presented 
for the heteroscedastic univariate probit and switching probit models. The final section summarises 
the results.
4.1: YTS and Employment
In chapter one, some broad issues concerning the youth labour market in Britain were raised. 
This also involved a brief discussion of the characteristics and development of YTS along with a 
consideration of some of the wider implications of the scheme for the youth labour market2. Here I 
limit myself to reiterating the central features of YTS which are relevant to the analysis undertaken in 
this chapter and the next.
The scheme was introduced in April 1983. It involved one years work experience with an 
employer including at least 13 weeks "off-the-job" training. The scheme was principally aimed at 
sixteen year-old school-leavers, although unemployed seventeen year-olds were also eligible. Young 
people received a small weekly allowance (£26.25 in 1985) financed by the government, although 
employers were free to supplement this if they so chose. In the sample considered here, 8.4% of 
those on YTS at the time of the first sweep (Summer 1985) reported that they received more than 
£26.25. The mean take home pay for those receiving more than the minimum was £34.46.
One of the stated aims of the programme was to provide "a permanent bridge between school 
and work" and, in particular, to enhance the employment prospects of young people. Two principal 
ways in which this was to be achieved may be identified in government pronouncements. Firstly, 
through the provision of general (as opposed to firm-specific) training. Thus,
"YTS is designed to give school-leavers a range of practical, transferable skills to enable them 
to compete more effectively in the labour market," (HC Papers, 1982/3, 335-i, p. 1)
2 fhapman & Tooze (1987) provide a more detailed treatment of the development of YTS. Dolton (1994) provides a 
brief overview of the youth labour market in the eighties in Britain, along with a consideration of some of the issues in 
modelling the effectiveness of YTS.
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In other words, YTS was to increase participants' human capital, and therefore make them more 
attractive to employers. The second mechanism through which YTS was to improve young people's 
chances of finding jobs was through the lowering of their wage expectations. In his March 1985 
budget Speech, Nigel Lawson, then Chancellor of the Exchequer made this explicit saying,
"Since it was first launched in 1983 the Youth Training Scheme has proved to be a very 
successful bridge between school and work. It lias also helped to make young people's pay 
expectations more realistic," (quoted in Main, 1987a).
YTS was to make participants more attractive to employers both through increasing their 
level of (particularly transferable) skills and through the lowering of expected and, therefore, 
reservation wages. This suggests that one suitable indicator of the effectiveness of YTS would be its 
impact, at an individual level, on the probability of finding work.
It is important to be clear, however, that the analysis presented here, in common with M&S 
and W&B3, regards participants' relative position in the labour market. The evidence presented in 
chapter one on the job displacement effects of YTS, and, of more direct relevance, the importance of 
aggregate demand in determining the level of youth unemployment suggest that most of the YTS 
"effect" should be interpreted in terms of the improvement of participants position in the job queue 
at the expense of others, rather than through a generalised increase in demand for youth labour. 
Thus, the effects of YTS reported below are based on a comparison between YTS participants and 
non-participants in the presence of the scheme, and conclusions should not be drawn as to what 
would have happened in the absence of the programme.
4.2: Modelling Employment Probability
A useful staring point for this analysis presented here is the basic model used by the two 
studies of YTS cited above. M&S and W&B both estimate single equation probit models of the 
probability of finding work including as explanatory variables one or more dummies representing 
participation on YTS^.
3 This is also the case with the analysis of Dolton et al. (1994b) considered briefly below.
4 This approach was also used by Main (1985,1987a) in analysing YOP.
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Before outlining the model in detail, a brief digression is necessary to consider the alternative 
duration analysis of the employment effects of government training programmes. The earliest 
analyses of this form were undertaken by Ridder (1986) on Dutch data and Card & Sullivan (1988) 
on American data. Recently, this type of approach has also been used to analyse YTS in Britain 
(Dolton et al., 1994b, hereafter DMT15). The basic model of Dolton et al. comprises the analysis of 
the time spent between leaving school and obtaining the first job6. Although, in principle, this 
approach appears attractive, in practice it presents a number of problems. The first regards missing 
and erroneous response to the diary questions. The second, and more important problem concerns 
the modelling of YTS participation. Specifically, the treatment of time spent on YTS in the context 
of the duration of job search. On the one hand, it is not appropriate to treat YTS participation as if it 
were unemployment. YTS participants had less time in which to undertake job search than the 
unemployed, and, if they expected to be kept on by the same employer at the end of the scheme, they 
might not have engaged in job search at all. Therefore, comparing the time spent to the first job 
including the duration of YTS participation will tend to underestimate the impact of YTS. On the 
other hand, it is not appropriate to exclude time spent on YTS from the analysis. This is for two 
principal reasons. Firstly, It was shown in chapter two that the primary destination of early YTS 
leavers was full-time employment. Thus, at least some YTS participants were engaged in job search 
while they were on the scheme. There will, as a consequence, be a tendency to overestimate the 
impact of YTS if the time spent on the scheme is excluded from the analysis since a number of YTS 
participants left the scheme in order to take up an offer of a "real" job. Secondly, those YTS 
participants (assuming they joined the scheme more or less straight from school) who completed the 
scheme would be entering the labour market one year later than those who did not participate. They 
would be one year older and would face a different labour market to non-participants. DMT1 deals 
with these issues by considering duration models with and without time spent on YTS. This 
obviously does not resolve the problem7. Perhaps it might be reasonably argued that the effect of
5 in this chapter and the following one I make reference to a number of papers by Dolton, Makepeace & Treble. In 
doing so I refer to the specific papers I use index numbers (DMTi) whilst in referring to the authors themselves 1 use 
DMT, that is to say, I exclude the index.
6 DMT employ two basic definitions of exits. The first is the exit to any job. The second, in an attempt to distinguish 
between employment in the primary and secondary sectors, is exit to a good job. See the cited paper for details.
7 Nor, incidentally, does the estimation of an accelerated time model with a sample selection term for YTS 
participation which is reported in the second part of DMTI.
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YTS lies somewhere between the two estimates assuming that the first will tend to overestimate the 
duration and the second underestimate it. Since the results produced vary considerably according to 
whether time spent on YTS is included in the duration to the first job, this does not take one very far, 
and, perhaps for this reason, DMT1 does not adopt this sort of reasoning. In any event, 
considerations of this type lead me to exclude an analysis of YTS of the form undertaken in DMT1 
at an early stage in the preparation of this study.
Returning to probit analyses of the effect of YTS on the probability of finding work, the 
model is framed in terms of an unobserved or latent variable, e*, which is a linear function of 
individual characteristics and may be expressed as:
e* = Xfi+yy + e (4.1)
where y is a dummy variable representing YTS participation and X is a vector of individual 
characteristics affecting the probability of obtaining employment .^ The latent variable may be 
thought of as representing the person's position in the labour queue in the spirit of Thurow's job 
competition model9. M&S and W&B both suggest that this approach is also consistent with a human 
capital model. In such a model, however, one would expect the decision to participate on YTS to 
depend on the expected discounted lifetime gains in terms of both employment prospects and wages 
arising out of participation. That is to say, one would expect YTS participation to be endogenous, 
depending on both employment and wage outcomes 1®. A structural human capital model in which 
the decision to participate on YTS depends on the probability of subsequently finding work whilst 
the probability of finding work depends on YTS participation is not, however, logically consistent 
(Schmidt, 1981, Maddala, 1983, p. 119). Essentially, this is because, in order for the four 
probabilities to sum to one, one or other of the effects must be zero. In the present context, it is 
worth noting that Ashton & Maguire (1986) found that only 26 % of male and 30% of female YOP 
participants interviewed gave "easier to get a job" as one of the reasons for joining YOP and none 
replied in terms of increased wages, whilst, on the other hand, 65% of males (68% of females) stated
8 As before, individual subscripts are suppressed except in cases where their omission may cause confusion.
9 W&B offer a more detailed treatment of the logic underlying the job competition approach.
10 Chapter three considered an example of a structural human capital model of this type and provided fairly extensive 
criticisms of the assumptions implied by this type of approach.
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one reason for joining as being that it was "better than nothing" i. e. unemployment. Thus, the 
suggestion is that the YTS participation decision depended primarily on the individuals current 
situation and not on expected future gains, therefore, I exclude the endogeneity hypothesis a 
priori 11.
If e* is positive the person is observed as being in employment, otherwise they are not. The 
assumption that e is distributed normally with unit variance leads to the probit model so that the 
probability that a person is in employment may be expressed as:
p{e = \) = Q>{Xp+yy)= J (2/r)'1'2 expj — (4.2)
where e is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the person is in employment and zero 
otherwise. Thus, the likelihood function to be maximised is:
<43>
In this context, the effect of YTS on employment probability is calculated as:
p{e = l\y=\)-p{e = \\y=0) = <D( y) -  <t>{X0) (4.4)
and similarly for the other explanatory variables^.
4.2.1) Sample Selection Bias
The question of sample selection bias in models of wages has received much attention 
however, in a probabilistic framework the issue is generally ignored. The presence of sample
11 In the case of the basic bivanate model, but not the switching bivariate model, it is possible to estimate the reduced 
form. Employing this approach does not greatly alter the results obtained.
12 The assumptions that the critical value of e* is zero and that z has unit variance are innocent normalisations. See, 
for example, Greene (1993) on the former and Godfircy (1988) on the latter.
13 I use the discrete shift by the inclusion of the relevant variable rather than the partial derivative to measure 
the marginal effects of explanatory variables. When the relevant explanatory variable is a dummy, the use of partial 
derivatives can produce nonsensical results (Caudill & Jackson, 1989). See also chapter three above.
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selectivity is likely to have just as serious consequences for the estimated programme effects in the 
non-linear case as it does in the linear model. The problem is as follows. In order to use a single 
equation model, it must be assumed that the decision to participate on YTS is independent of 
unobserved variables in the error term o f the employment probability equation. In other words YTS 
participants should constitute a random subset of school-leavers, at least as regards unobserved 
characteristics. It was noted above that YOP was not considered an attractive alternative to 
employment. It will be recalled from chapter two that the YCS data tends to support this picture also 
for YTS. Only 8% of YTS entrants in the sample were in employment in the month previous to 
joining the scheme. The introduction of a term representing early employment experience in the 
equation should eliminate, or at least mitigate, this potential source of bias13.
The problem is more serious if unobserved factors, such as motivation, which influenced the 
chances of finding work, also influenced YTS participation. Consider the job competition model It 
may be the case that YTS participants were more motivated than non-participants, and that this 
greater motivation was observable by potential employers in job interviews, but not by the analyst 
conducting the research. If this is the case, then YTS participants would have held a higher position 
in the queue than non-participants, ceteris paribus, even if they did not participate on the scheme. 
Alternatively, the converse may be true. In both cases, a problem arises because unobserved factors 
influencing both YTS participation and employment probability will be interpreted as part of the 
YTS "effect".
The argument may be put more formally. The problem arises when y and e in (4.2) are 
correlated. Suppose that YTS participation itself may be thought of in the latent variable framework, 
in an analogous way to employment. Thus, the likelihood of YTS participation may be represented 
by an underlying latent variable, y*, which is determined by the relationship:
14 The seminal articles dealing with this problem are Heckman (1979) and Bamow et al. (1979).
15 It might be noted that univariate probit estimation of employment probability without the inclusion of a dummy to 
represent early employment experience produces a negative and statistically significant coefficient on YTS 
participation. This might explain the negative coefficient on YTS reported by Dolton et al. in an early presentation of 
DMT1 at the Conference on "Vocational Training in Britain and Europe," held at Oxford University, in September 
1992. Although they suggested at the time that two of the three specifications of the employment probability equation 
presented were replications of the M&S and W&B specifications respectively, nowhere did they introduce terms to 
control for early (unemployment present in this analysis and in M&S. Specifically in the "M&S specification" they 
introduced terms representing unemployment at the time of the first and second sweeps respectively (i.e. roughly one 
and two years after leaving school). The M&S equation, on the other hand, contains a term to represent unemployment 
in October 1984, in other words, at a much earlier moment in the post education experiences of young people than that 
employed by DMT.
Once again, assuming that u is distributed normally with unit variance and y* is related to the 
observed dummy variable, y, in that y =1 iff y* > 0, YTS participation may be expressed in terms of 
the probit model:
p(y=l) = <D(Za) (46)
If e and o are correlated, E(e | y) will not equal zero and, consequently, the estimates of y will be
introducing correction terms in the employment equation derived from the univariate probit
The same procedure has been suggested to correct for selection bias in the probit model of 
employment (Main, 1987b), however, in the non-linear context this approach is no longer valid. To 
see this, consider the two equation probit model described by (4.1), (4.2), (4.5) and (4.6). If the 
error terms, e and u, are correlated and both are individually normal then their joint distribution is 
bivariate normal. Thus, for example, the probability that an individual participates on YTS and is 
observed as being in employment in the spring of 1986 is given by16:
biased. If e* were observed, one could employ the procedure suggested by Heckman (1979),
estimation of YTS participation. This is the basis of the procedure employed in chapter five to 
control for bias in the estimation of the effects of YTS participation on wages and is laid out in more 
detail there.
p(e = \,y  = 1) = J J ¿ te  v,p)dadv
-Za -Xfi-r
ao co
= (2 * V lV )  * J J exP
- Z a  - J tp - r
= <t>(X/3+r,Zcr,p) (4.7)
16 It may be noted that is used to indicate both the univariate and bivariate normal distributions. The number of 
arguments is hopefully sufficient to distinguish between the two in the text.
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The conditional probability that a person is in employment given that he or she participated on YTS 
may, therefore, be expressed in terms of univariate normal distributions and densities as follows 
(Johnson & Kotz, 1972, chapter 36):
K v =  i)
CO
\<Kv) I f a + p v ) / V1 -P 2 ]*>*>
_  - Za -Xß-y
S^(uyt>
-Za
<D (Za) 
X ß + y - p u
IV
<D (Za)
whereas the Heckman type correction procedure implies estimating the probability as:
(4.8)
= l\y = l) = <W Xß+ y + oc <«Za) (4.9)
It is evident that the two formulas are not necessarily the same. The obvious solution to the problem 
in this case is to estimate a bivariate probit model of the joint determination of employment and YTS 
participation of the form of (4.7) a b o v e  17 The model is identified so long as Z contains at least one 
explanatory variable not in X (Maddala, 1983, p. 122). Thus, expressed in terms of the underlying 
latent variables, the model has the form:
y  = Za+ v 
è* = Xß+jy+£
(4.10)
17 An alternative approach to that adopted here would be to determine participation on YTS randomly. That is, once a 
group of young people willing to participate on YTS.had been identified, only a random subsample would actually be 
allowed to do so. In this way, one could randomly determine treatment and control groups which would alleviate the 
problem of sample selection bias. Arguments in flavour of this approach may be found in Lalonde (1986) and Ham & 
Lalonde (1989), whilst Manski & Garfinkel (1992) contains papers espousing both experimental and non* 
experimental approaches. One might express serious reservations about the ethical issues involved in determining 
beneficiaries of a government policy by lottery. Such a policy would also contradict repeated government promises 
guaranteeing a YTS place for all school-leavers who wished to participate.
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in order to compare this with the switching bivariate model proposed below, it is preferable to 
express (4.10) as:
>•* = Za+ v
e* = Xfi+y+e iff y > 0 l  (410')
e' = Xp + e otherwise J
with error variance, 2 = The corresponding likelihood function is therefore given by:
n [ 4 W +  r, Za,p)Y[4>(XP-Za,-p)]«-y)[<t>(-XP- y,Za,-p)f-,)y[<t>(-XP-Za,p)f
(4.11)
and the effects of YTS are estimated as:
(<11)
More generally, it is likely that the impact of YTS varies across different types of individual. 
That is, individuals with different characteristics are likely to benefit to varying degrees from 
participation on the scheme. Thus, for example, it may be the case that YTS helps people from ethnic 
minorities more than others, thereby reducing the relative disadvantage of such groups in the labour 
market. Alternatively, they may benefit less than others implying that YTS tends to widen the gap in 
opportunities between the two groups. Fenton at. al. (1984) and Pollert (1986) provide some 
evidence supporting the latter case. Rather than include a dummy term to represent YTS 
participation, one may directly estimate different parameter vectors for participants and non­
participants. That is to say, one may estimate a switching bivariate probit model, essentially the 
probit analogue to the switching linear regression model discussed by Maddala (1983). Specifically, 
expressed in terms of the underlying latent variables, the model becomes:
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>’* = Za+ v
e ' = Xfi} + f, iff y  > 0
e -  X p2 + e2 otherwise
(4.13)
with error variance matrix:
Z -
imposing the restriction ex = the likelihood function for this model is given by:
(4.14)
the conditions for identification are the same as for the bivariate model (4.10). Without loss of 
generality, this can most easily be seen by considering the case of the model estimated with just 
intercept terms. Thus, one has:
y  = a+ v
e =&+£ iff / > 0 j  
e* -  fi2 + e otherwise j
(4.15)
Now, this may be rewritten as:
y  = a+ v
e' =p2 + r+ e iff / > 0 j  
e* = fl2 + e otherwise j
with p2 + r  = P
(4.15’)
this is none other than the bivariate probit with a dummy variable to represent YTS participation 
given by (4.10'). As expressed, the model is not identified. We have three free probabilities (the 
fourth is a residual) with which to estimate four parameters a,fi2,y, and p. As with model (4.10'),
18 In practice, a sufficient condition for what follows is given by the restriction p ^  = p ^ .
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identification requires, therefore, that there is at least one variable in the YTS equation which is not 
in the employment equations. The precise specification of the two equations is discussed further 
below.
In the case of the switching bivariate model the effects of YTS on employment probability are 
calculated as:
........................ r *  " «
This approach is a natural extension of the model proposed by Van de Ven & Van Praag (1981) to 
deal with a situation in which the sample is selected. That is to say, these authors apply a bivariate 
model in which one of the dichotomous dependent variables was only observed if the other was 
equal to one.
4.2.2) Heteroscedasticity
Chapter three contained a brief consideration of the problem of heteroscedasticity. For the 
univariate model considered below, the same approach was adopted as before. Firstly, a full 
heteroscedastic model was estimated employing all the explanatory variables save the intercept in the 
estimate of the error variance. Subsequently, the heteroscedasticity term was reduced to a more 
manageable size by employing t-tests to determine the specific variables to be included. Finally, a 
Likelihood Ratio test was employed to ensure that the more general model was not preferred. For 
the bivariate models, the test and correction terms are extended in a straightforward way. Consider, 
the switching bivariate model for which full results are presented in the text. First of all, in order to 
simplify the already complicated model, the additional restriction, a u = tr^, was imposed. The terms
to include in the variance estimate were taken from the univariate models. Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
tests 19 were employed to ensure that: a) equality of the variance of the error terms in the YTS and 
employment equations was not rejected; and, b) a more general form of heteroscedasticity was not
19 LM rather than LR tests were employed because, although they have the same asymptotic x2 distribution, LM tests 
do not require the estimation of the alternative hypothesis.
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preferred. Thus, for the switching bivariate model, the basic heteroscedasticity hypothesis that was 
tested is given by:
\H0' gu = crt = l 
[Ha:au = os = xi (4.17)
with r, = exp(¡¥¡9) as in chapter three, equation (3:13).
The test effectively compares the models:
\H0:p(e = l,y=l) = <t>(XPi,Zcc-,p)
Ha:p{e = \,y = \) = <t> Za
exp( WS) ’ exp( WS) iP\
(4.18)
and the heteroscedastic likelihood function is given by:
n <t>
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<D Za- x p ___________
exp( WS) ’ exp( WS)
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exp( WS) ’ exp( WS)
\
\P (4.19)
It might be noted that no additional identifying restrictions are necessary in the 
heteroscedastic model20. However, one or two observations are in order as regards identifying 
restrictions and the additional simplifying assumptions adopted. It might be observed that, 
particularly in the case of the bivariate models, the likelihood function is rather complicated which 
precluded trials using different specifications21. Firstly, in the switching bivariate model (4.19), since
20 Indeed, it is fairly obvious that one could employ the heteroscedasticity terms to effectively identify the model in 
cases in which the homoscedastic equivalent is not identified. One might question the theoretical validity of such an 
approach, and, in any case, it would preclude testing for heteroscedasticity in itself, since there would be no 
appropriate homoscedastic model with which to compare the heteroscedastic estimation.
21 The models were estimated on a 486 33 Mhz. IBM personal computer using the MINIMIZE routine in LIMDEP 6.0 
386. Whereas the univariate heteroscedastic model took something in the region of 5-10 minutes to converge, the 
heteroscedastic switching bivariate model took between 72 and 168 hours (according to the starting values employed) 
to do so. This in part depended on the necessity of using the MINIMIZE routine which slows down estimation,
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the employment probability equations are estimated separately for YTS participants and non­
participants, one cannot introduce a YTS dummy in the heteroscedastic terms in the employment 
probability equations. This would be analogous to introducing a YTS dummy in the homoscedastic 
model (4.14) whose coefficient (in the presence of a constant term) is obviously not identified. 
Secondly, the assumption of a constant correlation coefficient, p, implies that the covariance 
between e and u varies across individuals in a rather particular way. .Specifically:
exp(2JT,9)
0* = ---------—  (4.20)
that is, the covariance is proportional to the variance of e and u. intuitively, I feel this preferable to 
the obvious alternative specification in which the correlation coefficient is allowed to vary. That is, it 
seems more reasonable to suppose that the covariance term to vary according to the size of the 
variance rather than letting the correlation coefficient do so. It might be noted that the restriction, 
aD = cru , which produces the rather particular form of the covariance term is tested.
It should also be observed that, once one introduces the heteroscedastic terms, the likelihood 
function is no longer necessarily globally concave. This implies that one may find a local rather than a 
global maximum in the estimation. The procedure adopted to avoid this pitfall, involved the repeated 
estimation of the model using different starting values. The results produced did not vary (although 
the time to convergence did), indicating that non-concavity did not present a problem in this context.
4.3: Empirical Model
The sample employed in this paper comprises 2855 young people drawn from the second 
sweep of YCS. That is, all those young people who were either in full-time employment or
however, it also depends on the complicated form of the likelihood function. The slow convergence of the model 
effectively precluded the testing of different specifications. The only re-estimation of the model undertaken was that 
employing different starting values to ensure that the likelihood function was converging on a global, not a local 
m a v im n m  Definition of the form of heteroscedasticity adopted was consequently derived from estimation of the 
univariate model. LM tests were then employed to ensure that the specification adopted was not rejected in favour of a 
more general model.
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unemployed at the time of the second sweep in the Spring 198622. The sample excludes 242 young 
people still on YTS, 31 on another government scheme, 94 who were in a part-time job, as well as 
79 young people who were outside the labour market in a more traditional sense23. YTS participants 
and those in part-time employment were excluded in order to avoid possible confusion in the 
interpretation of the results It is not clear whether YTS participants should more properly be 
thought of as employed or unemployed or as a different group altogether24. For part-time workers, 
analogous reasoning leads to their exclusion. The survey does not allow a distinction to be made 
between those preferring part-time work to full-time employment and those taking a part-time job 
because they could not obtain a full-time one. Therefore, it is not clear whether or not these young 
people were constrained in their choice25.
The sub-sample chosen also has the advantage that it conforms closely to that used by 
W&B26. W&B also employ the first YCS. Their study differs in as much as it uses data from the 
third sweep of the cohort That is, they estimate the probability that an individual who reached 
minimum school-leaving age during the academic year 1983/4 was in full-time employment in 
February 1987. The alternative considered being unemployment. The principal difference between 
the dataset employed by W&B and that used here is the timing of the critical 
(employment/unemployment) observation. This has important consequences for the analysis. By 
February 1987, all young people in the sample would have completed their normal period of school
22 That is, the status was defined according to the reply to the question "what are you doing now ?" Not the diaiy 
question. It might be recalled from chapter two, that almost all the replies to the second sweep (97.7%) were received 
during March and April, 1986 with the remainder arriving in May and the first week of June. It was also noted in that 
chapter that the introduction of dummy variables representing the week of return of the questionnaire did not affect the 
results produced. The coefficient on YTS participation in the homoscedastic univariate model remained identical
L27)-
23 That is, 33 young people who reported that they were engaged full-time at home plus the 46 who said they were 
doing something else. See table 2.6 above.
24 In practice, this group was mainly composed of late entrants to the labour market following a period of further 
education. Only 3 of them had spent more than a year on the scheme (these three having spent 13 months on YTS), 
whilst the majority (206 or 85.1%) had been on the scheme for between five and nine months. On the other hand, 191 
(78.9%) had spent at least nine months in full-time further education. The remainder had tended to drift between 
states, spending short periods in unemployment, employment, YTS and/or full-time education. Given the a priori 
separation of the school-leaving decision from employment probability and YTS participation, and the fact that, of 
those in this group, only three had over-run their time on YTS, it seems reasonable to reject consideration of 
endogenous selection. That is, it is reasonable to exclude this group as comprising, almost entirely, late labour market 
entrants. Excluding all those with some experience of further education and including those still on YTS (amongst the 
unemployed) at the time of the second sweep increases the coefficient on the YTS participation dummy in the 
homoscedastic univariate probit model from .27 to .34.
25 Inclusion of this group amongst the employed leaves the results virtually unchanged. For example, using the 
homoscedastic univariate model, the coefficient on YTS participation changes from .27 to .24.
26 W&B define their dependent variable and sample in the same way 1 do.
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education. Those remaining in education at this time would be either at a third-level educational 
institution, or at a college of further education to extend the qualifications previously obtained. This 
implies^ that the sample contained a substantial group of eighteen-nineteen year olds who left full­
time education at eighteen having completed A-level or equivalent qualifications. The implications of 
this difference are returned to below.
The sample used by. M&S covers the same period as .that analysed here and employs SYPS 
data which provides analogous information to the YCS for a sample of Scottish young people^ 
M&S also exclude participants on government schemes and those outside the labour market. They 
are not explicit, however, on whether the group which was employed in the Spring 1986 includes 
also those in part-time employment. Since they do not mention the exclusion of part-time employees, 
the implication is that this group is included amongst the employed. In the presentation of the results 
below we compare the findings of this study with that of M&S and W&B more closely.
In table 4.1, descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis are presented. The 
information contained in the surveys allows the inclusion of a variety of individual and background 
characteristics. The table reports the means and (where relevant) standard deviations of these 
variables. In the second and third columns statistics are given separately for the employed (e=l) and 
the unemployed (e=0). This allows a first rough indication of the effect of the different variables in 
determining whether a young person was in employment in the Spring 1986. That is to say, ceteris 
paribus, a higher (lower) value of the mean for employed rather than unemployed young people 
implies that the variable in question is positively (negatively) related to the probability of finding 
employment. The purpose of the analysis presented below is precisely that of imposing the ceteris 
paribus condition.
The explanatory variables fall into five broad groups. The first three variables representing 
indigenous individual characteristics. The possession of a significant disability, belonging to an ethnic 
minority and being female might all be reasonably expected to have a negative impact on the 
probability of finding work due to discrimination by employers and/or the perceived lower levels of
27 W&B do not maWft this explicit in either of their studies and, consequently, do not report the numbers falling into . 
this group.
28 See the discussion in chapter two above.
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human capital embodied in these individuals. Indeed, all of these groups comprise a greater 
proportion of the unemployed than the employed.
The next group of variables relate to the individual's experience at school. A part-time job or 
work experience are likely to have a positive influence on the chances of finding work, reflecting as 
they do greater contact with the labour market whilst at school. The dummy variables representing 
truancy at school are expected to be unequivocally negative in their influence in as much as they will 
reflect the motivation of individuals. Finally, the index of exam success at sixteen (ILEA), in as 
much as it represents (and is seen by employers as representing) ability and therefore potential 
productivity, should have a positive impact on the chances of finding work. With the exception of 
occasional truancy, the descriptive statistics confirm this a priori reasoning.
The model also includes variables to represent family background. The first three of these are 
derived from a question asking what the respondent's father did. That is, whether the respondent's 
father was reported as having a full or part-time job, or was unemployed at the time of the first 
sweep. The second and third of these variables are included in the employment equation and are 
expected, particularly in the case of paternal unemployment, to be negatively related to individuals' 
likelihood of finding work, reflecting constraints on fathers' access to the labour market which are 
likely to be transmitted to their offspring. It will be observed, however, that these variables relate to 
the parental situation in the Summer 1985. Thus, they should be interpreted as having an influence 
on the intermediate experience of labour market participants. The other three variables in this group 
are likely to be positively signed. Self-employment of the father is likely to increase the probability 
that a young person is taken on in the family firm or, at least, increase contact with the labour 
market. Non-manual employment on behalf of the mother and OWNER OCCUPIER (=1 if the 
respondent stated that they lived in an owner occupied household) are included to take some account 
of the social class of the person.
The fourth group of variables are related to general demand conditions and therefore job 
opportunities. The principal variable in this group is the adult regional unemployment rate subdivided 
by sex included to reflect general demand for labour conditions. This is expected to be negatively 
related to young people's employment prospects for obvious reasons. Regional dummies for London 
and the South East are included to take into account differences in employment opportunities not
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adequately controlled for by the adult unemployment rate Specifically, it is proposed that the 
chances of finding a job for young people varies more than proportionately with the adult 
unemployment rate29. In part, this is taken into account by the use of the natural logarithm of the 
unemployment rate. The additional dummies for London and the South East were introduced to 
control for differences in prospects not adequately dealt in this manner30
The final group of variables represent individuals' experience in and out of the labour market 
over the period September 1984-February 1986 and are the focus of interest in this chapter The first 
of these represents whether the young person obtained full-time employment (more or less) 
immediately on leaving school. Such early employment experience is likely to be positively related to 
the chances of being in employment eighteen months later. It is also important as an explanatory 
variable in as much as YTS (in contrast to its predecessor YOP) was proposed as a valid alternative 
to employment, not just as an ameliorative for unemployed youth. Thus, the early employment 
variable also provides a yardstick against which the effectiveness of YTS may be judged. The YTS 
variable reflects whether or not young people had some experience of YTS during the period 
September 1984-February 1986. Obviously, it is to be hoped that such participation had a positive 
influence on job opportunities. In this regard, it may be noted that the proportion of unemployed 
young people who had previously participated on YTS is higher than for those in employment in the 
Spring 1986. Thus, at a first glance, the suggestion is that not controlling for other influences, YTS 
participation was negatively related to employment probability. Finally, a variable reflecting whether 
or not young people had some experience of post-compulsory full-time education is included. One 
would expect this to be positively related to employment probability.
As regards the specification of the YTS equation, it was observed above that, in order to 
identify both the bivariate probit with a YTS participation dummy (described by the likelihood 
function (4.11)) and the switching bivariate probit (4.14) models, at least one variable must be 
included in the YTS equation which is not contained in the employment equation. The variables 
fulfilling this role are the dummy representing the possession of full-time job on the part of the father, 
and regional dummies for the North and Midlands and for Wales. The basic reasoning underlying the
29 This is certainly the case with the national figures over time, as was noted in chapter one.
30 In practice, the f in a l  specification presented here was the result of a certain amount of experimentation with the 
bivariate model. This will be returned to below.
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inclusion of the latter in the YTS equation is the a priori knowledge that YTS participation was 
particularly concentrated in areas of high unemployment. On the other hand, the presence in the 
household of a fully employed father is likely to encourage YTS participation, given the initial lack of 
success in job search which participation on the scheme tends to indicate. In addition, the YTS 
equation excludes several variables which are present in the employment equation. These were 
removed after trials with the homoscedastic bivariate model due ta  their Jack of .significance31. The 
choice of identifying variables is, to some extent, arbitrary. Also the precise form of the identifying 
variables was the result of some experimentation with this model. This may be criticised as a rather 
ad hoc procedure. On the other hand, there is an intuitive rationale for the specific 
inclusions/exclusions. In defence of this procedure, I would also add that the measured effect of YTS 
in the homoscedastic model is not sensitive to the particular identifying assumptions made. Since this 
is the key variable of interest, I feel justified in the approach adopted.
4.4: Results
In this section full results are presented for the univariate probit model (both heteroscedastic 
and homoscedastic), and for the switching bivariate probit. In addition, the results from the bivariate 
probit model including just a dummy variable representing YTS participation are summarised in table 
4.5 below. Table 4 .2 presents the results of the estimation of the first model. That is, the independent 
univariate probit estimation of the likelihood that young people: i) were in employment in the Spring 
1986, and, ii) whether they participated on YTS at some time during the period September 1984- 
February 1986. Although the focus of interest here is the first (employment determination) equation, 
the YTS results are also presented in as much as they provide a basis for comparison with the other 
models presented below, as well as being of interest in themselves. Since it is the model which most 
resembles that presented in both M&S and W&B the estimates not corrected for heteroscedasticity 
are reported in the third and fourth columns.
It will be observed that the Likelihood ratio test for heteroscedasticity is statistically 
significant for both the employment and YTS equations (34.7 and 37.0 against the 1% critical
31 As noted above (note 21), the lengthiness of the convergence procedure effectively precluded experimentation with 
different specifications of the heteroscedastic bivariate models.
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values 13.28 and 11.34 respectively), so that the hypothesis of homoscedasticity adopted implicitly 
by the M&S and W&B studies may be rejected. On the other hand, a more general form of 
heteroscedasticity is not preferred to the form presented here.
As regards the corrected estimates, the first four groups of variables all have the expected 
signs although they are not ail statistically significant. As regards the experience variables, all three of 
these have a statistically significant positive impact on the probability of being in employment. It also 
relevant to note that the coefficient on early employment experience is substantially larger than that 
on YTS although the inclusion of these variables in the estimate of variance make direct comparison 
of the parameters problematic. A clearer impression of the influence of YTS (and early employment 
experience) may be gained from table 4.3. The first part of the table reports the effects of YTS and 
early employment experience on three "ideal types" of teenager. The reported coefficients from M&S 
and W&B were also applied to the base probabilities in order to calculate comparable effects of YTS 
as found by these studies. In the second part of the table, the effects of the other explanatory 
variables on the probability of employment of an otherwise "average" young person are presented. 
The table reports estimates for both the heteroscedasdc (in bold figures) and homoscedastic models.
As noted above, YTS was proposed as a scheme for all school-leavers, not just the 
u n e m p l o y e d ^ .  It is evident from the table that YTS participation did not, however, compensate for 
a lack of early employment experience The effect of YTS on employment probability ranges from 
around 0 percentage points for an "advantaged" young person to around 11 percentage points for a 
"disadvantaged" one. This compares to an effect of early employment experience of between 3 and 
49 percentage points. Thus, YTS participation evidently did not compensate for a "real" job on 
leaving school^.
The introduction of heteroscedasticity terms alters the results to a limited degree. The 
principal difference regards less fortunate young people. YTS participation had the largest influence 
on the employment prospects of a "disadvantaged" individual. It might be noted that the 
homoscedastic model does not allow such a finding. That is, the functional form adopted ensures that
32 Even thnngh in practice, an MSC memo reports that only around 5% of YTS participants came from employment 
This figure is confirmed from the low level of movement from employment to YTS found in the YCS data and by the 
analysis of, amongst others, Roberts et al. (1986) who found that YTS was viewed as an alternative to unemployment 
for those not finding work, but not as a valid alternative to employment.
33 Another way of looking at this is to estimate the model without an early employment term. Doing this, the 
coefficient on YTS in the homoscedastic model changes from .27 to -.28.
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the measured effect of any explanatory variable will be greatest around a base probability of .5, 
becoming smaller as one moves towards the tales of the distribution34. At the same time, it will be 
observed that the worsening of employment prospects due to particular disadvantages is more severe 
when the heteroscedastic model is used.
These results may be compared with those presented in M&S and W&B. Table 3a reports my 
calculations of the effects of YTS implied by the two studies. The M&S study for Scotland estimated 
the probability that school-leavers in 1983/4 were in employment (as opposed to unemployment) in 
April 1986. That is, the study corresponds to a similar sample to this one, considered over the same 
time period examined here. The principal difference is that their analysis relates to Scotland. The 
effect of YTS found by M&S ranges from 4 to 11 percentage points3 ,^ which is very similar to 
those found here on the basis of the homoscedastic model. Although they do not themselves draw 
attention to the fact, M&S's results also suggest that YTS participation did not compensate for early 
unemployment, or rather, lack of early employment experience3*’
As regards the W&B model, their analyses refer to the same countries, but to a slightly 
different sample. The principal difference between the group analysed by W&B and that considered 
here lies in the fact that W&B look at young people's experience ten months later and therefore 
include young people who left school at eighteen with A-levels and other higher education 
qualifications. In the 1990 paper; they consider the effect of YTS on employment probability using 
two comparison groups. That is, they compared YTS participants, firstly, with those who had had 
some experience of unemployment, and secondly, with all those who had not participated on YTS. In 
contrast to this study and M&S, they do not introduce controls for either further education or early 
employment experience. Not surprisingly, the effect of YTS was much larger when compared with 
the former control group (6 to 17 percentage points) than with the latter (2 to 5 percentage points).*
34 This is obvious when one considers the partial derivative. The effect of an explanatory variable measured in this 
way is given by:
the maximum value of the effect is reached when pie“ !)“ .5. Although it is perhaps less clear in the case of a discrete 
change, analogous reasoning applies.
35 They themselves report a rather larger effect. This is because the base probabilities they employ are closer to the 
centre of the distribution than those reported here.
36 A precise comparison is not possible, in as much as M&S employ two terms relating to unemployment rather than 
employment experience, however, the implication of their results is similar to mine.
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It may be the case that the positive, and statistically significant effect, of YTS participation, even in 
the latter case, is due to the inclusion of eighteen year old school-leavers who had had neither early 
experience of employment nor had participated on YTS. In contrast, it was observed above37 that if 
the dummy for early employment experience is excluded from model presented here, the measured 
impact of YTS on employment probability is negative.
In any event, the model presented above ignores-sample selectivity. Table 4.4 reports the 
results of estimating the switching bivariate model which explicitly takes this problem into account. 
This model also allows a much clearer indication of the types of individual who gained more (or less) 
from YTS participation. Thus, one is able to explicitly model the differential effects that YTS had on 
the employment prospects of different types of individual. In this context, it may be noted that the t- 
ratio on the correlation coefficient is significant indicating the presence of sample selectivity. The fact 
that this is negative indicates that the effect of YTS will be, ceteris paribus, underestimated if no 
account is taken of sample selection bias. That is, unobserved factors which influence YTS 
participation are negatively correlated with unobserved factors influencing employment probability. 
The implication being that unobserved factors which raise the probability of participating on YTS are 
likely to lower the probability of finding work. The likelihood ratio test statistic on heteroscedasticity 
and on parameter variation are also statistically significant. On the other hand, tests for more general 
heteroscedasticity and for differences in the form of heteroscedasticity between employment and 
YTS equations do not refute the null hypothesis.
The effect of YTS in the context of this model is anything but obvious from the parameter 
estimates. Table 4.5 reports the effects of YTS on employment probability for the three ideal types of 
young people as estimated using four different models, whilst table 4.6 presents estimates of the 
effects of YTS on the employment probability of an average young person with the addition of one 
other individual characteristic. The comparison of the models presented in table 4.5 suggests that, 
whilst heteroscedasticity does not have a very large influence on the estimated effect of YTS, 
ignoring the problem of sample selection does. Specifically, the results suggest that , not taking 
account of selection bias leads to a substantial underestimate of the effect of YTS (at least for
37 See notes 15 and 33, this chapter.
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average individuals). This is true for both the bivariate probit with a YTS dummy and the more 
general switching model.
Table 4.6 reports the results of calculating the effects of YTS explicitly allowing for different 
effects for different types of individual. This gives a direct estimate of the effect of YTS on the 
chances of finding work for different types of person. In this context, it is worth pointing out that, as 
can be seen immediately from equation (4.16), that the effect depends explicitly on both the 
difference between the parameters for participants and non-participants and the influence that 
individual characteristics had on the probability that a young person participated on YTS (the 
denominator).
The table shows that, in particular, for disabled young people and those belonging to ethnic 
minorities YTS had no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of finding work. Furthermore, 
even if the point estimate is taken at face value, participation on the scheme did not compensate for 
the disadvantages faced, above all, by disabled young people. With regard to ethnic minorities, this 
provides further formal evidence to support the qualitative picture presented by, for example, Fenton 
et. al. (1984) and Pollert (1986).
On the other hand, young females appear to have gained more from the scheme than males. 
The effect is larger for them, and is statistically significant. Thus, whilst participation on YTS did not 
put young females on an even footing with their male counterparts, it did narrow .the gap in 
opportunities facing the two sexes. Those people who played truant at school (both seriously and 
occasionally) appear to have done particularly well out of the scheme. This may be because 
participation on the scheme succeeded in providing motivation which their truancy at school tends to 
indicate was initially lacking.
The results also suggest that for those with early experience of employment, YTS 
participation was damaging to employment prospects. This is in part explained by the very 
substantial initial advantage possessed by these people. The fact that the effect is actually negative 
suggests that those who initially found employment but subsequently became unemployed, and 
consequently joined YTS lost the advantage provided by early employment. In this regard it might be 
noted that the effect is not due to the lack of time spent in the labour market. Only one of these 
young people had experience of further education (lasting ten months) having returned to school in
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October 1984. The notable feature of these young people is their lack of constancy. The average 
number of states experienced by this group was 2.51. This might be compared to the overall sample 
average of 1.80 noted in chapter two. It might also be noted that the number of people who had 
early employment experience and had participated on YTS represent a very small minority, 
comprising 43 young people.
Thus, the overall impression gained from the results is that YTS did not elim ina te  the 
influence of labour market disadvantages, however for some groups, notably females and truants, it 
did narrow the gap in opportunities. For the disabled and ethnic minorities, on the other hand, the 
gap was widened.
4.5) Conclusions
In this chapter, some of the issues relating to the estimation of the effects of YTS 
participation on employment prospects have been examined. In contrast to previous studies, explicit 
account was taken of the potential bias arising from sample selectivity and heteroscedasticity. When 
tested for, both problems were found to be present and influential on the results. Thus, it is to be 
hoped that the importance of taking into account these issues has been established.
Employing a similar model to M&S and W&B, the impact of YTS was estimated as between 
3 and 8 percentage points. This is comparable to the impact found by M&S in Scotland of between 
(according to the recalculations presented here) 4 and 11 percentage points, whilst it lies between the 
two estimates implied by the 1990 W&B study. Taking into account heteroscedasticity and sample 
selection, however, substantially modifies these conclusions. The final estimate of the effect of YTS 
lies between 1 and 21 percentage points according to the type of individual. This finding suggests 
that previous analyses may have underestimated both the variability and the size of the YTS "effect".’
Furthermore, the switching bivariate probit model proposed in the text, as well as controlling 
for sample selection and heteroscedasticity, also allowed the direct estimation of variations in the 
impact of YTS according to specific individual characteristics. It was found that, whilst YTS reduced 
the disadvantages facing females and truants, participation on the scheme was not sufficient to annul 
such disadvantages. Perhaps of more importance is the finding that ethnic minorities and disabled
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teenagers did not appear to gain any statistically significant positive benefit from the scheme in terms 
of their likelihood of finding work with the implication that the disadvantages faced by these groups 
in the labour market were, if anything, accentuated. Further research might consider the robustness 
of these findings by considering the impact of YTS on later cohorts using the framework proposed 
above.
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Table 4 .1 : Descriptive Statistics on the variables employed (standard deviations of continuous 
variables in brackets).
WHOLE
SAMPLE
(N=2855)
EMPLOYED SPRING 
1986 
(N=2261)
UNEMPLOYED 
SPRING 1986 
(N=594)
INDIGENOUS
CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY .028 .020 .061
BLACK .020 .017 .032
GIRL .508 .503 .527
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
PART-TIME JOB .587 .625 .439
WORK EXPERIENCE .338 .349 .298
SERIOUS TRUANT .175 .139 .311
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .374 .377 .360
ILEA SCORE 20.22 21.90 13.85
(12.43) (10.38) (11.72)
HOME BACKGROUND
DAD IN FULL-TIME JOB .778 .823 .606
DAD IN PART-TIME JOB .010 .008 .020
DAD UNEMPLOYED .087 .062 .180
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED .150 .164 .094
MUM IN NON-MANUAL JOB .335 .366 . .217
OWNER OCCUPIER .624 .664 .473
LABOUR MARKET
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 10.58 10.38 11.35
(3 43) (3.38) (3 52)
LONDON .090 .098 .061
SOUTH EAST .195 .224 .084
NORTH AND MIDLANDS .543 .507 .677
WALES .047 .041 .071
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
EMPLOYED IN SEPTEMBER 1984 .239 .275 101
YTS .472 .457 .530
FURTHER EDUCATION .254 .265 .212
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Table 4.2: Independent Univeriate Probit estii 
1) the probability that young peopl 
ii) the probability that youig peop
(t-ralios in brackets)
[nation of:
e are in employment in the spring 1986; 
le participated on YTS.
ESTIMATES CORRECTED FOR UNCORRECTED ESTIMATES
HETROSCEDASTICITY
EMPLOYMENT YTS EMPLOYMENT YTS
INTERCEPT 1.54 (159) .41 (3-05) 1.23 (2.41) -.72 (-1.23)
INDIGENOUS
CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY -.08 (-4 1«) -.20 <•1-11) -.71 (-4.57) -.26 (-141)
BLACK -.25 (-1.34) -.54 (-2.89) -.20 (107) -.44 (-2.11)
GIRL -.39 (-3.31) .11 (97) -.31 (-3.16) .11 (93)
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
PART-TIME JOB .28 (3.54) - .25 (4.14) -
WORK EXPERIENCE .07 (-99) - .08 (129) -
SERIOUS TRUANT -.61 (-5.36) -.24 (-3.03) -.60 (-7.41) -.22 (-2.77)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT -.26 (-3.24) - -.22 (-3.23) -
Log(ILEA SCORE) .21 (4.41) .10 (2.64) .22 (8.29) .13 (461)
HOM E BACKGROUND
DAD IN FULL-TIME JOB - .33 (381) - .32 (1.89)
DAD IN PART-TIME JOB -.45 (-1.51) - -.48 (-1.86) -
DAD UNEMPLOYED -.39 (-3.55) .20 (1-76) -.41 (-4.40) .24 (1.89)
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED .21 (2-03) - .16 (179) -
MUM IN NON-MANUAL JOB .18 (2.29) - .16 (2.38) -
OWNER OCCUPIER .12 (174) - .03 (2.23) -
LABOUR M ARKET
LogCUNEMPLOYMENT RATE) -.72 (-3.16) .35 (1.35) .54 (-2.74) .42 (1 60)
LONDON .28 (193) - .28 (2.18) -
SOUTHEAST .30 a  1«) .18 (163) .28 (.35) .22 (2-00)
NORTH AND MIDLANDS - .24 (2.08) - .23 (2.06)
WALES - .40 (2.13) - .39 (2.12)
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
EMPLOYED IN SEPTEMBER 1984 1.84 (3.77) -3.12 (-2.99) .81 (8.06) -2.52 (-28.5)
YTS .55 (4.33) - .27 (3.33) -
FURTHER EDUCATION .48 (2-63) -2.81 (-3.45) .10 (1.05) -2.15 (-28.2)
CORRECTION FOR
HETEROSCEDASTICITY
LOG(IL£A SCORE) -.15 (-3.15) -.93 (-2.47) - -
EMPLOYED SEPTEMBER 1984 .83 (3.68) .67 (172) - -
YTS .41 (3-65) - - -
FURTHER EDUCATION .56 (3.50) .88 (2.36) - -
RESTRICTED LOG-UKEUHOOD -1460.0 -1974.5 -1460.0 -1974.5
UNRESTRICTED LOG-LIKELIHOOD -1178.4 -1077.3 -1195.7 -1095.8
McFADDEN R-SQUARED .19 .45 .18 .45
LR TEST FOR HETROSCEDASTICITY 34.7 (4 df.) 37.0 (3 d.f.) - -
LR TEST FOR MORE GENERAL
HETEROSCEDASTICITY 10.7 (15 d.f.) 10.2 (10d.f.) - -
n 2855
Note: The first test for hetcroscedasticity compares the homoscedastic model with the heteroscedastic model reported 
in the table. The test for more general heteroscedasticity compares the latter model with a model including all the 
explanatory variables save the intercept in the heteroscedastic function The degrees of freedom are given in brackets.
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Table 4.1a: Effects o f YTS participation and Early Employment Experience on the Probability
of Finding W ork for Different Ideal Types of Young Person with the Univariate Probit Model
(t-ratios of effects in brackets).
BASE EFFECT OF YTS EFFECT OF EARLY
M&S W&B My Estimates EMPLOYMENT
(A) (B)
ADVANTAGED
HOMOSCEDAST1STIC MODEL .92 .04 .06 .02 .03 (2.55) .06 (3.61)
HETEROSCEDASTIC MODEL .98 n.a. n.a. n.a. .00 (.42) .03 0*29)
AVERAGE
HOMOSCEDASTISTIC MODEL .75 .11 .17 .05 .08 (3-05) .18 (6.04)
HETEROSCEDASTIC MODEL .77 n.a. n.a. n.a. .09 (2.18) .18 (3-41)
DISADVANTAGED
HOMOSCEDASTISTIC MODEL .07 .07 .15 .03 .04 (2.64) .18 (4.19)
HETEROSCEDASTIC MODEL .01 n.a. n.a. n.a. .11 (2.73) .49 (4.12)
Table 4.3b: Effects of O ther Independent variables on the Probability of Finding Work
for an "A verage" Person.
HOMOSCEDASTIC MODEL HETEREOSCEDASnC MODEL
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY -.27 (-4.27) -.47 (-£13)
BLACK -.07 (102) -.13 (-1.26)
GIRL -.06 (-2.83) -.12 (-2.96)
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
PART-TIME JOB .07 (3.91) .11 (3.45)
WORK EXPERIENCE .03 (130) .03 (1.01)
SERIOUS TRUANT -.22 (7.03) -36 (-6.08)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT -.07 (-3.17) -.14 (-3.17)
HIGH ILEA SCORE (-32) .03 (8.03) .06 (630)
HOME BACKGROUND
DAD IN PART-TIME JOB -.17 (1.72) -.25 (-1.39)
DAD UNEMPLOYED -.15 (4.08) -.22 (-3.69)
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED .05 (1.85) .09 (2.18)
MUM IN NON-MANUAL JOB .05 (2.43) .07 (2.41)
OWNER OCCUPIER .04 (2.19) .05 (1.72)
LABOUR M ARKET
LIVING IN WALES (UNEMPLOYMENT • b oc (-2.77) -.18 (-3.45)
RATE -  16.4%)
EXPERIENCE 1984-36
FURTHER EDUCATION .03 (1.04) .03 (*«3)
Notes: 1) All "ideal types" are male. An average individual is defined as living in the south west (unemployment rate 
= 10.5%) and having achieved the mean ILEA score (20). An advantaged young person is defined as having a 
non-manual mother and a father in full-time employment, living in the south east (unemployment rate = 7.9%) and 
having achieved an ILEA score one standard deviation above the mean (32). A disadvantaged young person is 
defined as being disabled, a serious truant at school, having an unemployed father, living in Wales (unemployment 
rate = 16.4%) and with an ILEA score one standard deviation below the mean (8).
2) The results reported for the M&S and W&B models are recalculations employing their reported parameter 
estimates and using the same base probability as my estimates.
3) raimiatinn of t-ratios are based on the general formula for the asymptotic variance of a non-linear function. 
That is, the asymptotic variance of the effect under consideration denoted by E is given by:
4) Figures reported in bold refer to the preferred heteroscedastic model.
5) The effect of being female includes the influence of the lower adult unemployment rate.
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Table 4.4: Switching Bivariate Probit Estimation of the Joint Determination of Employment and 
YTS Participation (estimates corrected for heteroscedasticity).
(t-ratios in brackets)
EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT
YTS NON YTS YTS
PARTICIPANTS PARTICPANTS
INTERCEPT 222 (3.76) .79 (1.00) -.65 (-118)
INDIGENOUS
CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY -.60 (-2.94) -.58 (-241) -.18 (-1.09)
BLACK -.14 (-.65) .01 (.04) -.46 (-2.94)
GIRL -.34 (-2.97) -.38 (-2.62) .10 (100)
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
PART-TIME JOB .16 (2.38) .29 (2.89) -
WORK EXPERIENCE -.00 (-03) .13 (1 41) -
SERIOUS TRUANT -.37 (-3.74) -.47 (-2.90) -.21 (-2.94)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT -.15 (-2.17) -.26 (-2.43) -
Log(ILEA SCORE) .09 (1.87) .19 (4.10) .07 (2.35)
HOME BACKGROUND
DAD IN FULL-TIME JOB - - .32 4.27)
DAD IN PART-TIME JOB .01 (03) -.44 (-1.21) -
DAD UNEMPLOYED -.26 (-2.71) -.37 (-2-57) .22 (2.07)
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED .29 (2.68) -.01 (17) -
MUM IN NON-MANUAL JOB .11 (M2) .17 (1.73) -
OWNER OCCUPIER .06 (.95) .10 (110) -
LABOUR MARKET
LogfUNEMPLOYMENT RATE) -.70 (-3.25) -.70 (-240) .34 (1.48)
LONDON .13 (82) .32 (1.92) -
SOUTHEAST .23 (1 61) .24 (1.39) .14 (1 46)
NORTH AND MIDLANDS - - .20 (2.08)
WALES - - .28 (1.88)
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
EMPLOYED IN SEPTEMBER 1984 1.72 (2.94) 2.07 (6.29) -2.76 (-6.26)
FURTHER EDUCATION 1.03 (2-81) .99 (462) -1.98 (-7.88)
CORRECTION FOR
HETEROSCEDASTICITY
LOG(ILEA SCORE) -.12 (-4.03)
EMPLOYED SEPTEMBER 1984 .61 (3.60)
FURTHER EDUCATION .47 (3.36)
P -.62 (-2.76)
RESTRICTED LOG-LIKELIHOOD -3429.4
UNRESTRICTED LOG-LIKELIHOOD -2247.6
McFADDEN R-SQUARED .35
LR TEST FOR PARAMETER VARIATION 36.6 (18 <Lf.)
LR TEST FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY 45.6 (3d.f.)
LM TEST FOR EQUAL VARIANCE .5 (3 d.f.)
LM TEST FOR MORE GENERAL
HETEROSCEDASTICITY 24.5 (18 d.f.)
n 2855
Note: The test for parameter variation compares the bivariate probit with a YTS participation dummy with 
switching bivariate probit presented here. The LR test for heteroscedasticity compares die homoscedastic model to 
three term heteroscedastic form presented in the table. The LM test for equal variance tests for different values of
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Table 4.6: Effects of YTS on the Probability of Finding W ork for an Average 
Young Person with the Addition of the Following Characteristic (switching 
bivariate model estimates):
(t-ratios in brackets)
BASE EFFECT
AVERAGE .64 .21 (197)
INDIGENOUS
CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY .23 .27 (150)
BLACK .51 .19 (98)
GIRL .50 .28 (2.67)
SCHOOL
EXPERIENCE
PART-TIME JOB .80 .09 (1.14)
WORK EXPERIENCE .72 .13 (113)
SERIOUS TRUANT .28 .36 (3.10)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .46 .33 (2.80)
HIGH ILEA SCORE (ILEA=32) .70 .18 (172)
HOME
BACKGROUND
DAD IN PART-TIME JOB .35 .51 (2.09)
DAD UNEMPLOYED .46 .31 (2.25)
DAD SELF-EMPLOYED .63 .30 (2.43)
MUM IN NON-MANUAL JOB .74 .15 (1.38)
OWNER OCCUPIER .69 .17 (170)
LABOUR MARKET
LIVING IN WALES (UNEMP = 16.4%) .56 .19 (1.99)
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
FURTHER EDUCATION .77 -.04 (-45)
EMPLOYED IN SEPTEMBER 1984 .93 -.16 (-1.80)
Notes: 1) An average individual is defined as living in the south west (unemployment rate — 10.5%) and having 
achieved the mean ELEA score (20).
2) t-ratios are calculated as above in table 4.3.
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CHAPTER FIVE: YTS AND WAGES
The discussions of YTS in chapter two and in the first section of chapter four suggest that 
wages might be a second suitable indicator of the effectiveness of YTS. The expected influence of 
YTS on wages, however, is not as clear cut as it was in the case of employment. From the point of 
view of the scheme's proponents, two distinct and opposing "desired" effects may be identified. 
Firstly, YTS was intended to raise the levels of participants' human capital. Thus, one would expect 
a positive "human capital effect" on wages arising through the greater post-programme productivity 
of participants. Secondly, YTS was also to make young people's wage expectations "more realistic" 
(i.e. lower). Thus, there should be a second negative effect arising from the lower "expected"1, 
and/or reservation wages of participants. In addition, in what follows a third effect due to the 
increased chances of receiving a job offer arising out of YTS participation is also identified.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these issues. Estimates are produced of the 
influence that YTS participation had on the realised earnings of young people in employment in the 
Spring 19862, and on the "expected" and reservation wages of young people who were unemployed 
at that time. The analysis distinguishes between the positive "human capital effect" and the negative 
"reservation wage" and "job offer" effects. In this regard, the identification of sample selection bias 
due to non-random employment determination is of fundamental importance. The identification of 
this source of bias allows the distinction to be made between direct "human capital" effects of YTS 
on the productivity and, therefore, the earnings potential of young people and the indirect 
"reservation wage" and job offer effects which, by increasing the probability of observing the 
individual in employment, reduce the expected value of observed earnings.
This chapter makes a contribution in offering a coherent interpretation of a curious empirical 
finding present in this and all other studies considering the issue3. That is, it has been consistently 
found that YTS had a negative and statistically significant effect on the observed earnings of
11 employ the inverted commas in an attempt to avoid confusion between mathematical expectation and the beliefs of 
individuals. The inverted comma's are used to indicate the beliefs of individuals. The importance of the distinction 
between these two types of expectation will, I hope, become apparent in the discussion of the formation of wage 
"expectations" by the unemployed in section 5.1.4.
2 It will be recalled that 97.7% of the replies were received by the SCPR between March and April 1986.
3 In the addition to the results presented below, see also Main & Shelley (1990), Whitfield & Bourlakis (1991), and 
Dolton et al. (1994a, 1994c). All of these studies are considered in section 5.3 below.
employed young people. A second related finding is that this negative earnings effect tends to 
disappear4 when controls for sample selection bias are introduced. The underlying theoretical model 
presented here allows an interpretation of these two phenomena so far lacking in the literature. The 
analysis is further supported by consideration of the determination of the "expected" and reservation 
wages of the unemployed not considered by previous studies of YTS5. It is found that YTS had a 
negative influence-on the realised, "expected" and reservation wages of young people. When sample 
selection is taken into account, however, the effect on realised wages disappears. In the context of 
the simple job search model proposed here, such findings are in line with the proposition that YTS 
enhanced employment prospects through a reduction in the reservation wages and an increase in the 
probability of receiving a job offer of participants, whilst having a negligible effect on individuals' 
human capital stock.
In the first section, the underlying issues are treated. Two potential sources of sample 
selection bias are identified arising from non-random YTS participation and the truncation of the 
earnings distribution. Section S. 1.1 outlines the problem of sample selection in the context of non- 
random YTS participation. Section 5.1.2 goes on to treat the problem of sample selection bias6 due 
to the truncation of the earnings distribution in the context of a static model of labour supply. This is 
followed, in section 5.1.3, by an analogous treatment of the problem of sample selection bias as it 
affects the reservation and "expected" wages of the unemployed. Section 5.1.4 proposes three 
modifications to the static labour supply model. Firstly, the analysis is framed in terms of a simple job 
search model, allowing the introduction of rudimentary dynamic considerations. Secondly, the 
possibility of systematic mistakes by the unemployed in formulating "expectations" regarding the 
distribution of wages is allowed. Finally, the assumption that all young people receive a job offer is 
relaxed. All three of these modifications have substantive implications for the interpretation of the 
"reservation wage" effect. Specifically, the "reservation wage" effect may more properly be seen as 
the combination of at least two negative and two positive effects: the direct "reservation" wage effect
4 As will be seen below, the studies considering this issue are not unanimous, however, it is argued that results 
diverging from those presented here may be explained by the nusspecification of the models considered by previous 
authors.
5 An exception to this is the paper by Main (1987a) which earnings in employment with the wage "expectations* of 
the unemployed. The paper is discussed in section S.3.
6 This problem is more usually referred to as truncation bias. The structure of the problem is analogous to that of 
sample selection bias. Since, in both cases, the problem is one of the non-random selection of observations from the 
sample, I prefer to use the unified term for both sources of bias.
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(negative); the "erroneous expectations" effect (negative); the "job offer" effect (positive); and the 
indirect "earnings potential" effect (positive). In addition, it is shown that the probability of receiving 
a job offer also exerts a direct negative influence on the observed wages of employed participants 
Section 5.1.5 brings together the strands of the discussion thus far and proposes the econometric 
model to be employed in the empirical analysis.
Section 5.2 provides an overview of previous studies of the impact of YTS on wages. The 
principle argument here is that previous studies are misspecified in that they fail to take account of 
the two sources of sample selection bias identified in section 5.1. Section 5.3 outlines the empirical 
specification whilst section 5.4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5.5 offers some concluding 
comments.
5.1: Modelling YTS and Wages
5.1.1) Sample Selection: YTS.
The estimation of the effect of training programmes on wages has a rather longer history than 
the effect of such programmes on employment prospects The basic framework involves a model of 
the form:
w ^X f i+ jy t+ u ,  (5.1)
wj represents the (natural logarithm) of individual i's wages7, X, is a vector of individual 
characteristics influencing wages, yj is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the individual 
participates on the programme under consideration and Uj is a stochastic error term. More generally, 
the effect of YTS may be allowed to vary across different types of individual*. This implies the more 
flexible form:
7 Throughout the chapter, all the realised, reservation and expected wage terms should be understood as being 
expressed in natural logarithms.
8 Hereafter, I drop the use of individual subscripts.
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w-, = X ft+nt iff >- = 1 1 
w2 = Xp2 +u2 iff y  = Oj (5.2)
The principal problem with the estimation of models such as (5.1) or (5.2) identified in the 
predominantly American literature on the subject arises from the non-random nature of programme 
participation. That is to say, sample selection bias. Three basic approaches have been suggested to 
deal with this type of problem. The first exploits longitudinal earnings data to estimate the effect of 
programme participation in terms of differences between pre- and post-programme earnings. Using 
this approach, therefore, both observed and unobserved individual characteristics which remain 
constant over time are excluded. Studies of this kind have been undertaken by, for example, 
Aschenfelter (1978) and Bassi (1983, 1984). Bamow (1987) provides a review of a number of such 
studies and Aschenfelter & Card (1985) note the extreme variability in the results produced by these 
analyses according to the assumptions employed to derive an estimable model These authors argue 
the merits of a second methodology, namely the use of experimental data. That is, the random 
assignment of eligible young people to participant and control groups. The third approach, and that 
used here, employs purely cross-section data and introduces terms to correct for sample selection 
bias in the estimates.
The adoption of the third methodology here is determined by the nature of the problem under 
consideration and the available data. The first approach is not appropriate in as much as most YTS 
participants had no pre-programme employment and therefore no pre-programme earnings. The 
second approach is not possible since experimental data is not available. It might also be recalled that 
there are ethical as well as political problems associated with the random assignment of young people 
to YTS9. Lalonde (1986) explicitly compares experimental and non-experimental estimates of the 
impact of training programmes, finding the former to be, in general, superior although the results 
produced using correction terms for sample selection bias are very close to the estimates produced 
using an experimental design10.
9 See note 17 in chapter four.
to Manski & r,?rfinWi (1992) contains a number of papers espousing the relative advantages of experimental and 
non-experimental approaches.
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It was noted above, in chapter four, that YTS participants were anything but a random sub- 
sample of the sixteen year old population. Similar problems to those identified above arise if such 
differences are not observed, and therefore controlled for, in the wage equation(s). One obvious 
source of this unobserved non-randomness considered above regards the motivation of YTS 
participants. In the context of wages, it may be the case that YTS participants were more motivated 
in their search for employment. Thus, they might look harder and therefore find better paying jobs. 
Alternatively, YTS participation might indicate a predisposition or relative preference for work as 
opposed to "leisure". In such circumstances, one would expect the reservation wages of participants 
to be lower, as would the observed wages of participants in employment.
The problem may be expressed more formally. Taking the expectations of (5.1)11 one
obtains:
£ M y -l)« .jp + r+ £ (4 y = l) (5.3)
for programme participants and:
E{w\y = O) = X0+ E(u\y = 0) (5.3')
for non-participants. The estimates of the YTS effect will be biased if E(u|y)*0. Now, recalling from 
chapter four that the YTS participation decision may be expressed in terms of an underlying latent 
variable y* such that:
y = Z a + o  v~N(Q,l) (5.4)
The individual participates on YTS if and only if y* >0, so that the probability of participation can be 
expressed in terms of the probit model:
p(y = l) = <t>(Za) (5.5)
11 Model (5.1) is used here for expository simplicity. The treatment of the problem is the same in the context of a 
model of the form of (5.2).
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now, the conditional expectation of the error term can be expressed as:
(i6>
for YTS participants and:
for non-participants. The well-known procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) consists in the two-
stage estimation of the model, constructing estimates of ^ a— and — a ^
<D (Za) <D(-Za)
model of YTS participation and subsequently including these as an additional term in the wage 
equation to produce an estimate of auu as well as controlling for sample selection bias.
5.1.2) Sample Selection: Human Capital and Reservation Wage Effects
The type of correction procedure outlined above implicitly assumes that there is no post- 
programme unemployment. Such an assumption is obviously untenable in the present context. 
Unemployment implies the presence of a second source of sample selection bias associated with the 
truncation of the earnings distribution. All individuals may be thought of as being able to command a 
specific wage or range of wages depending on their potential productivity. Potential productivity is, 
in turn, determined by individual characteristics. This potential is only observed, however, if the 
individual is in employment. Controlling for this potential source of bias allows a distinction to be 
made between potential and realised earnings which, consequently, permits the separate identification 
of the "human capital" and "reservation wage" effects of YTS.
In the discussion of YTS on employment prospects in chapter four, two principal mechanisms 
through which YTS might operate were identified. Firstly, YTS was to provide general training and 
therefore raise the level of participants' human capital. Secondly, YTS was to lower reservation 
wages. Whilst both of these mechanisms would tend to raise the probability of finding employment,
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their effect on the wages of participants would work in opposite directions. The "human capital" 
effect implies an increase in productivity and, consequently, an increase in the wage that participants 
would be able to command. The "reservation wage" effect implies a reduction of the observed wage 
of participants. The basic idea underlying the "reservation wage" effect is that YTS influenced the 
preference formation of participants in as much as YTS had a negative influence on the wages that 
young people would find acceptable. It will be recalled that the YTS allowance in 1985 was £26.25 
per week. Employers were free to supplement the allowance provided by the government. In the 
YCS sample, 8% of those on YTS in the Summer 1985 received more than the minimum. The mean 
pay of those receiving a supplement was £34.46 so that, overall, the average take-home pay of YTS 
participants in the sample was £26.94. According to the New Earnings Survey (NES), the average 
gross weekly pay of sixteen and seventeen year old males was £69.50 and for females the 
corresponding figure was £64.70. Even taking into account the fact that the YCS figure refers to net 
pay whilst the NES provides information on gross pay, there is still a substantial difference between 
the YTS allowance and the average pay of the age-group12. The idea is that YTS participants 
became "used" to undertaking a full-time occupation for a relatively low wage and were therefore 
prepared to accept lower rates of pay. In other words, YTS lowered the reservation wage of 
participants13.
These arguments may be clarified by putting them in more formal terms. The basic ideas may 
be illustrated by a simple static labour supply model14. Each young person receives a wage offer 
which is a random drawing from a lognormal distribution whose mean is determined by the 
individual's observed characteristics through their influence on his or her potential productivity. The 
individual either accepts or rejects the wage offer according to whether it is greater or less than his 
or her reservation wage. The reservation wage is determined by the individual's preferences across 
the work-leisure choice. Specifically, the reservation wage is the value of the wage-rate for which 
one of the individual's indifference curves is tangential to the budget constraint at zero hours. Given 
the presence of unobserved individual characteristics affecting preferences, the reservation wage is
12 A part of this difference would also be accounted for by the training component of YTS. In the estimation of wages 
below, however, this is controlled for.
13 As will become dear in section 5.1.4, this is by no means the only possible interpretation of the "reservation wage" 
effect. Further discussion of this issue is deferred until then.
14 It will be observed that the model, as outlined in this sub-section, is similar in structure to the one used by Lee 
(1983) in his analysis of union wage effects.
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assumed to be randomly (and lognormally) distributed around its mean which is determined by 
observed individual characteristics. One may express the preceding considerations in terms of the 
following simple formal model:
wp = X J W + ywy
W* - = W p + U
r* =XJîr + yry+v
(5.7)
u~N(0,oï)  (5.8)
v~N(0,ol)  (5-9)
with, for simplicity of exposition:
E { r - )= X A + r ,y = f  (5 io)
The condition for observing wages is given by:
H'=w'* iff w* >r* 
w = 0 otherwise
(5.11)
introducing the criterion function:
I ' = w ' - r * = x j r - x j M r .  -  rr)y+ («-v) (5.12)
(5.11) may be rewritten as:
w = w* iff /* > 0 
w = 0 otherwise
(5.13)
Wp denotes the earnings potential of young people which is a function of individual characteristics, 
Xwi and of YTS participation, y. The increase in human capital arising out of the scheme implies that
Y -  i^JL)o Each young person receives a wage offer, w*, which deviates randomly from earnings 
" dy
potential, whilst his or her realised earnings, w, are equal to the wage offer, if that offer is accepted.
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This occurs if and only if the offer is greater than the individual's reservation wage, r*, which, in turn,
depends on individual characteristics and whether or not the young person participated on YTS. In 
dr*this case, yr = — (0, that is, through its influence on preference formation, YTS participation is 
&
expected to have a negative effect on reservation wages.
The expected value of an individual's observed wage is thus:
E(h,) = E{w*\w*)r*)
= E(w'\{u -  v) > ~(wp -  r>)
= wp + E(u\ (u- v)> -(w , -  r ))
= wp + Gu-(m~v) E((u-  v)|(t/-  v) > -(wp - r ))
< V v )
Normalising the variance of the criterion function, a[y.v)i to unity one obtains: 
E(w) = wp + ( -  crm)£((»/ -  v)| (« -  v) > -(wp -  r ))
w .
= wp+(oi-e?„) T *  r \
<D(w - r )
E{w) = w + (6 [ -o J a ,  with A, = ^  (5.14)
- r )
The effect of YTS on the observed wage is consequently given by: 
cfy cy
= r . +(Yr -  -  O ^ i U  + K  - f ))
= ( l- A w)yw + y,Aw with Aw= ( o [ - o m)Xx(a, +(wf - r ) )  (5.15)
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Given the normalisation, oJ,_¥) = 1, as long as cr > cx^  and cr > ct„., A*, will lie in the range
(0,1)15. The estimated effect of YTS on observed wages will comprise a reduced measure of the 
"human capital" effect in addition to a part of the "reservation wage" effect. It might also be 
observed that the size of the bias, ceteris paribus, will vary positively with the expected value of the 
reservation wage and negatively with earnings potential. The model provides a simple intuitive 
interpretation of the effect of YTS on wages in the presence of non-random employment 
determination. The observed wage is a random drawing from a distribution that is truncated from 
below. The expected value of this truncated distribution (the expected value of the observed wage) 
will obviously be positively related to the point of truncation (the reservation wage). YTS 
participation, in as much as it reduces reservation wages, lowers the point of truncation, and 
consequently, the expected value of the observed wage.
The implications for the analysis below are that if one estimates a wage equation of the form 
of (5.1) above without taking into account sample selection due to the truncation in observed wages 
the coefficient on YTS participation, yw, will actually be an estimate of the weighted average of the
"human capital" and the "reservation wage" effects. Since the "reservation wage" effect of YTS is 
expected to be negative, the estimate of the "human capital" effect will be biased downwards. If, on 
the other hand one estimates the effect of YTS, introducing a term to represent A, in order to 
explicitly take into account truncation then one purges the equation of the negative influence of YTS 
on reservation wages and one is left with the positive effect of YTS due to human capital 
accumulation.
5.1.3) Sample Selection: Reservation and Expected Wages
Further light may be thrown on the issues raised in section 5.1.2 by considering reservation 
and "expected" wages directly. In terms of the model considered above, the effect of sample 
selection bias on reservation and "expected" wages may be considered in an analogous way to the 
treatment of the problem in the context of realised wages. The observed distributions of both the 
reservation wages and the wage "expectations" of young people are truncated in that they are only
15 One knows that the term, A ,(a , + (h^ - r ) )  lies in the range (0,1) (Greene, 1993). The condition given in the
text implies that ( of -  cr^) also does. Another way of putting this condition is that u must be positively, and v 
negatively, correlated with (u-v).
139
observed if the person is unemployed. Thus, the expected value of the reservation wage, given that it 
is observed (I*<0) may be expressed as16:
£(r) = £(r*|w>* <r*)
l-0>(w - r )
= r - { a w - o l ) Z 2
2 l-O fw -r )
(5.16)
The effect of YTS participation in this context is given by:
= K -  (r„ )Aj(a2 -  (h-, - r ))
dy
= + with -4, * -(<»■«, -  o^)A2(a2 -  r)) (5.17)
it might be observed that given the conditions outlined in note 15 above, the covariance term, 
is negative so that A,- once again lies in the range (0,1). As before, the size of Aj will
vary, ceteris paribus, negatively with earnings potential and positively with the expected value of the 
reservation wage. The implication is that not taking into account sample selection bias, one 
underestimates, in absolute terms, the size of the negative effect of YTS participation on the 
reservation wage.
One may also consider the wage "expectations" of young people, denoted by we*. In the 
presence of full information concerning the distribution of wage offers, wage "expectations" would 
be identically equal to the expected value of the wage offer distribution (wp). There are two principal 
reasons for which the mean of observed "expected" wages might differ from earnings potential. 
Firstly, young people may have incomplete information on their earnings potential. Initially I assume
16 In common with the convention adopted for wages, terms with an asterisk should be understood as referring to 
values defined over the whole sample, whereas terms without the asterisk represent observed values.
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that errors in beliefs are randomly (and lognormally) distributed with unit mean17. Secondly, 
"expected" wages are only observed for the unemployed. That is, the observed "expected” wage is 
the wage that young unemployed people said they expected to earn in their next job. Thus, one needs 
to take account of the effect of non-random employment determination As in the case of observed 
wages, the existence of sample selection bias implies that the mean of the error term in the 
"expected" wage equation, given that the "expected" wage is observed, is notequal to zero. Putting 
these arguments more formally, assume that the "expected" wage, defined over all young people in 
the labour market, is given by:
w' =wn+u' , „ x
(518)= X J w + r wy  + u
wage "expectations" are equal to the earnings potential of young people give or take random 
mistakes arising from incomplete information. If the expected wage were observed for all young 
people, the error term would have zero mean However, since an individual's "expected" wage is 
only observed if that person is unemployed, the mean of the error term, given that the "expected" 
wage is observed, will pick up non-randomness in the determination of employment. As before, The 
expected value of the "expected" wage must be adapted to take this into consideration. Thus, the 
mathematical expectation of the observed "expected" wage is given by:
E&wt ) = x  r ’)
= h'j, + £(w,|w'* <r*)
<fiw _- r )
= <519) 
and the consequent effect of YTS on the observed "expected" wage is as follows:
-(r* - "K  -f))
&
17 1 am referring here to the underlying multiplicative form of the model, the assumption on the errors obviously 
implies that when one expresses the equation in logarithmic form the errors are normally distributed with zero mean.
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= (l - A ' ) y w + r rAt w ith ^ ,= (o ;.- a 1(,v)Aj(A2-(M'i, - r ) )  (5.20)
One immediately notes the similarity to equation (5.15) above. The effect of YTS on the observed 
"expected" wage comprises a reduced human capital term as well as part of the negative reservation 
wage effect. The principal difference between this and the wage equation being that the size of 
varies positively with earnings potential and negatively with the expected value of the reservation 
wage.
5.1.4) Job Search, Job Offers, and Systematic Errors in "Expectations"
The static model of labour supply outlined above provides a simple intuitive interpretation of 
sample selection bias in the context of the truncated potential earnings distribution, however, it 
ignores at least three important issues which need to be considered in order to introduce a modicum 
of realism into the empirical model.
Firstly, if one moves from the static model to even the simplest dynamic job search model18 
the determination of the optimal reservation wage is modified substantively. Suppose each young 
person receives one wage offer after leaving school and before the point in time at which they are 
observed (Spring 1986). As before, they will accept or reject wage offers according to whether or 
not they are greater than their reservation wage. The difference arises in that the optimal reservation 
wage will depend on the distribution of wage offers. The choice is no longer between accepting an 
offer and rejecting it to remain unemployed. Rather the choice is now between accepting an offer and 
therefore stopping searching, or rejecting it in order to continue searching for a better one. Thus, the 
reservation wage will depend on, in addition to individual preferences and the level of unemployment 
income19, the costs of search, and the expected value of the wage offer distribution. Even if one 
assumes that search costs and unemployment income are constant across individuals, it needs to be 
recognised that the reservation wage will be positively related to the mean of the wage offer
18 See, for example, Kiefer & Neumann (1979).
19 Obviously, the level of the optimal reservation wage will also depend on unemployment income (and above-all 
unemployment benefits which are lost if the person accepts employment) even in the static model.
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distribution20. Thus, all variables influencing earnings potential will also influence the reservation 
wage.
Secondly, it was assumed that all young people received an offer of employment. This is 
blatantly unrealistic. The introduction of the probability of receiving a wage offer21 (not necessarily 
equal to one) into the framework has non-trivial implications. The probability of being observed in 
employment will depend not just on the difference between earnings potential and the reservation 
wage, but also on factors influencing the likelihood of receiving an offer. The estimation of 
reservation wages also needs to take account of this. The level of the optimal reservation wage will 
.be positively related to the probability of receiving an offer (e.g. Wolpin, 1987). In the presence of 
the accumulation of both general and firm-specific human capital, participation on YTS is likely to 
raise the probability of receiving a job offer, primarily with the sponsor of the scheme.
Thirdly, it was assumed that young people knew (give or take a random error) what their true 
earnings potential was. It is plausible to suggest that young unemployed people had only a rather 
vague notion of what pay they could realistically expect to command in the labour market given their 
qualifications and other personal characteristics. The introduction of the possibility of systematically 
erroneous expectations drives a wedge between the earnings potential of those in employment and 
the wage "expectations" of the unemployed. Once again, also the estimation of reservation wages 
needs to take this into account. Since the reservation wage depends on an individuals beliefs about 
his or her earnings potential, systematic errors in the formation of these beliefs will influence the 
formation of the reservation wage. Thus, for example, if young unemployed people systematically 
overestimated the mean of the wage offer distribution, their reservation wages would also be raised 
above the optimal level. It may be that, through contact with the labour market, YTS participation 
provided more information on the true wage offer distribution, thereby reducing "expected", and 
consequently, reservation wages. The reduction of reservation wages due to YTS participation may 
thus be given a less pejorative interpretation22. That is, high reservation wages might also be the
20 It might also be observed that, even with risk neutrality, the optimal reservation wage is an increasing function of 
the variance of the wage offer distribution (Devine & Kiefer, 1991). In what follows, the assumption of 
homoscedasticity of the error term in the wage equation implies that the variance of the wage offer distribution is 
constant across individuals.
21 In what follows, I use the terms wage offer and job offer interchangeably.
22 In an interesting and, to my mind, much neglected paper, Gintis (1974) demonstrates that once one introduces 
endogenous preference formation into a neo-classical general equilibrium model, the desirable welfare properties of 
the model are lost.
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result of a lack of information leading to suboptimal choices. YTS participation, through its effect on 
"expected" wages, might bring reservation wages closer to their optimal value.
Before laying out the modified formal model, it is useful to verbally summarise the 
implications of these considerations for the empirical analysis. Firstly, the "expected" wage equation 
needs to be adapted to take account of systematic errors in the formation of expectations. If, YTS 
had a role to play in reducing the size of any systematic overestimation of individuals' earnings 
potential one would expect the value of the coefficient on YTS participation to be lower in the 
"expected" wage equation than in the realised wage equation. More generally, one might expect 
differences in the entire coefficient vector produced in the estimation of the two equations. If, on the 
other hand, there are no systematic mistakes in the formation of "expectations", one would expect 
the two parameter vectors to be identical. This suggests an obvious test for the existence of 
systematic errors obtained by testing parameter variation across the two equations.
Secondly, the reservation wage will depend on individual preferences, the expected value of 
the wage offer distribution, any errors in the formation of expectations and the probability of 
receiving a job offer. Therefore, all factors which influence "expected" earnings and/or the job offer 
probability must also be included in the reservation wage equation.
Finally, the criterion function determining whether or not an individual is observed as being in 
employment needs to be adapted to take account of the offer probability in addition to the 
acceptance probability. The introduction of uncertainty regarding the receipt of offers implies that 
the probability of being in employment is the product of two probabilities. The probability of 
receiving a job offer and the probability of accepting an offer given that it is received. In what 
follows, I adopt a significant simplification in this regard. Rather than attempt to separately identify 
factors influencing the two probabilities, and therefore estimate two separate "criterion" functions 
determining the receipt and acceptance of job offers respectively, I continue to employ a single 
criterion function whilst, however, recognising that the probability of being observed in employment 
will depend on factors influencing the receipt as well as the acceptance of wage offers. It was noted 
in chapter four that it is possible to estimate a bivariate model without separate observations on 
offers and acceptances (Poirier, 1980, Abowd & Farber, 1982), however, in order to estimate such a 
model, one needs to introduce identifying restrictions on the variables determining job offers and
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acceptances (at least one variable in the job offer equation does not enter the acceptance equation or 
vice versa23). Since the job offer probability also influences the reservation wage, all variables 
entering the job offer equation must also enter the job acceptance equation. On the other HanH it is 
likely that the same factors which influence earnings potential (and therefore the acceptance 
probability) will also affect the likelihood of receiving a job offer. Identifying restrictions in this 
context would be, at best, arbitrary. Thus, I prefer to proceed on the basis of an additive rather than 
multiplicative form. Since, as long as unobserved characteristics determining the probability of 
receiving an offer are positively correlated with those influencing the acceptance probability, the 
additive form of the probability will be highly correlated with the more correct multiplicative form, 
the simplified formulation of the criterion function will control for sample selection. On the other 
hand, the parameter estimates produced for the function will obviously be biased unless either the 
offer or acceptance probability does not vary over individuals. In this case, the criterion function 
represents the acceptance probability (if the offer probability is constant) or the offer probability (if 
the acceptance probability is constant). Since the parameters of the acceptance probability are also 
separately estimated, one also has a means of checking the hypothesis that the offer probability plays 
no role in determining employment. Should this be true, the parameter estimates from the criterion 
function should be equal to the difference between the parameter estimates from the wage and 
reservation wage equations (with controls for sample selectivity).
In terms of the effect of YTS on the observed wage, these considerations complicate the 
interpretation of sample selection. The criterion function will now contain factors directly influencing 
earnings potential, the reservation wage and the probability of receiving a job offer. The reservation 
wage itself will be influenced positively by earnings potential, errors in "expectations" and the job 
offer probability.
Introduction of these considerations into the simple formal framework adopted above, allows 
some further insights into the mechanisms through which YTS was operating. As regards wages in 
employment, earnings potential remains unaltered. Thus, as before:
K  + r~y (5-21)
23 Maddala (1983, p. 280).
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M> =Wp+U u - N i O , ^ ) (5.22)
The expected value of the observed wage needs only minor modification becoming:
(5.23)
where 1' is the systematic component and e is the error term of the modified criterion function I*124.
The introduction of the possibility of the erroneous formation of expectations modifies the 
"expected" wage equation which becomes:
w* = wp +M+u"
where M indicates erroneous expectations (or mistakes), and, used as a subscript, variables and their 
parameters influencing this error in expectations. In this context, the effect of YTS on "expected" 
wages is twofold. On the one hand, there is the positive "human capital" effect, yw. On the other, it
is plausible that, through contact with the labour market, participation on YTS provided young 
people with a clearer picture of the wage offer distribution, or, as Mr. Nigel Lawson would have it, 
made young people's wage expectations "more realistic". Thus, one would expect yM to be negative. 
The mathematical expectation of the observed "expected" wage is:
The effect of YTS on the "expected" wage contains two components: a positive effect due to the 
increase in earnings potential (yw) and a negative component (ym) arising if YTS played a role in 
reducing errors in wage "expectations". In this context, the proposition that young people's wage 
"expectations" did not differ systematically from their earnings potential may be straightforwardly 
tested. The null hypothesis implies that parameter vector (Pm , ym) should be nil. So long as 
al = of-, the hypothesis may be tested by pooling the realised wages of the employed with the
24 The specification of the modified criterion function is deah with below.
= + x Mp M +(r„ + y M) y + u " (5.24)
e (w.) = XJ ~  + x MPu +(r. + rM)y - 4 ? ) (5.25)
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"expected" wages of the employed and estimating a unified set of coefficients. If the pooling 
restriction is rejected, then one may presume that the unemployed did make systematically err in the 
formation of wage "expectations".
The reservation wage equation needs to be substantially modified. The job search model 
combined with the introduction of the possibility of errors in the formation of "expectations" and the 
job offer probability imply that, in addition to factors affecting individual preferences25, the 
reservation wage will depend on individual characteristics, the "expected" wage and the probability 
of receiving a job offer:
r* = r*{X„y,w„p{qfferj) (5.26)
The subscript r is now employed to distinguish factors affecting the reservation wage directly from 
those operating indirectly through the "expected" wage and the job offer probability. For simplicity, 
suppose that the (natural logarithm of the) "expected" wage and factors influencing the probability of 
receiving a job offer enter the reservation wage equation linearly. This may then be expressed as:
r* = KPr + yry + +  x MPu+(r~+ru )y]+AXpPr + r^v)+v (5.27)
where the subscript p indicates factors influencing the probability of receiving a job offer. The first 
two terms on the right hand side, XJ3r + yry, represent factors affecting preferences, costs of search 
and unemployment income26. The terms in square brackets, \Xwf3w +XM/3M +(?'„ + yM)y], represent
earnings "expectations" (the associated parameter, r|, measuring the elasticity of the reservation 
wage with respect to the "expected" wage), and the third group of terms, {Xfpp + y^y), comprise
25 As noted above, the factors influencing the reservation wage directly will comprise the costs of search and 
unemployment income in addition to preferences. Indeed, in the standard job search model, individual preferences are 
effectively excluded by the assumption that individuals maximise expected lifetime income (e.g. Devine & Keifer, 
1991).
26 The presumption here is that YTS was operating through its influence on the first of these. It is plausible that YTS 
participation also reduced the costs of search, thereby raising (for obvious reasons) the reservation wage. The so-called 
"direct" effect of YTS would in fact be a composite effect comprising the negative effect due to preference formation 
and a positive effect due to the reduction in the costs of search. I do not pursue the issue further. The implications for 
the analysis would simply be the addition of another positive effect of YTS on the reservation wage.
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factors affecting the job offer probability with their associated parameter n. Rearranging terms in 
order to bring together the coefficients on YTS participation equation (5.27) may be expressed as:
r ’ = Xrßr + r i X J w +XMßM) + A X pßp)+(yr + riyw + yu ) +//y„).y + V (5.27’)
The considerations outlined above suggest that yr and y f^-will be negative whilst t], |j and yp will be
positive. The reservation wage effect of YTS is, therefore, composed of a combination of the direct
negative "preference formation" effect, the indirect (positive or negative) "expected wage" effect
working through the influence of "expected" wages on reservation wages, and the indirect positive
"job offer" effect. YTS will have a negative influence on the reservation wage if 
yr + rjyM > rjyw + fj.yp, whilst the effect will be positive if the inequality is reversed.
Given non-random employment determination, the expected value of the observed 
reservation wage is given by:
Finally, the criterion function will depend on factors influencing the probability of receiving a job 
offer and factors influencing the probability of accepting it if received. Thus:
£(r) = r - (5.28)
(5.29)
expressed in terms of the underlying variables, this becomes:
(5.29’)
Again, to keep things simple, suppose that the criterion function may be expressed in linear terms, so 
that it is simply the sum of factors influencing the offer and acceptance probabilities. Thus:
/*' -  XJ3W + ywy - [ X r0 r + i i x wp w + XU0U)+^  XJf ip) + ( +  r^yw + yM) + W p)y\ + Xpf3p + y y + e
e~N{  0,1) (5.30)
The first term is earnings potential, the second composite term in square brackets is the reservation 
wage, and the final terms comprise factors affecting the probability of receiving a job offer. 
Rearranging, this may be expressed as:
/ ’’ = (1 -  rj)Xw/3w -  Xrpr -  r\XMpM + (l -  fi)Xfpp + [(1 -  rj)yw -  yr -  iyyM + (1 -  fi)yf ]y + e (5.30')
The effect of YTS through human capital accumulation, (l -  rj)yw , has both positive and negative 
components. YTS participation raises the probability of being in employment by increasing the 
human capital and, therefore, the earnings potential of participants. On the other hand, this increase 
in earnings potential also leads to an increase in the reservation wage of participants, thereby 
reducing the chances of accepting any given wage offer. So long as the elasticity of the reservation 
wage with respect to earnings potential (rj) is less than one, however, the net effect will be positive. 
The effect of YTS on the reservation wage through its influence on preferences (yr) and through its 
tendency to correct overestimates of earnings potential (ttym) ^  be negative, thus raising the 
chances that an individual will accept a given wage offer. Finally, the probability of receiving a job 
offer directly raises the probability of being in employment, but also indirectly reduces it through its 
positive influence on the reservation wage. The net effect, (l-|i)Vp will be positive so long as n < 1. 
To summarise, so long as t) and )i are less than one, the effect of YTS on the probability of being in 
employment will be unequivocally positive.
In this context, the measured effect of YTS on the expected realised wage is given by:
= + +  (531)
oy
with Aw = cr^A, ' +/' ).
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Once again, the effect of YTS on the observed wage is composed of one positive term (the "human 
capital" effect) from which must be subtracted a composite term, also expected to be positive. The 
estimate of the "human capital" effect of YTS, yw, will be biased downwards. The intuitive 
interpretation of the reservation wage effect is as before. It will be noted that the an increase in the 
job offer probability arising out of participation on YTS, directly raises the probability of being in 
employment, and therefore introduces an ulterior negative effect of YTS on the observed wage. This 
is because, the higher the probability of receiving a job offer, ceteris paribus, the lower will be the 
expected value of the observed wage. Since the job offer probability also influences the probability of 
being in employment indirectly (through its influence on the reservation wage) in the opposite 
direction, the net effect will be positive or negative according to whether the parameter is less than 
or greater than one27.
It should be observed that, although the particularly simple form of the job offer effect in this 
case is due to the simplification adopted regarding the formulation of the criterion function, the basic 
intuition regarding the effect is not altered if one specifies the probability of being in employment 
correctly as the product of the offer probability and the acceptance probability conditional on an 
offer being received. Since the issue is of some importance in the interpretation of the results it is 
worth a brief digression to demonstrate this.
Suppose that one specifies separately the job offer and acceptance probabilities. The model is 
now made up of equations (5.21), (5.22), (5.27), and the separate job offer and acceptance 
functions:
I9" = w* -  r = wp -  r -  (u -  v) = wp -  Xrpr -  yry -  t j w ,  -¿ X p P , + -  v) (5.32)
f  = X f p + Y J  + »  0,1) (5-33)
with
w = w* iff /*•’>0 and f > 0 (5.34)
in these circumstances, the probability of observing an individual in employment is given by:
27 Similar expressions may be straightforwardly derived for the bias in the YTS effect for the "expected" and 
reservation wages of the unemployed. I spare the reader the rather tedious derivations. Suffice it to say that with the 
obvious modifications, the expressions are analogous to the expression derived above for observed wages.
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p(e = 1) = p ( f "  > 0 , f  > o) = <t>(wp - r , X p/3p + y ^ p ^ J (5.35)
whereas, the single criterion function implies a p p ro x im atin g  this probability by:
p{e =  1) =  p ( r  > .o) =  O f* ',  -  F + Xjfip +  y j )  (5 .3 6 )
The expected value of the observed wage is given by:
£(h') = £(>v, |/*">0,J*>0) (5.37)
That is, the expected value of the observed wage is equal to the expected value of the wage offer,
given that a wage offer is both received and accepted. This, in turn may be written as:
Eiw) =  wp +E(u\I*" > 0, f  > 0)
=  w p +  E {u \iu  -  v) >  -  r ), a> >  - { X f l ,  +  y j ) )
= wp + ct«A.(w-v)£((u" v)l(«~ v) > -(wp - r io t»  ~ (X ^p + rpy))
+ VuPu.cA0^ ® > ~(XpPp + -  v) > -(h-, - f )) (5.38)
Where the p terms represent correlation coefficients. Expressed in these general terms, it is obvious 
that, so long as the error terms from job offer and acceptance equations are positively correlated 
with the error term from the wage equation, as well as being positively correlated with each other, 
the bias in the estimation of earnings potential will vary positively with the expected value of the 
reservation wage and negatively with the probability of receiving a job offer. That is, the bias will 
vary inversely with the probability of observing an individual in employment. It is plausible to expect 
such positive correlations. As regards the acceptance equation, this condition follows almost as a 
matter of course. The error term from the reservation wage would have to take a very odd form in 
order that the correlation coefficient be negative (e.g. v=-u2). A positive correlation between the 
error term from the job offer equation and the earnings equation suggests that unobserved
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characteristics of the individuals which positively influence the chances of receiving a wage offer also 
positively influence the value of such an offer. One might think in terms of motivation which, 
although not observed by the researcher, is observed by the prospective employer. Such motivation 
is likely to be positively correlated with the chances of receiving an offer (through its effects on the 
intensity of search for example) as well as being positively correlated to the wage offer (through 
being an indicator of greater productivity). Finally, it seems reasonable to suggest that the probability 
of accepting an offer is positively related to the probability of receiving one The keener one is to 
obtain a job, the harder one is likely to try to get an offer and the more likely one is to accept an 
offer if it is forthcoming.
Given these conditions, since the job offer probability also positively influences the 
reservation wage, the influence of YTS participation on the observed wage due to the raising of the 
job offer probability will have both positive and negative elements: an indirect positive element 
working through the influence of the job offer probability on the reservation wage; and, a direct 
negative influence due to the raising of the probability of receiving an offer.
More generally, it will be observed that the criterion function as given by (5.30) is 
misspecified The misspecification implies that the parameters of the criterion function will not be 
linearly related to the parameters of the underlying wage, reservation wage and job offer equations. 
However, since it is to be expected that the additive form will be highly correlated with the more 
correct multiplicative form, terms calculated using the single criterion function will control for the 
problem of sample selection. In effect, the inverse Mill's ratio derived from the single equation form 
is to be used as an instrument for the terms arising from the multiplicative form. Furthermore, if the 
job offer probability does not vary across individuals, the parameters in the criterion function should 
be equal to the difference between the parameters obtained by estimating the wage and reservation 
wage equations separately.
Where then does all this discussion leave us ? To summarise the issues as they affect the 
empirical analysis below, it is worth briefly restating the model. Seen in terms of the underlying 
variables and their observed counterparts we have:
w* =wp +v n~N[0.ai)  (5.39)
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w, = + r»y (5.40)
w = wp + <JUCXJ +u (5.41)
r* ~r  +v v~7V(0,cr) (5.42)
f = x rpr + i i x wpw + x Mpu ) + fjXfP,,+[ Yr + n i r .+ Y u )+ w P}y (5.43)
r = r -  ctv£A2'+v (5.44)
w*t =wp +A/+w" 0,c£.) (5.45)
M = x Mpu + Yuy (5.46)
w. = wp + M -  <vfA2' +!/" (5.47)
/ " = ( ! - 4 X J . - X . P ,  -  vxufiu + 0 - m)x s ,+ [(i -  n ) r . - r , ~ w M+{}-v)Yr]y+E
£~N(  0,1) (5.48)
The basic notion underlying the model is that if one estimates equations (5.39), (5.42) and 
(5 .45) on the subsamples of individuals for which these variables are observed, without taking into 
account non-random (un)employment determination, the resulting parameter estimates will be 
biased. In particular, it is expected that the estimate of the effect of YTS on earnings through its 
impact on the accumulation of human capital will be biased downwards. In as much as YTS 
participation reduces the reservation wage and raises the chances of receiving a job offer, it tends to 
raise the probability of observing an individual in employment and, therefore, reduce the value of the 
observed wage.
Following a similar logic, not introducing controls for sample selection bias implies that the 
effect of YTS on the reservation wage will also be biased downwards, whilst the estimated effect on 
the expected wage of participation on the scheme will upwardly biased. This is because the increased 
probability that an individual is observed in employment tends to reduce the expected value of the 
observed reservation wage and increase that of the observed "expected" wage.
In order to derive an unbiased estimate of the effect of YTS on "expected, reservation and 
realised wages, probit estimation of the criterion function (5.48) may be employed to derive 
estimates of the inverse Mill's ratio, and its complement, These estimates are then included 
as additional terms in the estimation of equations (5.41), (5.44) and (5.47) in order to derive the
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underlying parameter estimates of interest specified by (5.40), (5.43), and (5.46). In this manner, 
direct estimates are obtained of:
a) the human capital effect of YTS, yw (5.40);
b) the overall reservation wage effect of YTS, [yr + i i yw + yM)+/jyp] , composed of the
direct "preference formation" effect, yr , the "expected" wage effect (which, in turn, is composed of 
"human capital” and "erroneous expectations" effects), r^yw + yM) , and the effect due to the 
increased probability of receiving a job offer, ftyp (5.43);
c) the combined "human capital" and "erroneous expectations" effect, (yw + yu ), (5.46);
d) the effect of YTS on the probability of being in employment, 
[ 0 -  7 )r„ - Y r -  Wm + 0 ~M)rP] , (5.48).
In principal, the results thus achieved may be combined to further provide indirect estimates
of:
e) the effect of YTS on the probability of receiving a job offer, yp, (by subtracting a) from 
and adding b) to d));
f) the effect of YTS on errors in expectations y^j (by subtracting a) from c)).
Such direct and indirect estimates are reported below, however, the indirect estimates should
be treated with some caution. In particular, their reasonableness depends on the linear way in which
factors influencing the job offer probability influence the reservation wage in (5.43) and the criterion
function (5 .48). On the other hand, the calculation of e) is important in that, if YTS had no impact on
the job offer probability, the effect of YTS on employment probability would consist of just the
"human capital" and composite "reservation wage" effects. Thus, a divergence between the
coefficient on YTS in the criterion function (5.48) and the difference between the coefficient on YTS
in the wage (5.40) and reservation wage equations (5.43) would provide evidence that YTS was also
operating by raising the probability of receiving a wage offer. More generally, if the entire parameter 
vector (fip, yp) were nil, variations in the job offer probability would have no role to play in the
determination of employment, and, therefore, the criterion function would be correctly specified, 
simply containing factors influencing the acceptance probability. Finally, a pooled regression of the 
wages of the employed and "expected" wages of the unemployed may be used to provide a simple
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test of the hypothesis that M=0. That is, that there were no systematic errors in the formation of 
expectations.
On the other hand, whilst efforts are made to verify the existence of "erroneous expectations" 
and "offer probability" effects of YTS, no attempt is made to separate these effects from the 
"preference formation" effect of YTS. Such an attempt might more reasonably be made by explicitly 
modelling job offer and acceptance probabilities and goes beyond the scope of the present study.
5.1.5) Specification of Sample Selection
In the empirical analysis, the possibility of sample selection bias arising from both non­
random YTS participation and non-random employment determination is taken into account. That is, 
the considerations of the preceding sections are combined to produce the specification of sample 
selection implemented below. To my knowledge, this is the first study to consider both effects 
contemporaneously. Section 5.1.1, suggested the introduction of a term to control for bias arising 
from non-random YTS participation. Sections 5.1.2, 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 provided a justification for the 
introduction of a term to control for non-random employment determination. In the latter case, the 
additional factors are subsumed into a single probability of employment term. It will also be observed 
that, given the analysis of chapter four, employment determination and YTS participation are likely 
to be related.
The considerations outlined above suggest the use of two criterion functions. The first, to 
determine YTS participation, was given by (5.4) above as:
y ' = Za+ v  (549)
the second to determine non-random employment determination was expressed as (5.48):
/•' = (1 -  rj)XJw -  Xrpr -  rjXuPM + (1 -  n)Xpf}p + [{\-Tj)yw- y r-TryM+{\-v)y f ]y+£
(5.50)
the criterion function for employment determination may be more compactly expressed as:
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r  = x p + w + e (5.50)
where X contains all the factors, apart from YTS participation, influencing either earnings potential, 
the reservation wage or the probability of receiving an offer and y represents YTS participation as 
before. 3 and y represent the associated composite parameter vector. In order to impose as few 
additional a priori conditions as possible on the estimation procedure, the two criterion functions are 
jointly estimated by bivariate probit introducing the same individual characteristics in the equation 
determining YTS participation as in that determining employment This implies28 that the parameter 
on YTS participation in (5.50') is not identified. Therefore, the sample selection terms were derived 
by bivariate probit estimation of the two criterion functions29:
y*' = X a +  v’
r - ' ^ x p + e *
The likelihood function for the derivation of the sample selection terms is, therefore:
1 7  4>(XA Xa,p, „ -X a ,-p ,  „ f ' y’t(-Xp,Xcr, -p ,  „ )lw)'4>(-Xfi, -X a ,p , „
(5.53)
where $>(.,.;.) indicates the standardised bivariate normal distribution. Consequently, the wage 
equation corrected for sample selection bias is given by:
w = Xw0 w + r wy  + <ru,E{i?\w* > r \y )+ a udE(ü\M>* > r\y )  + u (5.54)
where, for YTS participants, one obtains30:
28 See the discussion of the identification of the bivariate probit model in chapter four.
29 I continue to employ a and p to describe the parameter vectors associated with the determinants of YTS 
participation and employment respectively, although obviously their form will vary with the explanatory variables 
introduced into the YTS participation and employment equations.
30 As in chapter four, I use the term <I>0 to refer to both the univariate and bivariate normal distributions. The number 
of arguments of the function should, I hope, be sufficient to distinguish between them.
(5.51)
(5.52)
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<axpyd
E{é\w* > r \ y  = l) =
X ja -P uJ) 
0 ~ / Ü 'A
<t>{X/3,Xa,Put) (5.55)
<(iXa)<S>
E^O\w* > r’,_v= l) = 0 - A ) *
®{Xp,Xa,pJ (556)
and, for non-participants, one has:
<W)4>
£(5* In'* >r',y = o) =
- X { a - p uJ3)
(1 -A >
4>(Xp-Xcr,-pJ (5.55’)
E{ ü  |w* > r*,_y = 0) = —
'  X [p -puca Ÿ
b - P i f -  J
< X X 0,-X a ,-pJ (5-56')
Estimation of the joint probability that an individual participated on YTS and was in employment in 
the Spring 1986 by bivariate probit allows the calculation of the terms given by (5 .55) and (5.56) for 
YTS participants and (5.55') and (5.56') for non-participants. These terms are then introduced into 
the wage equation to permit the unbiased estimation of the principal parameters of interest in the 
determination of earnings potential, as well as providing estimates of the covariance terms 0^  and 
ouu« which are estimated as two additional parameters in the equation31. The reasoning offered above ' 
suggests that the covariance between the error terms in the wage and employment equations is likely 
to be positive. The direction of the bias in the estimate of the effect of YTS participation is likely to 
have the opposite sign. This is because it is expected that YTS tended to raise earnings potential
31 This two-stage procedure is an extension of the well-known correction for sample selection bias suggested by 
Heckman (1979). Tunali (1986) employs this type of double selection procedure in analysing the migration decision 
of individuals. One could, in principle, estimate the wage equation and the correction terms simultaneously by 
mainmiim likelihood. This would, however, involve the evaluation of trivariate normal integrals and is not undertaken 
here
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(human capital effect) lower the reservation wage (preference formation and erroneous expectations 
effects)32, and raise the chances of receiving a job offer (job offer effect). Since, the size of the bias is 
inversely related to the probability of observing the individual in employment, and since YTS 
participation is expected to raise this probability, and therefore reduce the bias, the measured effect 
of YTS on earnings potential derived from an uncorrected estimate of wages will be biased 
downwards.
On the other hand, the direction of the bias arising from non-random YTS participation has 
the same sign as the covariance between the error terms in the wage and YTS participation 
equations. Suppose that YTS participants were more motivated than non-participants, with such 
motivation tending to raise their potential productivity in the eyes of prospective employers If this 
motivation was not captured by the other explanatory variables, it would manifest itself as a positive 
correlation between the error terms in the wage and YTS participation equations. This unobserved 
motivation would raise the observed wage of YTS participants and, therefore lead to an 
overestimate of the effect of YTS on wages if non-random YTS participation was ignored. 
Alternatively, the converse might be true. YTS participants might be particularly unmotivated with 
respect to non-participants. In this case one would expect a negative correlation and, therefore, an 
underestimate of the effect of YTS participation on wages. Whichever is the case, the sign of the bias 
will be the same as the sign of the covariance term. The sign of the covariance terms therefore 
provides an indicator of the direction of bias arising from YTS participation.
In reporting the results several variants of the wage equation are presented. Firstly, the 
equation was estimated with and without controls for sample selection bias and with and without the 
introduction of terms to control for differences in job characteristics. This produces four forms of the 
equation. To avoid confusion in the reporting the results, it is worth briefly outlining them here. 
Specifically, denoting by A« and Xy the conditional expectations of the error terms from the
32 As was noted in section 5.1.4, YTS would also have two positive influences on the reservation wage, through the 
increased chances of obtaining a job offer and the higher level of earnings potential. However, so long as the elasticity 
of the reservation wage with respect to the expected wage (11), and the parameter on the job offer probability (p) are 
both less than one, the overall effect of these factors in the determination of employment will be positive, and, 
therefore, the effect of YTS on wages will be unequivocally underestimated in the uncorrected equation.
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employment (defined by (5.55) or (5.55') as appropriate) and YTS participation equations (defined 
by (5.56) or (5.56') as appropriate) respectively, results are reported for the following models33:
w = XJ3w + r*y+* (5.57)
w = K P »  + r - y +  +u (5.57)
w = X J W + YJf+Xjpj +u (5.58)
w = Xwp w + y^y+Xjpj + auik. + audXy +w (5.58')
Where Xj and represent job characteristics with associated parameter vector J3j. It will be observed 
that the job search model implies that all the variables in the wage equation must also appear in the 
criterion equation. Thus, one should not introduce terms to control for job characteristics, hours 
worked and so on in the wage equation since these are only observed for those in employment. Two 
justifications for the of the models given by (5.58) and (5.58') may be offered. Firstly, the observed 
wage in the Spring 1986 is not necessarily the starting wage which was accepted. Secondly, the 
introduction of terms to control for job characteristics may be justified on the grounds of 
compensating variations. That is, jobs differ in rather more than the wage. Controlling for job 
characteristics takes this into consideration. In what follows, I report results for wage equations 
estimated both with and without job characteristics. Having criticised the Willis & Rosen (1979) 
model for a not entirely dissimilar procedure in chapter three, I would not place too much emphasis 
on the estimates including job characteristics. Their inclusion allows some consideration of other 
factors influencing the wages of young people, but, above-all, ensures that the measured YTS 
"effect" on wages is not due to differences in job characteristics, and, in particular, on-going training.
Secondly, wage equations were estimated separately for YTS participants and non­
participants. This allows further consideration of the effect of YTS on wages. Thus equations of the 
form:
33 Once again, the values of the parameter vectors, ^  yw and Pj, the estimates of the two covariance terms, o^' and 
aw \  and the error term u will vary according to the form of the equation estimated. They are presented here using the 
same terminology in each case, since the notional parameters being estimated are thé same. However, The estimates 
produced using equations (S.57) and (5.58) will be biased estimates of the true parameter vector if, as is likely, the 
conditional expectation of the error term is not zero.
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w = XJ3wX + oaeX' + <7mdÀy + «, (5.59)
for YTS participants, and,
*  = Xwfiw2 + CutK + C.rf*, +«2 (5.59')
for non-participants were also estimated34. In order to test the significance of the differences between 
the effect of individual characteristics on wages for YTS participants and non-participants, the 
following single wage equation with a full set of YTS interaction d u m m ie s  was also estimated:
*  = X J W +yXw/3y + ouik , + ouxjXy +h (5.60)
This produces a direct test of the significance of differences in the effects of individual characteristics 
on wages for YTS participants and non-participants. The purpose of estimating this form is to allow 
further insights into the mechanisms underlying the "human capital" effect (or rather it's absence as 
will be seen below).
Similar procedures were used for the estimation of "expected" and reservation wages. The 
"expected" wage equation, equation (5.47) must be replaced by:
w1=wr + M + a^ ,E ( i \w '  < r \y )  + oi.„E(0\w' <r',y)+i/' (5.61)
with:
X ( a - p J )
( l - A ) * (5.62)
34 It will be observed that the form of lambda terms vaiy according to whether the person participated or YTS or not. 
The lambda terms in (5.59) represent the conditional expectations of the error terms from the employment and YTS 
equations respectively given by (5.55) and (5.56). Whilst the terms in (5.59') represent the corresponding terms for 
non-participants defined by (5.55*) and (5.56').
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<HXaYD
E{ U\w‘ <r*,y = l) =
M Xp.X a .pJ (5 63)
for YTS participants and:
E{é |w* <r*,y = o) = —
'  -X(a+putpŸ
0 - A ) *
<H-X/3,-Xa,pJ (5.62')
<HXa)<b
E{ d |w* <r*,y = o) = --
-X[fi+pyta)
Q(-XA- Xa.pJ
<5.63')
for non-participants. Denoting, as before, the correction terms for non-random (un)employment 
determination ((5.62) or (5.62') as appropriate) and YTS participation ((5.63) or (5.63') as 
appropriate) by Xt and Xy respectively, the full results for equations of the form:
+pM)+{y„ + rM)y+* '
w, = x w(pw +pM)+{rw + rM)y+<y«K + a a  +u"
(5.64)
(5.64')
are reported. It will be observed that these equations differ from the more general form employed 
above in as much as the same variables influencing earnings potential are posited as influencing 
errors in expectations. This allows a simple test of the hypothesis that E(w) = E(Wg). That is, that 
there are no systematic errors in the formation of expectations. To implement this test, equations 
(5 .57') and (5 .64') were combined to produce a regression of the form:
*  = x„P *+ r»y+ °sA .+<TiÀy+i* (5 65)
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W  =  KM
with .  \ iff e= \
u = u \
w = w \  
and .  \ iff e = 0
An F-test of the pooling restriction is a test of the hypothesis that That is, refutation of
the null hypothesis in this context would imply that there were systematic differences between the 
wage "expectations" of the unemployed and the wages of the employed, which, given the reasoning 
outlined above, might be attributed to errors in the formulation of wage "expectations" due to 
incomplete information. Further, combined wage and "expected" wage equations were also estimated 
separately for YTS participants and non-participants. That is, equations of the form:
*  = + ° u A ' + <^ , A +“i (5-66)
for participants, and,
*  = X ~P«2 + + <7i,0Ày + «2 (5-66’>
for non-participants were estimated. This tests the accuracy of wage "expectations" separately for 
YTS participants and non-participants.
As regards the estimation of reservation wages, two different forms of the equation were 
estimated. Firstly, the following form derived from the static labour supply model outlined in section 
5.1.3 was estimated (with and without correction terms defined by (5.62) or (5.62') and (5.63) or 
(5.63') as appropriate):
r = XrPr + y,y+ v (5.67)
r = X £ r + yry  t  °v A  + + v (5.67’J
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Secondly, the modifications suggested in section 5.1.4 were introduced to produce the following 
forms (with and without correction terms):
r = XrPr + +fiM)+MXrPP+[r, + *irw + ^ (5.68)
r  = X r P r  + +  + [f, + + Ï M )  +  W  + Oy ^ (5 68')
Obviously, although expressed in terms of the underlying variables and their parameters, in the 
empirical estimation, only one composite parameter is identified for each explanatory variable35. As 
before separate equations were estimated for YTS participants and non-participants respectively, 
giving the forms:
r -  XrfirX + + A n)+ /0 'A >  + V v,' (5-69)
for YTS participants, and,
r  ~  X rPr2 "*■ V2X w { f i w2 +  P k f l   ^ M l X pPp7 +  Ü V2 (5 -6 9 )
for non-participants.
Finally, it was noted above that, given the form of the employment and YTS equations, a 
parameter on a YTS participation dummy would not be identified in the bivariate probit model. It is 
also the case that the cross equation covariance between reservation (5.68') and observed wages 
(5 .57') is not identified since one either observes the reservation wage or the realised wage, never 
both. In order to compare the effect of YTS on employment with the difference between the 
parameters on YTS participation in the wage and reservation wage equations, some rather ad hoc 
manipulation was employed. Firstly, the effect of YTS participation on the employment probability 
•was calculated using the bivariate model at mean values of the sample. This was then employed to
35 Qn the other hand, even though the reservation wage equation (5.69') contains the same variables (apart from the 
YTS dummy) as are in the employment and YTS participation equations, since the latter enter non-linearly, all the 
(composite) parameters are identified in the equation.
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derive an implied parameter on YTS participation for the employment equation. The implied 
parameter being calculated as the value of the parameter on YTS participation which would have 
produced the same shift in the employment probability estimated by an univariate probit model with 
the inclusion. That is, by setting the effect of YTS on employment calculated using the bivariate 
model:
<tjXfi,Xa,pt i ) Q iX p -X a -p ,,)
<t>(Xa) <U-Xa) ’
equal to the equivalent effect measured by the univariate model:
<D (X fi+ r)-Q (X 0) (5.70')
one may obtain an estimate of y. The most obvious point at which to calculate this estimate is at 
sample mean values of employment and YTS participation probabilities. In order to check the 
existence of an effect of YTS on the offer probability, this estimate was then compared with an 
estimate of the difference between the effect of YTS on wages (given by the coefficient on YTS in 
the wage equation (5.57)) and the effect of YTS participation on the reservation wage (given by the 
coefficient on YTS in the reservation wage equation (5.67')). This provides an, albeit informal, check 
on the existence of an offer probability effect of YTS. It was noted above that, if YTS had no 
influence on the probability of receiving a job offer, the parameter on YTS participation in the 
employment equation would be equal to the difference between the parameters on YTS participation 
in the wage and reservation wage equations. Since, in the case in which YTS participation had no 
role to play in increasing the probability of a wage offer, the coefficient on YTS in the employment 
equation (5.50') should be equal to the difference between the coefficients in the wage and 
reservation wage equations, this procedure provides an informal check on the existence of a job offer 
effect.
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5.2: Previous Studies of YTS and Wages
Before proceeding to the empirical implementation of the model, it is worth briefly reporting 
the results found in previous studies. In addition to the analyses of Main & Shelley (1990, hereafter 
M&S) and Whitfield & Bourlakis (1990, 1991, hereafter W&B) which consider the effect of YTS on 
both employment and wages, Dolton, Makepeace & Treble (1994a, hereafter DMT2, and 1994c, 
hereafter DMT3) have analysed the effect of YTS on wages36. Main (1987a) considers the issue of 
the realism of the wage expectations of the unemployed.
W&B estimate a wage equation of the form of (5 .1) above for young people in employment 
in February 1987 who reached minimum school-leaving age during the academic year 1983/4. They 
find that YTS had a small but statistically significant negative effect on the wages of participants. 
Although they don't report the results, they say that terms introduced to correct for non-random 
YTS participation (i.e. of the form given by 5.6, 5.6') were not statistically significant and did not 
"significantly" alter the results. W&B are lead to conclude (1991, p. 53) that,
"There is no strong evidence on...why YTS participants earn less than non-participants," 
(W & B , 1991, p .53 )
they also suggest that to answer this question, one requires,
"Further research using more detailed information on training, scheme-participation, 
youth wages and YTS selection procedures than is currently available." (W&B, 1991, 
p.53)
The considerations outlined above suggest that the model estimated by W&B is misspecified,. 
ignoring the truncation of the earnings distribution. That is, whilst they say that they found no 
evidence of bias arising from non-random YTS participation, W&B do not consider the possibility of 
bias arising from non-random employment determination. Including such considerations provides a
36 Also worth T^ ntinning is DMT1 (1993) which provides an overview of the results of analyses of the effect of YTS 
on employment probability and wages.
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plausible interpretation of the negative effect of YTS without recourse to ulterior extra sample 
information.
M&S analyse the wages in April 1986 of employed Scottish school-leavers who left school 
during the academic year, 1983/4. They report the results of estimating an equation of the form of 
(5 .1) without correction terms, and of the form of (5 .2) with correction terms for non-random YTS 
participation. In the uncorrected estimate, they find that YTS participation37 had a small but 
statistically significant negative influence on the wages of young people, reducing wages by around 
6-8 per cent.
The estimates of the effect of YTS including terms to control for sample selection bias 
modifies these conclusions. Estimating separate wage equations for YTS participants and non- 
participants, they find a statistically significant correction term in the non-participant equation whilst 
the corresponding term in the wage equation of participants is not statistically significant. Although, 
employing separate equations for participants and non-participants leaves the effect of YTS implicit, 
M&S report the estimated earnings (and associated 95% confidence intervals) of a number of ideal 
types of young people with and without YTS participation. The reported confidence intervals 
indicate that the difference is never statistically significant at 5%. In interpreting these results M&S 
suggest that,
"Lack of statistical precision, reflected in wide confidence intervals, prohibits any precise 
interpretation of these results," (M&S, 1990, p. 510),
going on to conclude that,
"The lack of precision in the estimates of expected wages.... reflects, in part, the difficulty 
in estimating wage equations for young people.... It would seem that the most that can
37 In practice, M&S employ three terms to represent YTS participation, "Ever on YTS" which is comparable to the 
variable employed here, "Completed YTS", and "YTS job”. The latter variable indicates whether or not the young 
person was kept on in employment by the YTS sponsor. Given the periodic nature of the "diary questions" in the 
Scottish School-leavers survey employed by M&S, it is not clear how the variable "Completed YTS" is defined. They 
themselves note (note 6, p. 499) that the variable might miss some young people who had completed the programme, 
although, in the published paper, no further information is given. The inclusion of three terms slightly complicates the 
interpretation. M&S employ the two extra terms with the expectation that completing YTS would allow a greater 
accumulation of specific and general human capital, whilst being kept on by the YTS sponsor should enhance the 
value of firm specific human capital obtained during participation on the scheme. In the event, the results are 
diametrically opposed to the a priori expectations, the negative effects of YTS being felt only by completers and those 
kept on after the scheme by the same employer.
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be said is that there is no statistically significant evidence that youth wages are higher or 
lower after participation on YTS."
Once again, I would beg to differ from these conclusions. Whilst it is undoubtedly true that 
introducing a correction term for non-random YTS participation implies the addition of a non-linear 
function of the explanatory variables already contained in the equation. This is likely to reduce the 
precision of the estimated coefficients due to correlations between the correction term and the other 
variables, however, two points should be added. Firstly, I would suggest that, in ignoring the 
truncation of the earnings distribution implied by non-random employment determination, the model 
is once again misspecified38. Secondly, the inclusion of an explicit job-search theoretical framework 
allows the interpretation of the effect of YTS with and without controls for non-random YTS 
participation in terms of the separate "human capital", "reservation wage" and "job offer" effects. In 
chapter four above, it was found that the unobserved factors determining YTS participation are 
correlated with unobserved factors influencing the probability of being in employment. This implies 
that the term introduced to control for non-random YTS participation is, to some extent, picking up 
the effects of non-random employment determination. Thus, the negative effect of YTS might be 
interpreted in terms of the predominance of the "reservation wage" and "job offer" effects, whilst, 
the absence of a statistically significant effect in either direction once sample selection is "controlled 
for", is consistent with the idea that the "human capital" effect was weak or null. Without explicit 
modelling of these issues, however, such considerations remain speculative.
The third pair of analyses to be considered here were undertaken by DMT and reported in 
DMT2 and DMT3. The two studies analyse the effects of the two-year YTS on the wages of young 
people in England & Wales who reached minimum school-leaving age during the academic year 
1985/6 and who were employed in March 1989. In DMT2, the authors consider the effects of YTS 
by dividing up young people into seven categories according to the type of training received: no 
training no training and some post-16 education; YTS participation but no other training; off-the- 
job »raining, but neither an apprenticeship nor YTS participation; some off-the-job training, no
38 It is interesting to note that, in another paper (Main, 1987b), Main provides an underlying theoretical framework 
which justifies the introduction of sample selection terms to control for the non-random nature of employment 
determination in a model of wage determination. In that paper, however, he is not concerned with the effects of 
government training programmes on wages.
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apprenticeship, but with YTS participation; apprenticeship without YTS; and, apprenticeship with 
YTS participation. They estimate separate wage equations for males and females, introducing six 
dummies to represent the different training categories, with the no training group providing the base. 
They also introduce a sample selection term to control for non-random "labour-force 
participation"39, however this term is not statistically significant in the reported specification (table 
9.4, pp. 272-4). They suggest that,
"YTS lowers earnings for women but, if anything, raises earnings for men," (DMT2,
p.275).
whilst it is possible to concur with the first part of this statement, at least in their reported 
specification, there is no support for the second. In pairwise comparisons of training group 3 with 1,
5 with 4, and 7 with 6, the results suggest40 that there is a statistically significant negative effect of 
YTS on wages for females, but no statistically significant effect (either positive or negative) of YTS 
on the wages of young males.
In their subsequent analysis (DMT3), DMT estimate separate wage equations for males and 
females and for each of the seven training "regimes". In this paper they introduce sample selection 
terms to control for the separation of young people into each of these seven groups. In order to do 
so, they estimate a multinomial logit selection equation41. The results produced are very similar to 
the earlier analysis. The overall impression gained is that YTS had a statistically significant negative 
effect on the earnings of females. For males, although the "effect" of YTS was almost always 
negative, this effect was not generally statistically significant42. It might be observed that DMT3
39 One can only assume that they mean non-random employment determination, rather than the more traditional 
interpretation of labour force participation as referring to labour force participants (both employed and unemployed).
40 I base my conclusions on the reported results. Strictly speaking, to construct confidence intervals for the latter two 
comparisons, one requires the unreported covariance of the parameter estimates as well as the reported standard 
errors.
41 One might question the appropriateness of the multinomial logit in this context. As is well known, such a model 
implies the independence of irrelevant alternatives. It would perhaps be more sensible to model the selection using the 
conditional logit model which, nests the multinomial logit as a special case and does not impose the "independence” 
assumption a priori. Amemiya (1981) provides an excellent treatment of this and other issues in the estimation of 
multinomial probability models.
42 Comparisons are complicated by the separate estimation of wages for the different groups. The results vary 
somewhat across individual characteristics. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that (for both males and females) 
where the effect was statistically significant, it was always negative.
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does not report the regression results so that little can be said about the actual specification adopted 
or, perhaps more importantly, the statistical significance of the rather complicated selection terms.
Finally, mention should be made of the study by Main (1987a). Using data on the labour 
market experiences of Scottish young people who were in the labour market in the Spring 1985 and 
who had left school during the academic year 1983/4, Main tests the proposition that the "expected" 
wages of the unemployed are formed on the same basis as the wages of the employed. To do this, he 
estimates separate wage and expected wage equations for the employed and unemployed, including a 
sample selection term to control for non-random employment determination. He then estimates a 
pooled regression which allows the use of an F-test to determine whether differences in the 
coefficients produced by the two equations are statistically significant. He finds that the expected 
wage equation of the unemployed is significantly different from the wage equation for the employed. 
He also finds that there is no statistical difference in the wage expectations of the unemployed and 
those on YTS. One interesting characteristic of the results is that the statistical difference between 
wage expectations of the unemployed and the wages of the employed is due to wage expectations 
being below those of the employed. That is, the young unemployed appear to have had wage 
expectations which were too low with respect to their personal characteristics. The effect of YTS, 
although not statistically significant, was to raise wage expectations. One possible explanation of this 
lies in the absence of any variables to represent the duration of various labour market experiences. 
For example, it may be that a young person who was continuously unemployed after leaving school, 
might be aware that he or she could not expect to earn the same income as a similar young person 
who had been continuously employed since leaving school, due to the loss of human capital during 
unemployment and the absence of any increment to earnings gained through the accumulation of 
work experience. Certainly, taken at face value, the findings are not in line with the proposition that 
young people's wage expectations were too high. Although Main provides some slight (but not- 
statistically significant) evidence that YTS was making young people's pay "more realistic", since 
these expectations were too low to begin with, the direction of this effect was the opposite of that 
intended by Mr. Nigel Lawson43.
43 See the quote on p. 101.
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Studies of the impact of YTS have thus tended to find a small negative effect, or no effect at 
all according to whether sample selection bias is controlled for. DMT, using a later cohort and a 
larger sample size44, find a negative effect of YTS on the wages of females even in the presence of 
controls for sample selection bias. None of the studies, however, take into account the presence of 
both sample selection bias due both to non-random YTS participation and non-random employment 
determination. In as much as unobserved factors determining the probability of finding employment 
are correlated with those determining YTS participation, the sample selection terms introduced to 
control for non-random YTS participation, may also be picking up some of the "employment 
selection" effect. The lack of an underlying theoretical model prevents a coherent treatment of the 
selection problem, as well as impeding an interpretation of what is being found. W&B offer a series 
of possible explanations which, however, they are unable to test. M&S attribute their results to the 
existence of "statistical problems" whilst DMT offer no interpretation at all of their findings.
In the following two sections, I outline and estimate an empirical model which takes into 
account sample selection effects from both YTS participation and employment determination. The 
inclusion of the explicit modelling of the reservation and "expected" wages of the unemployed absent 
from previous studies further enhances the analysis and provides some further insights into the 
mechanisms through which YTS was operating.
5.3: Empirical Specification
The dependent variables employed here are the natural logs of respectively, the reported 
weekly wages of those in employment, and, the reported weekly reservation and "expected" wages 
of the unemployed. The basis of the sample is similar to that used for the analysis of employment 
determination in chapter four. Specifically, all those who reported themselves as being in full-time 
employment or as unemployed, full-time at home or doing something else in the Spring 1986. The 
estimation includes those reporting both wages and hours worked (86% of the employed), whilst the
44 The sample base of YCS3 (the third Youth Cohort Study) was 21,087. 9,328 young people replied to all three 
sweeps. DMT2 (and presumably also DMT3) employs a sample of 2202 employed young men and 2560 employed 
young women.
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reservation and "expected" wage equations are estimated for all those reporting both of these 
variables in a consistent manner45 (75% of the "unemployed"). As before, no attempt is made to 
account for panel attrition. It may be noted that hours are introduced as an explanatory variable. 
That is, it is assumed that hours are not chosen by young people, but rather constitute one of the job 
characteristics which are exogenously given.
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used46. Figures are provided 
separately for the four different groups considered. It may be noticed that observed, reservation and 
"expected" wages are all lower for YTS participants, although, obviously this does not control for 
other factors. It will also be observed that the mean of "expected" wages is higher than that of 
realised wages both for YTS participants and non-participants. Turning to the other explanatory 
variables, once again these are collected into different groups to clarify the exposition. It should be 
noted that the final group labelled "employment variables" represent factors which are introduced 
into the employment equation (and consequently into the reservation wage equation) but which are 
not included in the wage and "expected" wage equations. The exclusion of these variables from the 
wage equation was determined by their lack of statistical significance rather than by the identification 
requirements. However, restricting the number of explanatory variables obviously does allow the 
more precise identification of certain key variables which might be obscured by problems of 
multicollinearity. In particular, the inclusion of both adult regional wage and unemployment rates 
leads to a statistically insignificant coefficient on the (natural logarithm of the) weekly wage-rate. 
Since, for obvious reasons, unemployment and wage rates are likely to be highly negatively 
correlated, an explanation of this lack of statistical significance might more reasonably be sought in 
this correlation rather than by attributing no role to regional wage rates.
Returning to the variables in the wage equation, the first group represent, as before, 
indigenous characteristics. The first two of these are expected to have a negative influence on wages 
in employment reflecting the poorer job opportunities available to those from ethnic minorities and 
those with disabilities, however, in the uncorrected estimation at least, in as much as reservation 
wages may vary across these groups this conclusion may be mitigated by higher reservation wages.
43 One person was excluded due to the reporting of a reservation wage which was higher than the "expected" wage.
46 The variables are described briefly in the text. For Aill definitions and sources, see the data appendix at the end of 
the thesis.
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As regards females, the fact that the adult wage rate is subdivided by sex implies that the coefficient 
for this group may be positive. This is because, due to the lower average skills levels in female 
occupations, the juvenile wage is likely to be closer to the adult wage, not because females are likely 
to have a higher earnings potential.
The second group concerning school experience are intended to further capture individual 
characteristics. Work experience at school might be expected to raise wages through its effect on 
human capital formation. Truancy is intended to reflect motivation, and therefore one might find a 
dual effect as before. The effect on earnings potential is likely to be negative, however, this may be 
mitigated in the uncorrected estimates, in as much as people with lower motivation are likely to have 
higher reservation wages. Exam results, represented here by the ILEA score, are likely to have a 
positive effect on wages, reflecting as they do (perceived or real) differences in potential 
productivity.
One family background variable, indicating whether or not the individual's father had a non- 
manual occupation, is included to take account of the influence of social class. Whilst the regional 
average adult weekly wage subdivided by sex is included to reflect general differences in the levels of 
remuneration in the area. The results are discussed in detail below, it may be noted, however, that a 
number of variables reflecting family background were experimented with, all of which were 
singularly unsuccessful in explaining differences in wages.
Variables are also introduced to take account of the intervening labour market experience. 
Specifically, terms are included representing early employment experience, and the duration of 
unemployment and further education. Human capital levels are likely to fall with unemployment 
duration and rise with the duration of employment. Unemployment duration in combination with 
early employment experience (EMPLOYED IN SEPTEMBER 1984) should pick up both of these 
aspects, although, given the length of time under consideration, their effects may not be very 
pronounced. Further education would, in the long run, tend to raise earnings and reservation wages, 
however, the observation regarding the time scale is further reinforced here. The inclusion of these 
variables is principally motivated by the desire to ensure that the measured YTS "effect" is not simply 
picking up other aspects of intervening labour market experience.
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As regards the job characteristics included in the wage equations, variables are introduced to 
control for the number of hours worked, whether the person had changed jobs over the period 1984- 
86, self-employment, non-manual employment, whether the job was an apprenticeship, or the job 
involved some on-the-job training (considered long if it lasted for more than a month). The three 
variables here are considered independently. That is, the impact of an apprenticeship is comprised of 
all three of these variables. Also included are dummy variables representing whether or not the job 
involved the supervision of others and whether it was temporary or not. Additional dummy variables 
are included to take into account the characteristics of the employer, namely, whether the firm 
employed more than twenty-five workers and its one digit SIC.
As regards the estimation of "expected" wages, the explanatory variables employed in the 
wage equation are used. On the other hand, the estimation of reservation wages takes a slightly 
different form. The static labour supply model includes the same explanatory variables employed for 
the wage equation with the exception of experience variables, whilst the job search motivated 
estimates include, in addition, all the variables entering the employment and YTS participation 
equations. The specification of these is derived from the specification adopted in the previous 
chapter with the addition of the adult weekly wage-rate and the duration variables.
5.3: Results
5.3.1) Wages
Table 5.2 produces the results of estimating the equations given by (5.57), (5.57'), (5.58) and 
(5.58'). Full results for the bivariate probit estimation of employment determination and* YTS 
participation are given in the appendix to this chapter. The first two columns in the table present 
uncorrected estimates without (5.57) and with (5.58) controls for job characteristics. The third and 
fourth columns present the corresponding estimates (5.571 and 5.58') including correction terms of 
the form defined by (5.55) and (5.56) for YTS participants and by (5.55') (5.56’) for non­
participants. The equations are estimated by OLS with corrected standard errors47.
47 T n n a li  (1986) gives the precise form of the correction.
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The point of central importance emerging from the estimation is that YTS participation has a 
statistically significant negative influence on wages when no account is taken of sample selection. 
Once correction terms are introduced, this negative influence disappears. This is consistent with YTS 
having a negative influence on wages through the lowering of reservation wages and the raising of 
the probability of receiving a job offer. Estimation without sample selection controls comprises 
"reservation wage", "job offer" and "human capital" effects of YTS. Once controls for sample 
selection are introduced, the coefficient on YTS participation is purged of (direct and indirect) 
"reservation wage" effects as well as the direct influence of the job offer probability. This suggests 
that there was, at least in the time scale considered here, no "human capital" effect. That is, no 
raising of potential wages through the enhancement of individuals human capital.
As regards the correction terms, it may be noted that although the individual t-ratios are not 
significant, an F-test on the joint significance of the terms gives values of 8.98 (without job 
characteristics) and 17.25 (with job characteristics) which is significant at 1%48. Thus, one may reject 
the hypothesis that both terms are equal to zero. The estimated covariance between the errors in the 
employment and wage equations is, in both cases, positive, whilst the corresponding term for the 
YTS and wage equations is negative. Both of these effects produce a downward bias on the YTS 
coefficient in the uncorrected equation. Thus, it may be concluded that the negative effect of YTS 
participation on wages when sample selection is not taken into account is due to the negative (direct 
and indirect) effect of YTS on the reservation wage and its positive influence on the job offer 
probability as well as being caused by YTS participants having unobserved characteristics (such as a 
lack of motivation) which were negatively related to earnings potential. On the other hand, the lack 
of individual statistical significance of the covariance terms suggests, however, that one should not 
place too much stress on the point estimates. Certainly it is not possible to distinguish between the 
effects of non-random employment determination and non-random YTS participation, far less, as it 
stands, say anything about the relative importance of the effects of YTS on preference formation, 
erroneous expectations and the job offer probability.
It may be observed that being female has a significant positive influence on wages. As noted 
above, this may be attributed to the lower differential between adult and juvenile female wages.
48 The critical F-value in both cases is 4.61 (with 2 and 1927 or 1910 degrees of freedom).
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There is slight evidence that being disabled reduced wages although this effect is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. On the other hand, belonging to an ethnic minority appears to raise 
earnings. Indeed, the coefficient for ethnic minorities is positive and always significant albeit at a 
10% significance level. That is, the positive influence on wages for this group, for which there is 
some evidence, cannot be attributed to higher reservation wages using the interpretation of the 
correction terms suggested above. One possible explanation is that ethnic minorities tend to be 
concentrated in cities (and above all in London49) where, ceteris paribus, wages are higher, even 
though, the inclusion of the regional adult wage should control for this to some extent.
Serious truancy has a positive and statistically significant effect on wages with and without 
correction terms. Occasional truancy, on the other hand appears to have no significant effect. The 
ILEA score has a small positive influence on wages, although this effect tends to be weaker when job 
characteristics are taken into consideration, suggesting that exam success was important also in 
determining the type of job attained.
The variable reflecting social class (non-manual father) is positive but never statistically 
significant. This contrasts strongly with the results concerning employment determination. In chapter 
four it was shown that social class was an important determinant of the probability of finding work, 
even taking into account indicators of ability. Thus, it would appear that social class, or, more 
generally parental background, is important in determining employment but not wages..
The labour market experience variables are not generally statistically significant, however, as 
noted above, their inclusion is important to ensure that the coefficient on the YTS participation 
dummy was not picking up other aspects of labour market experience. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the coefficient on the (natural logarithm of the) duration of further education is 
negative in both the uncorrected equations (and significant at 10% in the equation including job 
characteristics) becoming positive, albeit not statistically significant, in the corrected equations. This 
might be attributed to either the higher probability of receiving a job offer or the lower reservation 
wages of those continuing in further education.
It may be noted that the inclusion of job characteristics increases substantially the significance 
of the regression. It is interesting to observe that the coefficient on the natural logarithm of hours
49 4% of Londoners report themselves as coming from an ethnic minority as opposed to 2% of the sample as a whole.
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worked is significantly less than one, implying that wage-rates fell with the length of the working 
day. This finding is not consistent with an utility maximising model in which individuals choose jobs 
and hours, providing some support for the (implicitly assumed) exogenously determined hours. As 
regards the other variables, it may be noted that an apprenticeship significantly reduced wages. This 
is important, in as much as the inclusion of this term, and the other training terms ensures that the 
negative effect of YTS participation is not to be attributed to ongoing training. It may also be noted 
that working for a large firm had a strong positive effect confirming the picture provided by, for 
example, Main & Reilly (1993) of significant differences in wages by firm size.
In order to investigate the role of YTS in more detail it is useful to consider a model of the 
form of (5.59,5.59') above. That is, the estimation of wages separately for YTS participants and non­
participants. Table 5.3 reproduces the results of this exercise. To derive tests of significance on the 
individual coefficients, a model of the form of (5.60) was also estimated50. Full results of this 
equation are reported in the appendix to this chapter, coefficients which were found to be statistically 
significant at a 10% significance level are reported in bold letters in table 5.3. An F-test of the 
significance of differences between the two equations produces a value of 2.30 which is significant 
at 1%5'.
The first column of table 5.3 reports the results of estimating equation (5.59') for non­
participants. The second column reports the coefficients from the wage equation (5.59) estimated for 
YTS participants. The striking feature of the results is the fact that the constant term in the 
participants' equation significantly (at 10%) greater than the corresponding term in the non­
participants equation. The reason for this may be sought in the difference in the coefficient on the log 
of adult weekly wages. The earnings of young people who participated on YTS are much less 
responsive to adult earnings than non-participants. In the separate equations the difference is of the 
order of 13 percentage points in the elasticity of earnings with respect to adult wages. Estimating an 
equation of the form of (5.60), increases this estimated difference to 23 percentage points (table
50 The difference between this procedure and the separate estimation of the wage equation for participants and non- 
participants is that the former imposes the restrictions that the error variance in the wage equation and the estimated 
error covariance terms are the same for YTS participants and non-participants.
51 The critical value of the F-test at 1% with 16 and 1911 degrees of freedom is 2.00 It will be observed that for the F- 
test to be valid, the variance of the error terms from the two equations must be equal. An F-test of the difference 
between the error variances produces a value of 1.07. The critical value with 890 and 1051 degrees of freedom is 1.08. 
Therefore the null hypothesis of the equality of error variance is not rqected
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A5.2). Also significant are the differences between the coefficients on the ILEA score and on the 
dummy variable representing a non-manual father. Exam performance appears to be have a 
significantly greater positive impact on wages for YTS participants, whilst having a non-manual 
father seems to reduce the wages of participants but not those of non-participants. In the case of 
both these variables, however, the size of the estimated difference is much smaller than for the 
intercept and the coefficient on the adult wage-rate, indicating that differences in the responsiveness 
of wages to this variable for participants and non-participants was relatively unimportant.
One possible interpretation of this result is that, on the one hand YTS was channelling young 
people into lower paid jobs with a low responsiveness to the adult wage, producing the smaller 
elasticity with respect to the adult wage. This was made possible through the work socialisation or 
preference formation effect of YTS. On the other hand, given that YTS participants tended to be 
located in the lower paid occupations, they did gain some relative advantage out of human capital 
accruing to them on the scheme, leading to the positive difference in the intercepts (reinforced by the 
benefits of good exam performance). The net effect of these two opposing influences, reflected by 
the pooled regression with a YTS dummy, is nil. Such an interpretation goes rather beyond the 
simple underlying job search framework adopted here. In order to model this more subtle type of 
effect, one would require a more detailed analysis of the selection mechanism, perhaps along the lines 
of that adopted by DMT. I would suggest, however, that the appropriate selection mechanism would 
be concerned with distinguishing between types of occupation, in addition to the 
employment/unemployment dichotomy, rather than forms of training regime per se. The problem 
with such an analysis is that, in order to derive reasonable results, one would require a rather larger 
sample size than is available here. One wonders, indeed, whether even the later youth cohort studies 
would be sufficiently large to derive statistically significant differences between groups.
Turning to the other explanatory variables, one may note that the coefficient on 
DISABILITY and BLACK actually increases for YTS participants, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. This, perhaps, represents the other side of the coin of the findings regarding 
employment prospects. It was shown above, in chapter four, that young blacks or disabled people 
received no positive increase in the chances of finding work as a result of participating on YTS. 
Here, the results suggest that if they managed to get over the barrier of finding a job their earnings
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did actually increase Obviously, not too much weight should be attached to this observation given 
the lack of statistical significance.
5.3.2) Reservation and "Expected" Wages
I turn now to explicit consideration of reservation and "expected" wages52. Table 5.4 
presents the results of estimating corrected and uncorrected "expected" wage equations. The first 
column gives the results of estimating equation (5.64) for all the unemployed introducing a YTS 
participation dummy. The second reports the results of the corrected equation (5.64'). As noted 
above, the specification is the same as that used for the wage equation. The sample selection terms 
are jointly significant, the F-value being 8.06 (the 1% critical value being 4.61 as before). The 
principal result of note arising from the corrected equation is that the value of the YTS coefficient 
falls, although it is no longer statistically significant. This is quite the opposite of the effect on wages 
and its cause may be sought in the estimated covariances between the wage equation and the 
employment and YTS equations respectively. It will be observed that the covariance term from the 
former is negative, whilst it is positive in the latter case. As noted above, the sign of both of these 
covariance terms suggest that the effect of YTS on "expected" wages is overestimated in the 
uncorrected equation. Thus, there is some slight evidence of an "erroneous expectations effect" of 
YTS on "expected" wages.
To investigate this issue further, equations (5.65), (5.66) and (5.66') were estimated. That is, 
in an attempt to distinguish between the hypothesis that the statistical insignificance of the YTS 
coefficient in the corrected was due to the non-existence of the effect and the alternative that YTS 
was, by making young people's wage "expectations" more realistic was having a negative influence 
on "expected" wages, but that collinearity (i.e. Main's "statistical problems" noted above) between 
the correction terms and YTS participation was preventing the effect to be identified with precision. 
Thus, the hypothesis that systematic component of the wage "expectations" of the unemployed were 
not statistically different from the wages of the employed was tested. Firstly, using all young people 
in the sample, and, secondly, considering the hypothesis separately for YTS participants and non- 
participants. I do not report the full results suffice h to say that for the entire sample an F-test of the
52 That is, the wages that young unemployed people said they expected to earn in their next job.
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pooling restriction gives a value of .94, which is not statistically significant53. On the other hand, 
when pooled "expected'Vrealised wage equations (5.66) and (5.66') are estimated separately for YTS 
participants and non-participants, one finds that whilst, for YTS participants the pooling restriction is 
not rejected54, for non-participants it is. The value of the F-test in the latter case is 2.30 which may 
be compared to the critical 1% value of 2.00 (with 16 and 1253 degrees of freedom). I interpret 
these results as support for the argument that YTS participation, by reducing the erroneously formed 
wage expectations, did have a role to play in making young people's wage "expectations" "more 
realistic", although identification of the effect in the "expected" wage equation is impeded by 
collinearity between the correction terms and the YTS participation dummy. This interpretation is 
supported also by the direction of the bias in the YTS effect in the uncorrected estimates. That is, 
correction of sample selection bias leads to a reduction of the coefficient on YTS participation in the 
"expected" wage equation (5.64'). I leave the reader to judge how reasonable are these conjectures.
As regards the estimates of the reservation wage, I present the full results of two basic 
specifications in Table 5.5 both without and with corrections for sample selection bias. The first 
column reports the results of the static labour supply model given by (5 .67) with only a limited set of 
explanatory variables whilst the second column reports the results of a reduced form version of the 
job search motivated reservation wage equation given by (5.68). The third and fourth columns report 
the results of the corrected estimates of the two models given by (5.67') and (5 .68'). An F-test of the 
joint significance of the sample selection terms gives values of 6.40 for the static model and 13.28 for 
the job search model. Both of these are significant at a 1% level55.
It will be observed that the effect of YTS on reservation wages is negative and statistically 
significant in the uncorrected estimates. In the corrected static model (column three) the effect 
remains statistically significant whereas in the job search model with its sounder theoretical base the 
significance disappears. With regard to the latter estimates, it is worth noting that only one of the 
entire vector of coefficients (on serious truancy) is individually statistically significant. Clearly, the 
problems of multicollinearity arising in the case of the corrected estimates of "expected" wages are 
compounded here by the necessity of including all the explanatory variables in complete model in the
33 The critical value at a 5% significance level is 1.64 with 16 and 2419 degrees of freedom.
34 The value of the F-test is 1.43, the critical 5% value being, as before, 1.64 (with 16 and 1134 degrees of freedom).
35 The 1% critical value is 4.61 with 2 and 495 or 481 degrees of freedom.
179
reservation wage equation. On the other hand, in the model given by (5.68') reported in column four, 
the signs of the covariance terms conform to the prior expectations, both implying an overestimate of 
the effect of YTS in the uncorrected estimation. Once again, given the lack of individual statistical 
significance one should not place too great an emphasis on this result. However, one may make some 
progress by estimating separate reservation wage equations for YTS participants and non­
participants given by (5.69) and (5.69'). An F-test represents, as before, a test of the hypothesis that 
the systematic component of reservation wages of YTS participants was not significantly different 
from those of non-participants. The F-test in this case produces a value of 1.67 which allows the 
refutation of the null hypothesis (no difference between the coefficients) at a 5% level of significance 
(the critical value is 1.52 with 27 and 454 degrees of freedom), but not at 1% (the critical value is 
1.79). Thus, there is some weak support for the idea that YTS participation did have a role to play in 
the reduction of reservation wages. The precision of the estimate, however, is impeded in the 
reduced form estimates due to multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables (including the 
correction terms).
Thus, the estimation of the "expected" and reservation wages of the unemployed with 
corrections for non-random employment determination and YTS participation provide some 
evidence to support the notion that YTS did have a role to play in reducing errors in the formation of 
wage "expectations" and reducing the reservation wages and of the unemployed. The model outlined 
above, in section 5.1.4, suggests that part of the reduction in reservation wages is, in itself, to be 
attributed to reduced wage "expectations".
The final issue to be considered, albeit in a rather informal manner, is the question of the job 
offer probability. Estimation of the implied parameter on YTS in the estimation of the employment 
equation (5.50') using the methodology outlined in section 5.1.5, produces a value of .36, whereas 
subtraction of the coefficient on YTS in the reservation wage equation (5.67) form the coefficient 
on YTS in the wage equation (5.57’) produces a value of .13. The estimate of the parameter on YTS 
participation is thus nearly three times the size of the parameter derived from the combination of the 
wage and reservation wage equations56. Thus, one has some evidence (which, it must be emphasised,
56 It might be observed that this is, if anything a conservative estimate of the parameter on YTS in the employment 
equation. Using the results of the switching bivariate probit model of YTS participation and employment 
determination reported in chapter four, table 4.5, to derive the estimate, produces, for an average individual, an 
implied parameter of .68.
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is, given the nature of model estimated necessarily rather informal) to support the idea that YTS 
participation enhanced the prospects of receiving a job offer, which in turn would tend to reduce the 
realised wage of young YTS participants when no account was taken of sample selection bias.
5.4: Conclusions
In this chapter I have examined the question of the impact of YTS on wages. In particular, 
estimating wage, reservation and "expected" wage equations it was found that YTS had a negative 
impact on earnings when no account was taken of non-random employment determination and YTS 
participation. This effect disappears when these factors are taken into consideration.
The results are qualitatively similar to those of M&S and W&B although the model goes 
rather beyond both of these in allowing for two sources of sample selection bias and in explicitly 
considering the source of the negative YTS wage effect. W&B find a small negative impact of YTS 
participation on wages, however, they do not present results corrected for sample selection bias. 
M&S find a small negative impact as well, however, this effect disappears when account is taken of 
non-random YTS participation. On the other hand, DMT find a negative effect on the wages of 
female participants even taking into account sample selection bias. In as much as none of these 
studies take into account sample selection bias arising from both non-random YTS participation and 
non-random employment determination, it was argued above that the models are misspecified. The 
simple job search framework proposed here also allows a coherent interpretation of the results to be 
offered. Whilst M&S suggest that "the lack of precision in the estimates....reflects, in part, the 
difficulty in estimating wage equations for young workers," the analysis presented here, in the 
context of a simple job search model may be given a different interpretation. That is, the introduction 
of rudimentary theoretical considerations absent from the M&S, W&B, DMT2 and DMT3 allowed 
three (principal) possible effects to be identified. A positive "human capital" effect and negative 
"reservation wage" and job offer effects. • The principal conclusions to be drawn from the results 
presented here are, firstly, that sample selection bias due to non-random employment determination 
and/or non-random YTS participation was present. Secondly, the "human capital" effect of YTS
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participation due to the increased productivity of young people who participated on the scheme was 
negligible or non-existent.
Rather more tenuous conclusions might be offered regarding the source of sample selection 
bias and, therefore, by implication the causes of the enhanced employment probabilities of YTS 
participants. Whilst the absence of a "human capital" effect implies that increased potential 
productivity arising from the training component of YTS, since it was effectively non-existent, is 
definitely not the cause of the increased employment probability due to YTS participation. On the 
other hand, distinguishing between the "preference formation", "erroneous expectations" and "job 
offer" effects of YTS proved to be more difficult. Tentative evidence of the existence of these effects 
has been presented, however, no attempt was made to distinguish between their influence on sample 
selection. Indeed, to do so would require a structural model rather than the reduced form presented 
here.
Thus, the findings presented here are consistent with the suggestion that YTS "enhanced" the 
employment prospects of young people in terms of raising their chances of finding employment 
through an increase in the probability of receiving a job offer and through the lowering of reservation 
wages. The latter effect being composed of a direct "preference formation" effect and an indirect 
effect due to the increased realism of participants' wage "expectations. On the other hand, YTS did 
nothing to raise participants wages through the enhancement of their human capital.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics (standard deviations of continuous variables in brackets).
EMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED
YTS NO YTS YTS NO YTS
Jn=891) (n=1052) (n=275) (11=233)
WAGE 55.5 (15.6) 63.1 (19.7)
RESERVATION WAGE - - 46.1 (11.6) 51.6 (15.0)
EXPECTED WAGE - - 61.7 (16.0) 69.2 (20.4)
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY .02 .02 .05 .05
BLACK .01 .02 .04 .03
FEMALE .51 .51 .52 .54
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
WORK EXPERIENCE AT SCHOOL .34 .36 .30 .27
SERIOUS TRUANT .13 .15 .29 .35
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .39 .37 .36 .33
ILEA SCORE 20.1 (11.1) 23.8 (12.7) 13.2 (9.82) 15.7 (13.5)
FAMILY BACKGROUND
OWNER OCCUPIER .65 .69 .49 .48
LABOUR MARKET
ADULT WEEKLY WAGE-RATE 166.1 (36.6) 170.9 (40.0) 161.8 (34.9) 164.4 (34.9)
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
EMPLOYED SEPTEMBER 1984 .04 .48 .03 .20
DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT .84 (1.87) 1.02 (2.34) 6.43 (3.93) 9.00 (6.03)
DURATION OF FURTHER EDUCATION .62 (2.29) 3.90 (4.98) .43 (1.92) 3.58 (5.00)
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
HOURS WORKED 39.7 (4.78) 39.9 (5.29) - -
JOB CHANGED .11 .15 - -
NON-MANUAL JOB .44 .51 - -
SELF-EMPLOYED .02 .01 - -
APPRENTICESHIP .20 .18 - -
ON-THE JOB TRAINING .51 .57 - -
LONG ON-THE-JOB TRAINING .32 .34 - -
JOB SUPERVISORY .13 .15 - -
LARGE FIRM .50 .58 - -
TEMPORARY JOB .06 .06 - -
INDUSTRY:
ENERGY (1) .01 .02 - -
MINERALS (2) .03 .04 - -
METALS & OTHER MAN.(3,4) .24 .25 - -
BUILDING & BANKING (5,8) .19 .21 - -
TRANSPORT (7) .04 .04 - -
OTHER SERVICES (9) .15 .16 - -
NOT STATED .07 .06
'
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Table 5.1 continued: Descriptive Statistics
EMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED
YTS NO YTS YTS NO YTS
(n=891) (ns 1052) (ii-275) (n=233)
EMPLOYMENT VARIABLES
PART-TIME JOB AT SCHOOL .56 .67 .44 .48
OWNER OCCUPIER .65 .69 .49 .48
FATHER IN FULL-TIME JOB .80 .84 .63 .63
FATHER IN PART-TIME JOB .01 .01 .01 .03
FATHER UNEMPLOYED .08 .05 .20 .15
NON-MANUAL MOTHER .31 .41 .19 .27
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 10.84 (3.44) 9.99 (3.29) 11.81 (3.56) 10.80 (3.33)
LONDON .06 .13 .03 .08
SOUTHEAST .17 2 1 .06 .12
NORTH AND MIDLANDS .60 .44 .73 .61
WALES .04 .04 .09 .06
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Table 5.2: Corrected and Uncorrected Wage Equation. The dependent variable is tlie natural 
lot of weekly w ig«. (t-ratias in brackets)
UNCORRECTED ESTIMATES CORRECTED ESTIMATES
WITHOUT WITH WITHOUT WITH
JOB JOB JOB JOB
CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTERISTICS
INTERCEPT -.49 (-1.32) -1.40 (-3.37) -.81 (-1.73) -1.68 (-3.73)
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY -.05 (-1.2«) -.06 (-1.56) -.05 (“1-27) -06 (-158)
BLACK .07 (1.67) .07 (167) .08 (1.81) .07 (178)
FEMALE .30 (9.53) .26 (*•52) .32 (8*9) .27 (*14)
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
WORK EXPERIENCE AT SCHOOL .01 (1.12) .01 (-*4) .01 (1-16) .01 (L03)
SERIOUS TRUANT .05 (2.70) .04 (2-37) .05 (2.67) .04 (2.29)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .01 (1.03) .01 (.71) .01 (104) .01 (.64)
LogftLEA SCORE) .02 (2.79) .01 (2.08) .02 (2.62) .01 (198)
FAMILY BACKGROUND
NON-MANUAL FATHER .01 (.96) .02 (1.37) .02 (113) .02 (1.55)
LABOUR MARKET
Lof (ADULT WEEKLY WAGE-RATE (£)) .*6 (1232) .78 (12.21) .89 (11.07) .82 (1114)
EXPERIENCE I984-S6
EMPLOYED SEPTEMBER 19*4 .00 (.15) .00 (-23) .01 (1-29) .08 010)
Log(DURATION OF FURTHER EDUCATION (month»)) -.01 (-.10) -.01 (-169) .03 (101) .02 (-53)
Log (DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT (month*)) -.00 (-.25) -.01 (-1.11) .12 (-37) -.01 (-.20)
YTS -.10 (-5.31) -.08 (-4.75) .02 (.19) .01 (.11)
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Log(HOURS WORKED) - .31 (7.12) - 31 (7.16)
JOB CHANGED - .06 (3.99) - .06 (3.95)
NON-MANUAL JOB - .04 (3-19) - .04 (3.22)
SELF-EMPLOYED - .12 (2.61) - .12 (2-68)
APPRENTICESHIP - -.11 Hi-51) - -.11 (•6*54)
ON-THE JOB TRAINING - .05 (3.55) - .05 (3.59)
LONG ON-THE-JOB TRAINING - -.04 (-2.62) - -.04 (-2.67)
JOB SUPERVISORY - .05 (3.01) - .05 (306)
LARGE FIRM - .14 (12-78) - .14 (12.86)
TEMPORARY JOB - .06 (2.61) - .06 (2.59)
INDUSTRY:
ENERGY (I) - .19 (4-07) - .20 (4.08)
MINERALS (2) - .15 (4 76) - .14 (4.77)
METALS & OTHER MAN.(3,4) - .08 (5.27) - .08 (5.26)
BUILDING & BANKING (5,*) - .06 (374) - .06 (3.77)
TRANSPORT (7) - .11 (3.79) - .11 (3-83)
OTHER SERVICES (9) - .02 (131) - .02 (1-33)
NOT STATED - .07 (2.98) - .07 (3-03)
EMPLOYMENT CORRECTION TERM . .00 (.07) .02 (.28)
YTS CORRECTION TERM • -.07 (-118) -.05 (-.98)
Adjusted R-Squarcd .14 30 .14 .30
n 1943 1943 1943 1943
Notes: l)The first two columns of the table show the results of estimating models given by (5.57) and (5.58) without 
the addition of correction terms. The first column presents the results for estimation without job characteristics, the 
second includes them.
2) Columns three and four present the results (without and with job characteristics respectively) of estimating 
the models given by (5.57) and (5.58') with the correction terms as specified by (5.55) and (5.56) or (5.55') and (5.560 
as appropriate.
3) Full results for the bivariate probit model of YTS participation and employment determination used to 
calculate the correction terms are given in an appendix to the chapter (table A5.1). The precise form is derived from 
the theoretical model. It might be observed that the equations are "reduced forms" in as much as both YTS and 
employment equations contain the same variables, the effect of YTS being left implicit. It should also be noted they 
there form is derived from an index function of the type implied by (5.50). That is, all the variables entering the wage 
and/or reservation wage equations (without job characteristics) are entered with the addition of other variables thought 
to affect the chances of receiving a job offer but not the wage variables.
4) F-tests on the joint significance of the selection bias correction terms produce values of 8.98 (without job 
characteristics) and 17.25 which are significant at a 1% level, the critical value, in both cases, being 4.61 (F(2,1927) 
“ *l'°rF<2,1910)>-
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Table 5.3: Wage Equations estimated separately for YTS participants and non- participants, 
corrected for sample selection bias.The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly wages.
(t-ratios in brackets)
NON-YTS
PARTICIPANTS
YTS PARTICIPANTS
INTERCEPT
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
-.88 <-L«) -.31 (-31)
DISABILITY -.06 (-116) -.04 (-.47)
BLACK .06 (1-16) .13 (1 50)
FEMALE
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
.33 (7.84) .28 (3.17)
WORK EXPERIENCE AT SCHOOL -.00 (•-23) -.03 (-1.56)
SERIOUS TRUANT .06 (2.62) .03 (98)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .29 (1.74) -.01 (-.28)
Log(ILEA SCORE) 
FAMILY BACKGROUND
.00 (51) .03 (2.W)
NON-MANUAL FATHER 
LABOUR MARKET
.04 (2.1®) -.02 (-.67)
Log(ADULT WEEKLY WAGE-RATE) 
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
.93 (9.76) .80 (4.11)
EMPLOYED IN SEPTEMBER 1984 .05 (.64) .09 (.24)
Log(DURATION OF FURTHER EDUCATION (months)) .01 (36) .05 (.41)
Log(DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT (months)) .03 (.70) -.01 (-12)
EMPLOYMENT CORRECTION TERM -.06 (-.76) .07 (.40)
YTS CORRECTION TERM -.03 (-.59) -.08 (-33)
Adjusted R-Squared 13 .05
n 1052 891
Notes: 1) The table reports the results of estimating equations of the form of (5.59) and (5.59*). The sample selection 
terms are given by (5.55) and (5.56) or (5.55*) and (5.56*) as appropriate
2) An F-test of the joint significance of the YTS interaction dummies produces a value of 2.30 which may be
compared to the 1% critical value of 2.00 (16 and 1911 degrees of freedom).
3) Coefficients reported in bold letters are those for which the difference in the coefficient was found to be
statistically significant at 10% using the model given by equation (5.60) in the text. Full results for this model 
are reported in the appendix to this chapter (table A5.2).
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Table 5.4: Expected Wage Equation with and without correction terms.The dependent 
variable is the natural log of expected weekly wages.
(t-ratios in brackets)
UNCORRECTED CORRECTED
ESTIMATES ESTIMATES
INTERCEPT
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
.32 (35) .61 (102)
DISABILITY .02 (.38) .03 (49)
BLACK .06 (1.03) 06 (98)
FEMALE
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
.15 (2.00) .13 (158)
WORK EXPERIENCE AT SCHOOL .03 (137) .03 (1.14)
SERIOUS TRUANT .08 (2.83) .08 (2.76)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .03 (.97) .03 (1.01)
LogdLEA SCORE) 
FAMILY BACKGROUND
.01 (133) .01 (1.17)
NON-MANUAL FATHER 
LABOUR MARKET
.03 (-94) .03 (.74)
Log(ADULT WEEKLY WAGE-RATE) 
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
.73 (4.16) .67 (3.24)
EMPLOYED IN SEPTEMBER 1984 -.01 (-.19) -.05 (-45)
Log(DURATION OF FURTHER EDUCATION (months)) .00 (22) -.01 (-24)
Log(DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT (months)) .01 (88) .03 (35)
YTS -.08 (*2.94) -.14 (-.89)
EMPLOYMENT CORRECTION TERM . -.03 (-29)
YTS CORRECTION TERM - .04 (43)
Adjusted R-SquaTed .14 14
n 508 508
Notes: 1) The first column reproduces the results of estimating an equation of the form (5.64) The second column 
reports the results of estimation of (5.64*) with corrections for sample selection bias defined by (5.-62) and 
(5.63) or (5.620 and (5.63') as appropriate.
2) An F-test refutes the null hypothesis that both correction (covariance) terms are zero. The value of the test 
is 8.06 whilst the 1% critical value is 4.61.
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Table 5.5: Reservation Wage Equations with and without cm 
variable is the natural log of weekly reservation wages.
(t-ratios in brackets)
Tection terms. The dependent
Uncorrected Estimates Corrected Estimates
Static Labour Job Search Static Labour Job Search
Supply Model Model Supply Model Model
Estimates
INTERCEPT .36 (38) -2.62 (-43) .27 (.28) -3.68 (-.54)
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY -.04 (-.86) -.06 (-1.06) -.05 (-.90) 1 s (-43)
BLACK .00 (0 0 ) -.02 (-■33) -.00 (-.02) -.02 (-.23)
FEMALE .12 (1.49) .31 (-66) .12 (1.55) .39 (74)
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
WORK EXPERIENCE AT SCHOOL .03 (.99) .02 (.74) .03 (1.02) .02 (38)
SERIOUS TRUANT .06 (2.09) .06 (187) .06 (2.05) .07 (167)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .02 (70) .02 (73) .02 (.71) .02 (.77)
Log(ILEA SCORE) .01 (74) .01 (103) .01 (.83) -01 (.44)
FAMILY BACKGROUND
NON-MANUAL FATHER .01 (•24) .01 (-22) .01 (.29) -.00 (-03)
LABOUR MARKET
Log( ADULT WEEKLY WAGE-RATE (£)) .68 (3.80) 1.33 (1.14) .69 (3.81) 1.48 (1.10)
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
EMPLOYED SEPTEMBER 1984 -.00 (-.08) - « s (-.08)
Log(DURATION OF FURTHER EDUCATION (months)) -.01 (-07) - -.01 (-.07)
Log(DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT (months)) .01 (67) - .08 (.35)
YTS -.09 (-3.75) -.09 (-2.93) -.09 (-2.97) -.11 (-.20)
EMPLOYMENT VARIABLES
PART-TIME JOB AT SCHOOL .00 (18) - -.00 (-06)
OWNER OCCUPIER .03 (122) - .03 (81)
FATHER IN FULL-TIME JOB -.00 (-.03) - .00 (12)
FATHER IN PART-TIME JOB -.01 (-11) - -.01 (-06)
FATHER UNEMPLOYED .04 (97) - .06 (100)
NON-MANUAL MOTHER -.01 (-19) - -.01 (••23)
Log(UNEMPLOYMENT RATE) -,20 (-172) -.18 (-133)
LONDON -.20 (-61) - -.27 (-73)
SOUTHEAST -.12 (-96) - -.16 (-1.04)
NORTH AND MIDLANDS .04 (.78) - .04 (62)
WALES .02 (.28) - .04 (.41)
EMPLOYMENT CORRECTION TERM .01 (.35) -.11 (-32)
YTS CORRECTION TERM . - .00 (-.13) .03 (.10)
Adjusted R-Squared .14 .13 .14 .13
n 508 508 508 508
Notes: 1) The first and third columns report the results of estimating the static labour supply specification of the 
reservation wage equation given by (5.67) and (S.6T) without and with sample selection correction terms 
(defined by (5.62) and (5.63) or (5.62') and (5.63') as appropriate) respectively. That is, the specification 
excludes variables thought to influence the reservation wage through the "expected wage" and the probability 
of receiving a job offer.
2) Columns two and four report the estimates for the uncorrected and corrected reduced form specification 
given by (5.68) and (5.68*) respectively. That is, with the inclusion of all variables thought to influence the 
"expected wage” and the probability of receiving a job offer.
3) An F-test of sample selection bias gives a values of 6.40 for the static labour supply model and 13.28 for 
the job search motivated estimates. The critical 1% value in both cases is 4.61.
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Table AS.l: Reduced Form Bivariate probit estimation of Employment and 
YTS participation employed for the sample selection correction.
(t-ratios in brackets)
EMPLOYMENT YTS
PARTICIPATION
INTERCEPT 14.04 (.66) 2.55 (13)
WAGE VARIABLES
DISABILITY -.52 (-2.02) .01 (03)
BLACK -.06 (-.24) -.24 (-1.01)
FEMALE -1.20 (-.73) -.11 (-.07à)
WORK EXPERIENCE AT SCHOOL .01 (13) -.13 (-167)
SERIOUS TRUANT -.28 (-2-56) -.06 (-60)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT -.07 (-70) .08 (.99)
Log(ILEA SCORE) .05 (1.31) .03 (.94)
NON-MANUAL FATHER .14 (131) -.11 (-122)
Log(ADULT WEEKLY WAGE-RATE) -2.25 (-.55) -.45 (-12)
EMPLOYED SEPTEMBER 1984 .14 (117) -2.77 (-29.44)
Log(DURATION OF FURTHER EDUCATION) -.07 (-1.67) -1.08 (-26.69)
Log(DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT) -1.07 (-23.69) -.47 (-11.22)
EMPLOYMENT VARIABLES
PART-TIME JOB AT SCHOOL .08 (.91) -.00 (-.04)
OWNER OCCUPIER .04 (.46) .11 (1.33)
FATHER IN FULL-TIME JOB -.06 (-.46) .13 (124)
FATHER IN PART-TIME JOB -.18 (-.43) -.65 (-1.85)
FATHER UNEMPLOYED -.29 (-1.93) .36 (2.51)
NON-MANUAL MOTHER .06 (.60) -.14 (-177)
Log(UNEMPLOYMENT RATE) -.22 (-.55) .38 (105)
LONDON 1.04 (90) -.12 (-.12)
SOUTH EAST .70 (1.62) .16 (.43)
NORTH AND MIDLANDS .06 (.34) .16 (.98)
WALES -.27 (-97Ù) .53 P. 18)
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT -.24 (4.32)
Restricted Log-Likelihood 2941.25
Unrestricted Log-Likelihood 1513.59
McFadden R-Squared .49
n 2451
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Table A5.2: Wage Equation with a full set of YTS interaction dummy variables and corrected for 
sample selection bias (MODEL 5.60).The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly wages.
(t-ratios in brackets)
NON-YTS YTS PARTICIPATION
PARTICIPANTS DUMMIES
(i.e. the difference in the
parameters for YTS participants)
INTERCEPT -1.08 (-2.06) 1.15 (1.67)
INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
DISABILITY -.06 (-1.26) .04 (.43)
BLACK .06 (1.15) .07 (.69)
FEMALE .35 (8.22) -.00 (-.13)
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
WORK EXPERIENCE AT SCHOOL -.00 (-.16) .03 (1.34)
SERIOUS TRUANT .06 (2.47) -.02 (-.59)
OCCASIONAL TRUANT .03 (1.70) -.03 (-1.31)
LogflLEA SCORE) .00 (.58) .03 (2.04)
FAMILY BACKGROUND
NON-MANUAL FATHER .04 (2.23) -.07 (-2.21)
LABOUR MARKET
Log(ADULT WEEKLY WAGE-RATE) .96 (10.37) -.23 (-1.66)
EXPERIENCE 1984-86
EMPLOYED SEPTEMBER 1984 .07 (.93) -.03 (.57)
Log(DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT(months)) .01 (.17) .01 (.54)
Log(DURATION OF FURTHER EDUCATION(months)) .02 (.58) .02 (.88)
EMPLOYMENT CORRECTION TERM -.01 (-09)
YTS CORRECTION TERM -.05 (-.93)
Adjusted R-Squared .14
n 1943
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis I have looked at various aspects of young people's experience in and out of the 
labour market in the mid 1980's in England & Wales. The primary foci of interest were: factors 
influencing the school-leaving decision at sixteen; the impact of YTS participation on employment 
prospects; and, the effect of YTS on the wages and reservation wages of participants.
Chapter one provided an introduction to the evolution of the trends in the situation facing 
teenagers in the seventies and eighties. A brief review of explanations of youth unemployment 
concentrating on the relative importance of aggregate demand and youth wages was followed by a 
consideration of the policy response.
In chapter two, the principal data source, YCS was introduced and some issues surrounding 
its use were considered. The chapter also provided an opportunity to look at little closer at the 
experiences of young people in the period under consideration.
Chapter three considered factors influencing the school-leaving decision of sixteen year olds. 
The chapter provides a contribution, I hope, at both the theoretical and empirical levels. A fairly 
extensive consideration of previous studies of the question, and in particular a critical review of the 
seminal paper in the economic analysis of school-leaving by Willis & Rosen was followed by an 
empirical analysis. In both the literature review and the empirical results, grounds for criticism of the 
traditional human capital approach were found. The crucial difficulty with such models regards the 
typical assumption concerning the formation of expectations. In order to arrive at an estimable 
model, and without any direct evidence on expectations, one requires an assumption on the 
relationship between expectations and observed variables. The most usual approach has been to 
include, when available, an estimate of actual lifetime earnings to represent expectations. The 
problem with such an approach is that hypotheses concerning the adequacy of this proxy cannot be 
tested independently of hypotheses concerning the influence of expectations. The poor results 
produced by such models, therefore, may be attributed to two potential sources. Failure of the proxy 
to adequately measure expectations, and/or failure of the theoretical model to explain individual 
behaviour.
The results of chapter five might be brought into play at this point. It was shown there that 
the wage "expectations" of the unemployed who didn't participate on YTS were statistically different 
from the systematic component of the earnings of the employed. Thus, there is some evidence that 
actual earnings differ from "expected" earnings even early in ones "working" life. How much greater 
would one expect such a disparity to be when one considers "expected" earnings over a lifetime ?
The introduction of considerations regarding the introduction of unemployment and 
unemployment expectations into structural school-leaving models complicates things further. The 
approach of Kodde (1988) suggests a means of resolving these problems. That is, by way of a direct 
question concerning expectations. This simplifies things considerably since the model no longer 
requires the simultaneous determination of earnings, employment and school-leaving. Kodde's 
analysis remains somewhat ambiguous, however, in as much as the question asked of people did not 
explicitly make reference to lifetime earnings or employment prospects. One cannot therefore 
explicitly consider the issue of what exactly the expectations refer to. However, the analysis supports 
the idea that both unemployment and wage expectations have a role to play in the decision.
In the discussion of modelling issues, attention was also paid to the implications of 
introducing the role of government intervention in the youth labour market, and, in particular, the 
role of YTS in the decision. It was argued that the introduction of YTS was likely to alter the nature 
of the choice, ceteris paribus, raising the opportunity cost of staying-on in school. The picture is 
slightly complicated by the existence of displacement effects of YTS. That is, since, to some extent, 
YTS places replaced jobs which would have existed in any case, the considerations need to be 
slightly modified. In the case of displacement, YTS would actually lower the (short-run) opportunity 
costs of staying on in school, since, YTS positions provided a lower level of remuneration than 
"real" jobs.
In the absence of fuller information which might act as a basis for a structural model, the 
empirical section of the chapter reports the results of estimating a reduced form model of the choice. 
The principal innovation concerning the econometric estimation regarded the introduction of terms 
to test and control for the presence of heteroscedasticity in the estimates. Since, in the probit model, 
heteroscedastic errors affect the parameter estimates as well as their estimated standard errors, a 
treatment of the problem is important. The existence of standard options available in commercially
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available packages (e.g. LIMDEP 6.0) to deal with the problem, at least in the case of the univariate 
model, mean that ignoring heteroscedasticity cannot be justified. In the event, the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity was rejected and consequently results for the heteroscedastic model were reported. 
It might be observed, however, that controlling for heteroscedasticity does not greatly change the 
size of the estimated effects of the explanatory variables.
Aggregate labour market variables (adult unemployment, youth unemployment and the ratio 
of adult non-manual to manual wages) were introduced to take some account of expectations, but 
clearly these do no adequately control for individual differences. The three variables were jointly 
significant and all have the expected signs, however, they were almost never individually significant. 
This suggests that, whilst expectations had some role to play, the poor quality of the variables 
employed to measure them, did not allow identification of the relative importance of these effects.
As regards other factors influencing the choice, the principal results of note reported in the 
chapter regard the role of social class in individuals' decisions. This role is substantial and statistically 
significant even controlling for ability and labour market variables. In the preferred model (model 5, 
table 3.3), having a professional father was found to raise the probability of staying on at school by 
17 percentage points; having a father engaged in another non-manual occupation raised this 
probability by 12 percentage points, a non-manual mother implied an 8 percentage point increase; 
whilst, living in owner occupied accommodation increased the probability by 9 percentage points. 
Comparison with previous studies which analysed the decision during periods of relatively low 
u n e m p lo y m e n t suggested that the effect of social class has remained fairly constant in time. This was 
interpreted as additional evidence that class outweighs worsening labour market conditions in young 
people's choice. It was also suggested that the influence was too strong to be given a time-rate of 
preference interpretation. That is, it was suggested that familial background may play a role in the 
decision affecting both consumption and investment demand for education. Thus, social class is seen 
as affecting tastes for further education, but also as influencing the ability of young people to realise 
the potential gains from education. This contrasts strongly with the emphasis of papers from the 
human capital school (e.g. W&R) which consider familial background as having an influence on the 
decision entirely through its affect on the discount rate.
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In chapter four, the impact of YTS on employment prospects was considered. Much 
attention was paid to modelling issues. In particular, it was suggested that the sample selection 
problem, often found to be present and influential in the determination of the effects of government 
programmes on wages, needs to be dealt with in the context of the analysis of the employment 
effects of YTS. After demonstrating that the Heckman correction procedure is not appropriate in the 
case of a non-linear probability model, the use of the bivariate probit model is proposed as a solution 
to the problem. Sample selection is found to be present and influential on the estimates obtained. 
This suggests that previous studies which do not deal with this issue may have estimated 
misspecified models.
In addition, some attention was paid to the identification of the differential impact of YTS on 
different types of individual. For this purpose, the chapter proposed an extension of the selected 
bivariate probit model of Van Praag & Van de Ven. The extension, which I call a switching bivariate 
probit model allows the explicit modelling of differential effects of YTS participation across different 
types of individual. Formal comparisons of the various models suggest that, in this case, the 
switching bivariate model is to be preferred.
Finally, at all stages of the modelling procedure attention was paid to the effects of 
heteroscedasticity on the estimates. In the case of the univariate model, the standard procedure 
employed in chapter three was adopted. For the bivariate and switching bivariate models a simple 
extension of the procedure is proposed and implemented. In all cases, heteroscedastic errors are 
found to be present.
In common with previous studies, it is found that participation on the scheme had, on 
average, a positive and statistically significant influence on the probability of finding employment. 
Using the univariate probit model, the estimated effect is of the same order as that found by Main & 
Shelley in Scotland and Whitfield and Bourlakis in England & Wales. It is also found that 
participation on the scheme did not remotely compensate for an initial lack of initial employment 
experience. That is, the scheme did not compensate young people for an initial failure to find 
employment. When the preferred switching bivariate probit model is estimated, this effect of YTS is 
found to be greater than that estimated by previous authors using the univariate probit model. On the 
other hand, the effect varies substantially across individuals. It is found that, in particular, ethnic
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minorities and disabled people gained little or nothing from participation on the scheme, in terms of 
improved chances of finding work, and, therefore their relative disadvantage in the labour market 
was increased rather than reduced by participation on the scheme. On the other hand, female* and 
truants seemed to do particularly well out of the scheme.
In chapter five, the analysis turns to the question of YTS and wages. This issue of the impact 
that participation on YTS had on the earnings of participants is of interest in itself but also helps to 
provide some insights into the mechanisms through which the effect of YTS on the probability of 
employment was operating. The introduction a simple job search model of employment 
.determination, allows the identification of at least four possible mechanisms These are identified as: 
the "human capital" effect - by increasing the level of human capital, the scheme might have raised 
participants' earnings potential and, consequently earnings in employment, the "direct reservation 
wage" or "preference formation" effect - by altering participants' relative preference for work as 
opposed to "leisure", the scheme may have reduced the reservation wage of participants; the 
"erroneous expectations" effect > by providing more and better information on the distribution of 
wage offers available in the labour market, the scheme may have allowed participants to form a more 
realistic (i.e. lower) estimate of the wage they might expect to receive given their individual 
characteristics; and, finally, the "job offer" effect - participation on the scheme may have raised the 
likelihood that a young person actually received an offer of a job. The presence of .these different 
effects has implications for the estimation of the impact of YTS on the earnings of participants, and, 
on the interpretation of the positive employment probability effect of the scheme found in chapter 
four.
It was shown that, in the absence of controls for sample selection (truncation) bias, the 
measured effect of YTS on the realised earnings of those in employment will measure, not the effect 
of YTS on human capital, but rather a combination of all four of these effects. Introduction of 
controls for non-random employment determination in a wage equation for those in employment 
allows the identification of the "human capital" effect which proves to be zero. On the other hand, 
the separate estimation of wage equations for YTS participants and non-participants respectively 
provides some tentative evidence that, whilst YTS was pushing young people into lower paid
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occupations, within those occupations, participants were able to gain a wage premium through 
human capital accumulation. The net effect being nil.
It is suggested that the "expected" wages of young people are likely to depend on both their 
earnings potential and on errors in the formation of these expectations. The combined estimation of 
the expected wages of the unemployed with the wages of the employed suggests that, for non-YTS 
participants, the "expected" wages of the unemployed are statistically distinguishable form the 
realised earnings of the employed whilst those of YTS participants are not. This suggests that the 
erroneous formation of expectations was present for non-YTS participants, with these errors being, 
to some extent corrected by YTS participation. Thus, there is some support for the idea that YTS 
did indeed have the effect of making participants wage expectations "more realistic"
The estimation of the effect of YTS on reservation wages was less conclusive. Three effects 
working through the reservation wage were identified in the theoretical part of the chapter. Through 
its influence on preference formation and in correcting errors in wage "expectations", YTS 
participation was likely to reduce the reservation wage, whilst any increase in the likelihood of 
receiving a job offer arising from participation on the scheme would tend to raise it. Unfortunately, it 
is not possible, in this framework to separately identify these three effects The static labour supply 
model produces a negative and statistically significant effect of YTS participation even in the 
presence of controls for sample selection bias whereas the job search motivated estimates do not. 
Separate estimation of reservation wages for YTS participants and non-participants provides some 
slight evidence (statistically significant at a 5% significance level) that the reservation wages of 
participants was statistically distinguishable from those of non-participants.
As regards the probability of finding a job, it is shown that this will depend on both the 
difference between the (mathematical) expected values of the wage offer and the reservation wage, 
as well as on the probability of receiving an offer. Since the reservation wage depends also on the 
subjective expectations of individuals on the wage offer distribution, as well as on the probability of 
receiving an offer, all four effects are present in the employment determination equation. Taken as a 
whole, evidence was presented that the reduction of the "expected" and reservation wages of 
participants as well as the increase in the chances of receiving a job offer all have a role to play in 
determining the positive influence of YTS on employment probability.
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To summarise, the findings of the chapter are that, firstly, YTS reduced the realised wages of 
participants who subsequently found employment. This reduction is attributable to changes in the 
expected and reservation wages of participants, as well as to an increase in the chances of receiving a 
job offer. Once controls for these factors are introduced, the negative effect of YTS disappears. At 
the same time, YTS had no appreciable effect on earnings through an increase in the level of human 
capita] of participants. Some evidence was found that YTS participation had a depressing effect on 
the reservation and expected wages of participants, as well as raising the chances of being offered a 
job. It is suggested that all of these factors had a role to play in explaining the enhanced 
"employment prospects" of participants. Although, separate identification of the importance of these 
effects was not possible. Further analyses with more recent and better data might take up the issue of 
reconciling the findings of chapters four and five, as well as updating the findings presented here.
What then did YTS achieve ? To return to the aims of policy-makers identified in chapter 
one, it was suggest that YTS was, amongst other things, intended: to provide an effective transition 
from school to employment (Atkinson and Lawson, both quoted on p. 19); to increase the levels of 
participants' general human capital (HC papers, quoted on p. 19); to make young people's pay 
expectations more realistic (Lawson, p. 19); and, to provide work socialisation (Morrison, quoted on 
p. 21).
As regards the first of these, the issue was analysed in some detail in chapter four. It was 
found that, as a whole, YTS participation did increase, to some extent, the probability of finding 
employment, raising the probability of being in employment two years after reaching minimum 
school-leaving age by 21 percentage points for an average individual. On the other hand, two types 
of young person with disadvantages (the disabled and ethnic minorities) did not gain any statistically 
significant increase in the probability of finding work, suggesting that the scheme had the effect of 
widening gaps in opportunities for these groups. Furthermore, YTS participation did not, by any 
means, compensate young people for an initial lack of employment experience. Thus, at best, the 
effective transition was only partially achieved.
The analysis of chapter five suggests that the second aim was not achieved. Or, at least, that 
any increase in the level of human capital accruing to participants was not translated into an increase 
in their earnings. The analysis of chapter five also suggests that YTS participation did indeed lower
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young people's wage expectations, rendering them "more realistic". There is also some support for 
the work socialisation role of YTS. It was suggested that through work socialisation YTS might 
have a direct negative effect on young people's reservation wages (i.e. the preference formation 
effect) although, in the results presented in the chapter it was not possible to disentangle the direct 
effect from the indirect effect working through wage "expectations".
The aims of YTS considered here form only a part of what policy-makers intended to 
achieve. Although the type of analysis presented in this thesis does not allow direct consideration of 
the wider issues, in conclusion, it might just be mentioned that, there has not been any appreciable 
reduction in unemployment as a result of widespread state intervention with micro-level policies 
Unemployment is still hovering at around three million. On the other hand, the Conservative Party 
has won three consecutive general elections with unemployment at this level. Thus, if micro-level 
schemes have done little to reduce unemployment, it would appear that they may have helped in the 
political management of the problem.
APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
I present here full definitions of the variables employed in the analyses above, and references to the 
chapters in which they appear. The reference to the source of variables from the YCS provides 
information on the sweep in which they were asked and the number of the question on the 
questionnaire or, if they were obtained independently of the individual from the school records 
employed to identify potential respondents, this is stated. Thus, ClSl/P3Q2a means that the variable 
was derived from question 2a on page 3 of the questionnaire for sweep one and so on.
Variable Definition Source Chapti
STAY ON -1 if the young person replied that they were full-time at school or 
college at the time of the first sweep
C1S1/P4Q3 3
DISABILITY =1 if yes to the question: Do you have a disability or handicap 
which would affect the type of work you could do or the sort of 
conditions vou could work in ?
C1S2/P13Q4 3,4,5
BLACK =1 if the person replied that they were of: a) 
Black/African/Caribbean; b) Indian; c) Pakistani; or, d) 
Bangladeshi origin. The alternatives (=0) were: White; None of 
these; or, I prefer not to say.
C1S2/P13Q6 3, 4,5
GIRL =1 if the person was female School Records 3, 4,5
PART-TIME JOB =1 if yes to the question: "Did you do any of the following in the 
4th or 5th yean at school ? Please tick either 'yes' or 'no* for 
each one" under the reply: "a part time job e.g. a paper round or 
Saturday job".
C1S1/P1Q2 3,4
WORK
EXPERIENCE
-1 if yes to the question: "Did you do any of the following in the 
4th or 5th years at school ? Please tick either 'yes' or 'no' for 
each one" under the reply: "a period of work experience (an unpaid 
job arranged throueh school for a short time)".
C1S1/P1Q2 3,4
SERIOUS TRUANT =1 if replied: "for weeks at a time", or, "for several days at a time", 
to the question: "Did you play truant in your 5th year at school ?"
C1S1/P1Q3 3,4,5
OCCASIONAL
TRUANT
=1 if replied: "for particular days or lessons", or, "for the odd day 
or lesson", to the question: "Did you play truant in your 5th year at 
school T
C1S1/P1Q3 3, 4,5
SIXTH FORM 
COLLEGE, 
GRAMMAR, 
COMPREHENSIVE 
(SIXTH FORM)
School type. Alternatives were: comprehensive to sixteen, 
secondary modem, and other.
School Records 3
ADVISED TO STAY 
BY FAMILY
=1 if ticked the box corresponding to,: "advised me to stay on", 
under the category, "family", to the question: When you were about 
16 and thinking whether to stay on at school or to leave, did any of 
these people advise vou to stav on in full time education, and did 
any of them advise you to leave ? (there was also the possibility to 
reolv. "No advice erven").
C1S1/P3Q2 3
ADVISED TO STAY 
BY TEACHER
=1 if ticked the box corresponding to,: "advised me to stay on”, 
under the category, "another teacher at school’ , to the question: 
When you were about 16 and thinking whether to stay on at school 
or to leave, did anv of these people advise vou to stav on in full time 
education, and did any of them advise you to leave ? (there was also 
the possibility to reply, "No advice given").
C1S1/P3Q2 3
ADVISED TO STAY 
BY CAREERS 
SERVICE
-1 if ticked the box corresponding to,: "advised me to stay on”, 
under the category, “someone from the Careers Service” , to the 
question: When you were about 16 and thinking whether to stay on 
at school or to leave, did anv of these oeoole advise vou to stav on 
in full time education, and did any of them advise you to leave ? 
(there was also the possibility to reply, "No advice given").
C1S1/P3Q2 3
ILEA SCORE Integer Index representing the respondents' grade score calculated 
as follows:
•O'level A B C D E 
16+ A B C 2 3 4 5  
CSE 1 2 3 4 5
School Records 3,4,5
SCORE 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
SIZE OF FAMILY 1 + number of brothers and/or sisters reported by respondent C1S1/P1101 3
DAD
PROFESSIONAL
This and the following five variables were derived from the 
question: "Please tell us about your parents' (or step parents') jobs. 
If they are not working at the moment please tell us about their 
most recent jobs. The replies elicited for father and mother 
separately were: a) What is the name of the job ? b) What kind of 
work do they do ? c) what sort of place or organisation do they 
work for (e.g. shop, factory, office, hospital, school etc.) ; d) are 
they self-employed ?.
C1S1/P11Q4 3
DAD OTHER NON- 
MANUAL
See above C1S1/P11Q4 3
DAD NON- 
MANUAL
See above C1S1/P11Q4 5
DAD SELF- 
EMPLOYED
See above C1S1/P11Q4 3,4
MUM NON- 
MANUAL
See above C1S1/P11Q4 3,4,5
MUM SELF- 
EMPLOYED
See above C1S1/P11Q4 3
DAD IN FULL-TIME 
JOB
This and the following two variables derived from the question: 
Which of the following apply to your parents (or step parents) to 
which replies were elicited separately for father and mother, the 
possible replies being: a) "in a full-time job"; b) "in a part-time 
job"; c) "unemployed"; d) "retired"; e) "doing full-time housework" 
; and f) "something else (please describe)".
C1S1/P11Q3 4,5
DAD IN PART-TIME 
JOB
See above C1S1/P11Q3 4,5
DAD
UNEMPLOYED
See above C1S1/P11Q3 3,4,5
OWNER OCCUPIER *=1 if replied "Owner occupied" to the question: Is the home you 
live in at the moment: a) "Rented from the Council"; b) "Rented 
privately”; c) "Owner occupied"; d) "Something else (please write 
in".
C1S1/P11Q5 3,4,5
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EMPLOYED IN 
SEPTEMBER 1984
Derived from the diaiy question for September 1984, reply d). At 
the time of the first and second sweeps respondents were asked 
what they were doing in each month over the period September 
1984-May 1985 (sweep 1) and May 1985-February 1986 (sweep 2). 
The possible categories were: a) out of work and registered at the 
Unemployment Benefit Office; b) out of work but not registered; c) 
on YTS; d) in a full-time job (over 30 hours a week); e) at school or 
sixth form college full-time; f) full-time at a College of Further 
Education; g) something else.
C1S1/P4Q1 4
YTS Derived from the diary question from the two sweeps (see above). 
Includes all those replying at least once to category c).
C1S1/P4Q1
C1S2/P1Q2
4,5
FURTHER
EDUCATION
Derived from the diaiy question from the two sweeps (see above). 
Includes all those replying at least once to categories e) and/or f).
C1S1/P4Q1
C1S2/P1Q2
4
DURATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT
Derived from the diaiy question from the two sweeps (see above). = 
sum of the replies in category d).
C1S1/P4Q1
C1S2/P1Q2
5
DURATION OF
FURTHER
EDUCATION
Derived from the diary question from the two sweeps (see above). = 
sum of the replies in category e) and/or f).
C1S1/P4Q1
C1S2/P1Q2
5
DURATION OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT
Derived from the diary’ question from the two sweeps (see above). = 
sum of the replies in categories a) and/or b).
C1S1/P4Q1
C1S2/P1Q2
5
FULL-TIME
EMPLOYMENT
1986
=1 if replied "in a full-time job (over 30 hours a week)" to the 
question asking what they were doing at the time of the second 
Rweep.
C1S2/P1Q2 4,5
WAGE Reolv to the auestion: What is vour weeklv take-home oav after anv 
stoppages but including bonuses or overtime ?
ClS2/P4Q3a 5
EXPECTED WAGE Reply to the question: How much weekly take-home pay do you 
expect to earn in your next job ?
ClS2/P2Q4a 5
RESERVATION
WAGE
Reply to the question: What is the lowest take-home pay you would 
consider [in your next job] ?
ClS2/P2Q4b 5
HOURS WORKED Reply to question: How many hours do you usually work each week
?
ClS2/P4Q3b 5
JOB CHANGED =1 if reolied two or more to the auestion: Since Aueust 1985 how 
many different employers have you worked for ? Please do not 
include YTS; but if you have been self-employed please tell us 
about that
ClS2/P4Qla 5
NON-MANUAL JOB =1 if the job non-manual derived from the social class classification 
of thejob
ClS2/p4Q2 5
SELF-EMPLOYED -1 if gave the second answer to the question: Are you an employee 
or are you self-employed ?
ClS2/P4Q2b 5 '
APPRENTICESHIP =1 if gave affirmative response to the question: Are you doing a 
recognised apprenticeship ?
ClS2/P4Q2d 5
ON-THE-JOB
TRAINING
=1 if replied yes to the question: Do you get any training or 
instruction in vour job either at work or somewhere else ?
ClS2/P5Q4a 5
LONG ON-THE-JOB 
TRAINING
=1 if replied, "longer than one month” to the question: How long 
do you expect training to last ?
ClS2/P5Q4b 5
JOB SUPERVISORY =1 if replied yes to the question: Do you supervise other people or 
are you responsible for other people's work ?
ClS2/P4Q2e 5
LARGE FIRM -1 if the replied "twenty-five or more" to the question: Including 
yourself, how many people work at the place where you work ?
ClS2/P4Q2g 5
TEMPORARY JOB =1 if replied "the job is temporary to the question: Have you been 
taken on permanently or is the job temporary ?
C1S2/P4Q3C 5
INDUSTRY Standard Industrial Classification of the job ClS2/P4Q2f 5
LONDON Standard Regional Classification School Records 4,5
SOUTH EAST Standard Regional Classification School Records 4,5
NORTH AND 
MIDLANDS
Standard Regional Classification School Records 4,5
WALES Standard Regional Classification School Records 4,5
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YOUTH
UNEMPLOYMENT
Median uncompleted duration of unemployment spell by region and 
sex, April 1984.
Calculated 
from DE 
Published 
figures
3
ADULT
UNEMPLOYMENT
Annual average adult unemployment rate by region and sex 1984. DE Published 
figures
3
UNEMPLOYMENT
RATE
Annual average adult unemployment rate by region and sex 1986. DE Published 
figures
4
NON-
MANUAL/MANULA 
HOURLY WAGE 
RATE
Ratio of non-manual to manual gross hourly earnings subdivided by 
region and sex, 1984.
New Earnings 
Survey
3
ADULT WEEKLY 
WAGE-RATE
Average weekly wage-rate for all employees subdivided by region 
and sex. 1986.
New Earnings 
Survey
5
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